From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B0A7B13DB for ; Wed, 16 Sep 2015 17:53:21 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-vk0-f47.google.com (mail-vk0-f47.google.com [209.85.213.47]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 50885220 for ; Wed, 16 Sep 2015 17:53:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: by vkfp126 with SMTP id p126so106147168vkf.3 for ; Wed, 16 Sep 2015 10:53:20 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:cc :content-type; bh=VxX4yVZYxfzDRdaP5DUy7KrNd1Ea1r5Cm3x7Q4BNyiA=; b=SHZEfB4RFwr1+9XV8aDiBWQ8JWjosaLQXstI0jyRGSwP0xnl+arya7O1m1X7UxLFx+ PyL+Q/dv9Nr5UhIFlxbEHXlOdPoap+U6EPKHYlBRrDc+5sfDILyFPC4O0ERMzDCD3IVq oO+f4Td/CrG116tRBCsgtGfqF6QUs8MM00XFr0nZgPHHNNnt1gdToR43o35D/0g1+F0V IX3aQ/O++3oVOJC3VpX77seHwJ+JfVGh0gtL1fsBfzXhr0YrTZ0H3+byocvUlV8w8H9g Xbidy4VZFJ9Q5mTLKYhNgyXKjpyJOtXf7PYaLmesQDkCjr0dkKbaBPEDQDo6Oe9dgldk W3Bg== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.31.166.206 with SMTP id p197mr6216614vke.52.1442426000384; Wed, 16 Sep 2015 10:53:20 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.103.65.204 with HTTP; Wed, 16 Sep 2015 10:53:20 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <87mvwqb132.fsf@rustcorp.com.au> References: <87mvwqb132.fsf@rustcorp.com.au> Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2015 18:53:20 +0100 Message-ID: From: Tier Nolan Cc: Bitcoin Dev Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a1141664c5e2a81051fe0f9d9 X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.3 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, MALFORMED_FREEMAIL, MISSING_HEADERS,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [BIP Proposal] Version bits with timeout and delay. X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2015 17:53:21 -0000 --001a1141664c5e2a81051fe0f9d9 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Sun, Sep 13, 2015 at 7:56 PM, Rusty Russell via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > '''States''' > With every softfork proposal we associate a state BState, which begins > at ''defined'', and can be ''locked-in'', ''activated'', > or ''failed''. Transitions are considered after each > retarget period. > I think the 75% rule should be maintained. It confirms that miners who are setting the bit are actually creating blocks that meet the new rule (though it doesn't check if they are enforcing it). What is the reason for aligning the updated to the difficulty window? *defined* Miners set bit If 75% of blocks of last 2016 have bit set, goto tentative *tentative* Miners set bit Reject blocks that have bit set that don't follow new rule If 95% of blocks of last 2016 have bit set, goto locked-in *locked-in* Point of no return Miners still set bit Reject blocks that have bit set that don't follow new rule After 2016 blocks goto notice *activated* Miners don't set bit for at least 10080 blocks Reject blocks that don't follow new rule '''Failure: Timeout''' > A soft fork proposal should include a ''timeout''. > I think counting in blocks is easier to be exact here. If two bits were allocated per proposal, then miners could vote against forks to recover the bits. If 25% of the miners vote against, then that kills it. In the rationale, it would be useful to discuss effects on SPV clients and buggy miners. SPV clients should be recommended to actually monitor the version field. --001a1141664c5e2a81051fe0f9d9 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


On Sun, Sep 13, 2015 at 7:56 PM, Rusty Russell via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
'''States'''
With every softfork proposal we associate a state BState, which begins
at ''defined'', and can be ''locked-in'', &= #39;'activated'',
or ''failed''.=C2=A0 Transitions are considered after each<= br> retarget period.

I think the 75% rule s= hould be maintained.=C2=A0 It confirms that miners who are setting the bit = are actually creating blocks that meet the new rule (though it doesn't = check if they are enforcing it).

What is the reason for a= ligning the updated to the difficulty window?

= defined

Miners set bit
If 75% of blocks of last= 2016 have bit set, goto tentative

tentative

Miners set bit
Reject blocks that have bit set that don't follow n= ew rule
If 95% of blocks of last 2016 have bit set, goto locked-in

locked-in

Point of no return
Miners still set bit
Reject block= s that have bit set that don't follow new rule
After 2016 blocks goto notice

activated
<= /div>

Miners don't set bit for at least 10080 blocks=
Reject blocks that don't follow new rule

'''Failure: Timeout'''
A soft fork proposal should include a ''timeout''.=C2=A0

I think counting in blocks is easier to = be exact here.

If two bits were allocated per proposal, t= hen miners could vote against forks to recover the bits.=C2=A0 If 25% of th= e miners vote against, then that kills it.

In the rationa= le, it would be useful to discuss effects on SPV clients and buggy miners.<= br>
SPV clients should be recommended to actually monitor the= version field.
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