[bitcoin-dev] Economic majority vote by splitting coins

[bitcoin-dev] Economic majority vote by splitting coins

[Tier Nolan]

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The economic majority is defined as the will of those who actually use
Bitcoin as a payment system.

No matter what the miners want, if users and merchants refuse to accept
their fork, then the fork loses and cannot be considered the "true" bitcoin
fork.

The problem is that it is easy to measure a miner vote.  The economic
majority is not so easy.

The relative value of two forks could be compared by adding a system
similar colored coins.

These contracts could be added with a soft fork like the P2SH one.

OP_IF
    <fork_id1> <fork_id2> OP_DROP OP_DROP OP_HASH160 <hash script 1>
OP_EQUAL
OP_ENDIF
OP_IF
     <fork_id3> OP_DROP OP_HASH160 <hash script 2> OP_EQUAL
OP_ENDIF

This works like P2SH and is template matching.  You can have as many
entries as you want.

In the example, the output can be spent on fork 1 and fork 2 by the owner
of <hash script 1> and can be spent on fork 3 by the owner of <hash script
2>.

Until the deadline, the value on each fork must be preserved when spending
the output.  If you provide the key(s), you are allowed to consolidate
entries.  You can also consolidate multiple outputs to the same key even if
you don't have the key.

This means that split outputs are a little more hassle to use and the
transactions are larger.  This doesn't matter much, since measuring the
relative value of the two sub-coins only requires some of them to be traded.

If someone wants to propose a hard fork, they create a new fork id and
deadline and release software that implements the hard fork at the given
deadline (no miner vote needed).

To prevent spam, there could be a cost to create a fork-id (BTC paid to
OP_RETURN) and the deadline could have a max time in the future (say 2
years).

After the deadline, core will allow conversion of outputs that pay to the
core fork-id (probably 1) to be converted into unencumbered outputs by the
person with the core-id script.  Likewise, the fork software will allow
outputs that pay to the fork id to be converted.  Legacy bitcoin that
haven't been "split" will be spendable on both sides equally.

This means that users can convert x legacy bitcoin into x fork-bitcoins and
x core-bitcoins in advance of the fork.

This means that Exchanges could support trading between the two.  The side
that trades with the most value is the one that is supported by the
economic majority.

As it becomes clear which side is going to win, the price of coins on the
losing side should drop.  It is unlikely that the two would stay at exactly
the same value without one side winning.

Users who want to to use the losing rules are free to do so but the
economic majority will have made its decision.

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Re: [bitcoin-dev] Economic majority vote by splitting coins

[odinn]

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That's interesting.  But in all honesty I don't see most users being
able to pull off what you are describing.  If people don't want XT it
isn't going to get used. If they are convinced that it is needed its
use will grow but they won't realize how bad they will be misled until
later, at which point it will be...

.. Too Late

On 08/20/2015 04:16 AM, Tier Nolan via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> The economic majority is defined as the will of those who actually
> use Bitcoin as a payment system.
> 
> No matter what the miners want, if users and merchants refuse to
> accept their fork, then the fork loses and cannot be considered the
> "true" bitcoin fork.
> 
> The problem is that it is easy to measure a miner vote.  The
> economic majority is not so easy.
> 
> The relative value of two forks could be compared by adding a
> system similar colored coins.
> 
> These contracts could be added with a soft fork like the P2SH one.
> 
> OP_IF <fork_id1> <fork_id2> OP_DROP OP_DROP OP_HASH160 <hash script
> 1> OP_EQUAL OP_ENDIF OP_IF <fork_id3> OP_DROP OP_HASH160 <hash
> script 2> OP_EQUAL OP_ENDIF
> 
> This works like P2SH and is template matching.  You can have as
> many entries as you want.
> 
> In the example, the output can be spent on fork 1 and fork 2 by
> the owner of <hash script 1> and can be spent on fork 3 by the
> owner of <hash script 2>.
> 
> Until the deadline, the value on each fork must be preserved when 
> spending the output.  If you provide the key(s), you are allowed
> to consolidate entries.  You can also consolidate multiple outputs
> to the same key even if you don't have the key.
> 
> This means that split outputs are a little more hassle to use and
> the transactions are larger.  This doesn't matter much, since
> measuring the relative value of the two sub-coins only requires
> some of them to be traded.
> 
> If someone wants to propose a hard fork, they create a new fork id
> and deadline and release software that implements the hard fork at
> the given deadline (no miner vote needed).
> 
> To prevent spam, there could be a cost to create a fork-id (BTC
> paid to OP_RETURN) and the deadline could have a max time in the
> future (say 2 years).
> 
> After the deadline, core will allow conversion of outputs that pay
> to the core fork-id (probably 1) to be converted into unencumbered
> outputs by the person with the core-id script.  Likewise, the fork
> software will allow outputs that pay to the fork id to be
> converted.  Legacy bitcoin that haven't been "split" will be
> spendable on both sides equally.
> 
> This means that users can convert x legacy bitcoin into x
> fork-bitcoins and x core-bitcoins in advance of the fork.
> 
> This means that Exchanges could support trading between the two.
> The side that trades with the most value is the one that is
> supported by the economic majority.
> 
> As it becomes clear which side is going to win, the price of coins
> on the losing side should drop.  It is unlikely that the two would
> stay at exactly the same value without one side winning.
> 
> Users who want to to use the losing rules are free to do so but
> the economic majority will have made its decision.
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing
> list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org 
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> 

- -- 
http://abis.io ~
"a protocol concept to enable decentralization
and expansion of a giving economy, and a new social good"
https://keybase.io/odinn
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Re: [bitcoin-dev] Economic majority vote by splitting coins

[Tier Nolan]

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On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 4:22 AM, odinn <odinn.cyberguerrilla@riseup.net>
wrote:

> That's interesting.  But in all honesty I don't see most users being
> able to pull off what you are describing.


The idea assumes that it is a BIP + soft fork.  This means that most
wallets would support/recognise the encumbered coins.

Even if only some wallets support it, you can still move your coins
around.  Only the people who are trading between XT and Core would need to
have wallets that support it.

If you consolidate x BTC-Core and x BTC-XT into a single output, then you
can convert it back to a normal output.


> If they are convinced that it is needed its

> use will grow but they won't realize how bad they will be misled until
> later, at which point it will be...
>
> .. Too Late
>

That is the point, this gives a sneak preview.  At minimum, it shows which
choice will give the highest BTC value.

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