From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-4.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Yxxyf-00019b-7N for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 28 May 2015 13:36:05 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.220.181 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.220.181; envelope-from=tier.nolan@gmail.com; helo=mail-qk0-f181.google.com; Received: from mail-qk0-f181.google.com ([209.85.220.181]) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Yxxyd-0002Dg-G5 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 28 May 2015 13:36:05 +0000 Received: by qkx62 with SMTP id 62so25649024qkx.3 for ; Thu, 28 May 2015 06:35:58 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.140.202.130 with SMTP id x124mr3354514qha.9.1432820157973; Thu, 28 May 2015 06:35:57 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.140.85.241 with HTTP; Thu, 28 May 2015 06:35:57 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <20150528120434.GA31349@savin.petertodd.org> References: <20150528120434.GA31349@savin.petertodd.org> Date: Thu, 28 May 2015 14:35:57 +0100 Message-ID: From: Tier Nolan Cc: Bitcoin Development Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11432f148b15050517247058 X-Spam-Score: 3.3 (+++) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (tier.nolan[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.2 MISSING_HEADERS Missing To: header 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature 2.7 MALFORMED_FREEMAIL Bad headers on message from free email service X-Headers-End: 1Yxxyd-0002Dg-G5 Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Consensus-enforced transaction replacement via sequence numbers X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 28 May 2015 13:36:05 -0000 --001a11432f148b15050517247058 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Thu, May 28, 2015 at 1:04 PM, Peter Todd wrote: > For that matter, we probably don't want to treat this as a *version* > change, but rather a *feature* flag. I think it is still a version change. At the moment, the 4 bytes refer to the sequence number and afterwards they mean something else. For relative locktime verify, I think most use cases could be block count based and don't need to be able to count very high. I think the main benefit is that protocols can have one party trigger a step while giving the other party guaranteed time to respond. *Fast Channel Close* This assumes that malleability is fixed. Alice creates TXA: output (x) to [multisig A1 & B1] Refund: input TXA (signed by Alice) Output [(A2 & relative_check_locktime(150)) OR (multisig A3 & B2)] Alice sends Refund to Bob Bob signs it and sends it back to Alice Alice verifies the signature, adds her own and sends it to Bob. She broadcasts TXA (would wait until Bob confirms acceptance). This means that both Alice and Bob have the refund transaction and can use it to close the channel (assuming TXA is not mutated). Alice can send money to Bob by creating a transaction which spends the output of the refund transaction (splitting the output x-b for Alice and b for Bob), signing it and sending it to Bob. Alice can force Bob to close the channel by broadcasting the refund transaction. 150 blocks later, she gets the channel deposit if he doesn't act. If she had sent some money to Bob, he has 150 blocks to sign the transaction that pays him the most money and broadcast it. Alice gets the remainder of the deposit. Alice cannot broadcast earlier version, since Bob doesn't send her the signed versions. This means that the channel doesn't need a defined end date. Either party can close the channel whenever they want. TXA could be protected against malleability by adding a locktime path. This would only be for use if the transaction is mutated. --001a11432f148b15050517247058 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On T= hu, May 28, 2015 at 1:04 PM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:
For that matter, we probably don't want to treat this as a *vers= ion*
change, but rather a *feature* flag.

I thi= nk it is still a version change.=C2=A0 At the moment, the 4 bytes refer to = the sequence number and afterwards they mean something else.

<= div>For relative locktime verify, I think most use cases could be block cou= nt based and don't need to be able to count very high.=C2=A0

I think the main benefit is that protocols can have one party trig= ger a step while giving the other party guaranteed time to respond.

Fast Channel Close

This assumes that mal= leability is fixed.

Alice creates

TXA:
output (x) to [multisig A1 & B1]=

Refund:
input TXA (signed by A= lice)
Output [(A2 & relative_check_= locktime(150)) OR (multisig A3 &=C2=A0 B2)]

Alice sends Refund to Bob
=
Bob signs it and sends it back to Alic= e

Alice verifies the signature, add= s her own and sends it to Bob.

She = broadcasts TXA (would wait until Bob confirms acceptance).

This means that both Alice and Bob have the refund = transaction and can use it to close the channel (assuming TXA is not mutate= d).

Alice can send money to Bob by = creating a transaction which spends the output of the refund transaction (s= plitting the output x-b for Alice and b for Bob), signing it and sending it= to Bob.

Alice can force Bob to clo= se the channel by broadcasting the refund transaction.=C2=A0 150 blocks lat= er, she gets the channel deposit if he doesn't act.

If she had sent some money to Bob, he has 150 blocks t= o sign the transaction that pays him the most money and broadcast it.=C2=A0= Alice gets the remainder of the deposit.

Alice cannot broadcast earlier version, since Bob doesn't send h= er the signed versions.

This means = that the channel doesn't need a defined end date.=C2=A0 Either party ca= n close the channel whenever they want.

TXA could be protected against malleability by adding a locktime path.= =C2=A0 This would only be for use if the transaction is mutated.
<= /div>
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