From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A9C33B4C for ; Fri, 18 Dec 2015 09:44:37 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ig0-f179.google.com (mail-ig0-f179.google.com [209.85.213.179]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 174CD89 for ; Fri, 18 Dec 2015 09:44:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-ig0-f179.google.com with SMTP id m11so30131177igk.1 for ; Fri, 18 Dec 2015 01:44:37 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:cc :content-type; bh=3twv9sCirXl+haRjBX9EmfxEqJN3IU88OvP90pQ+XPo=; b=J03bBIsGltwCGDIEqPXVER92ArJgxtgnOK+1djTRSioqQ+pei00hJfEx8Cu3isz4f4 xGtZLBnSDAnhO0SAq5/++IPcbi/KYUdqvE26OtSXLHyxEN2L9hdBRN0cryEKPP1DpXXh fJ8YOADwm1QVi649G5Qf7lT6NITN+vTH2RM4eZH7QNi9qudpd8BkI7xdvcKfurok7Qxv nQw2BbN+X52rlB8/rOmIkSaYqG5WphN7cgCWyn6eTEn3hx43GFRoWNt54ZpnnBpR/xaa 2nSiM1WJDsZx87OYNrnFXQjRqY3s0hOcgmWR8S4gULiGt7+eQjTe4nJgiTG4v2QkTt6l TyyA== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.50.73.198 with SMTP id n6mr1791883igv.95.1450431876470; Fri, 18 Dec 2015 01:44:36 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.79.77.75 with HTTP; Fri, 18 Dec 2015 01:44:36 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: <20151217194407.GB1351@muck> References: <20151217194407.GB1351@muck> Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2015 09:44:36 +0000 Message-ID: From: Tier Nolan Cc: Bitcoin development mailing list Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e011839a6c4c08c052728fcaf X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.2 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, MALFORMED_FREEMAIL, MISSING_HEADERS,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size: It's economics & user preparation & moral hazard X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2015 09:44:37 -0000 --089e011839a6c4c08c052728fcaf Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Thu, Dec 17, 2015 at 7:44 PM, Peter Todd wrote: > If Bitcoin remains decentralized, miners have veto power over any > blocksize increases. You can always soft-fork in a blocksize reduction > in a decentralized blockchain that actually works. > The actual users of the system have significant power, if they (could) choose to use it. There are "chicken" effects though. They can impose costs on the other participants but using those options harms themselves. If the cost of inaction is greater than the costs of action, then the chicken effects go away. In the extreme, they could move away from decentralisation and the concept of miners and have a centralised checkpointing system. This would be a bankrupting cost to miners but at the cost to the users of the decentralised nature of the system. At a lower extreme, they could change the mining hash function. This would devalue all of the miner's investments. A whole new program of ASIC investments would have to happen and the new miners would be significantly different. It would also establish that merchants and users are not to be ignored. On the other hand, bankrupting miners would make it harder to convince new miners to make the actual investments in ASICs required to establish security. As a gesture, if merchants and exchanges wanted to get their "seat" at the table, they could create a representative group that insists on a trivial soft fork. For example, they could say that they will not accept any block from block N to block N + 5000 that doesn't have a specific bit set in the version. Miners have an advantage where they can say that they have the majority of the hashing power. As part of the public action problem that merchants face, there is no equivalent metric. --089e011839a6c4c08c052728fcaf Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On T= hu, Dec 17, 2015 at 7:44 PM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:
If Bitcoin re= mains decentralized, miners have veto power over any
blocksize increases. You can always soft-fork in a blocksize reduction
in a decentralized blockchain that actually works.

The a= ctual users of the system have significant power, if they (could) choose to use it.=C2=A0 There are "chicken" effects though.=C2=A0 They can= impose costs on the other participants but using those options harms thems= elves.=C2=A0 If the cost of inaction is greater than the costs of action, t= hen the chicken effects go away.

In= the extreme, they could move away from decentralisation and the concept of= miners and have a centralised checkpointing system.=C2=A0 This would be a = bankrupting cost to miners but at the cost to the users of the decentralise= d nature of the system.

At a lower = extreme, they could change the mining hash function.=C2=A0 This would deval= ue all of the miner's investments.=C2=A0 A whole new program of ASIC in= vestments would have to happen and the new miners would be significantly di= fferent.=C2=A0 It would also establish that merchants and users are not to = be ignored.=C2=A0 On the other hand, bankrupting miners would make it harde= r to convince new miners to make the actual investments in ASICs required t= o establish security.

As a gesture,= if merchants and exchanges wanted to get their "seat" at the tab= le, they could create a representative group that insists on a trivial soft= fork.=C2=A0 For example, they could say that they will not accept any bloc= k from block N to block N + 5000 that doesn't have a specific bit set i= n the version.

Miners have an advan= tage where they can say that they have the majority of the hashing power.= =C2=A0 As part of the public action problem that merchants face, there is n= o equivalent metric.
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