From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-4.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1YLuoj-0004YA-QS for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 12 Feb 2015 14:32:33 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 74.125.82.176 as permitted sender) client-ip=74.125.82.176; envelope-from=alex.mizrahi@gmail.com; helo=mail-we0-f176.google.com; Received: from mail-we0-f176.google.com ([74.125.82.176]) by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1YLuoi-0001x0-QL for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 12 Feb 2015 14:32:33 +0000 Received: by mail-we0-f176.google.com with SMTP id x3so10444061wes.7 for ; Thu, 12 Feb 2015 06:32:26 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.180.90.206 with SMTP id by14mr7028118wib.0.1423751546807; Thu, 12 Feb 2015 06:32:26 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.27.148.13 with HTTP; Thu, 12 Feb 2015 06:32:26 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: <20150212064719.GA6563@savin.petertodd.org> Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2015 16:32:26 +0200 Message-ID: From: Alex Mizrahi To: Bitcoin Dev Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=f46d043c80ec322dd3050ee4fd45 X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (alex.mizrahi[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1YLuoi-0001x0-QL Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] replace-by-fee v0.10.0rc4 X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2015 14:32:34 -0000 --f46d043c80ec322dd3050ee4fd45 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > "The approach" is how Bitcoin has always worked. > Mike, you're making "it worked before, and thus it will work in future" kind of an argument. It is an extremely shitty kind of an argument. And it can be used to justify any kind of bullshit. E.g. any scamcoin which haven't yet collapsed will work forever. As I mentioned, it depends on scale. Highly sophisticated attacks are only feasible when scale is sufficiently big. I.e. when you have millions of dollars transacted each day it is one thing, but if you process billions of dollars, it becomes a whole another matter. The best way to profit from zero-confirmation payment disruption is through derivatives: short-sell Bitcoin while performing this attack. But this kind of an attack depends on a number of conditions: 1. highly liquid and reliable derivative market 2. sufficiently stable exchange rate 3. significant attack impact: lots of merchants relying on zero-confirmation payments, and lots of customers paying this way 4. significant amounts of capital available to the attacker These conditions are not yet met, and were never met in the Bitcoin's history so far. This is why I wrote "5 years from now", I believe that we might reach those conditions around that time. Direct impact of an attack might actually be low (but even if it is just 0.1%, 0.1% of 1 billion is 10 million, which isn't bad), but attacker might profit from the panic it causes. Note that I'm talking about situation where Bitcoin-aware PoS solutions are deployed on a big scale, so cost of upgrade might be huge. So anyway, in my opinion, it is actually great that Bitcoin is still relatively small: we have an opportunity to analyze and improve things. But you seem to be hostile to people who do that (and who do not share your opinion), which is kinda uncool. Also, you do not bother to back your intuition with rigorous reasoning, while also attacking people who offer alternatives with non-rigorous slipper-slope kind of arguments. Which is doubly uncool. --f46d043c80ec322dd3050ee4fd45 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
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"The approach" is how Bitcoin has always worked.
=

Mike, you're making "= it worked before, and thus it will work in future" kind of an argument= .
It is an extremely shitty kind of an argument. And it can be us= ed to justify any kind of bullshit.
E.g. any scamcoin which haven= 't yet collapsed will work forever.

As I menti= oned, it depends on scale. Highly sophisticated attacks are only feasible w= hen scale is sufficiently big.
I.e. when you have millions of dol= lars transacted each day it is one thing, but if you process billions of do= llars, it becomes a whole another matter.

The best= way to profit from zero-confirmation payment disruption is through derivat= ives: short-sell Bitcoin while performing this attack. But this kind of an = attack depends on a number of conditions:

1. highl= y liquid and reliable derivative market
2. sufficiently stable ex= change rate
3. significant attack impact: lots of merchants relyi= ng on zero-confirmation payments, and lots of customers paying this way
4. significant amounts of capital available to the attacker

These conditions are not yet met, and were never met in th= e Bitcoin's history so far.
This is why I wrote "5 years= from now", I believe that we might reach those conditions around that= time.

Direct impact of an attack might actually b= e low (but even if it is just 0.1%, 0.1% of 1 billion is 10 million, which = isn't bad), but attacker might profit from the panic it causes.

Note that I'm talking about situation where Bitcoin-a= ware PoS solutions are deployed on a big scale, so cost of upgrade might be= huge.

So anyway, in my opinion, it is actually gr= eat that Bitcoin is still relatively small: we have an opportunity to analy= ze and improve things.
But you seem to be hostile to people who d= o that (and who do not share your opinion), which is kinda uncool.

Also, you do not bother to back your intuition with rigoro= us reasoning, while also attacking people who offer alternatives with non-r= igorous slipper-slope kind of arguments. Which is doubly uncool.
=
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