From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D47587AA for ; Tue, 18 Aug 2015 12:13:49 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ig0-f180.google.com (mail-ig0-f180.google.com [209.85.213.180]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3621819A for ; Tue, 18 Aug 2015 12:13:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: by igui7 with SMTP id i7so77976116igu.0 for ; Tue, 18 Aug 2015 05:13:48 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:date:message-id:subject:from:to :content-type; bh=q8vHawa9zkylTkYO17U8B9vdf4nB4dZF0vG4OeZAhEY=; b=N2A4id6dxnxO0Y83zMOCnphlYoPLQMDZxAXDHByc9l++c+YWwv32CnLWIFUjHOWL+Z uVL38NSTFf2x8ieT4J6/TgFA0qViByn8gZ68/iF10OBt2z1/jFuLOJSMukovFFQU7SFV 4RSdbTg4gT6HhzWj7gWt0MeH2g2ft8igGDfueYQ5agAqwfBLx/mtY0YuIEfoEiDalV7m e6GN0VlBxtjswKknOIFlnEK5ezLBP/QcAcIxyLvpQUomf7ACNjXAT01Hg04QnVPPIF9P /oOoVQ5KDCn8s/L7W78Zi3ZMnrSzIiFRbU4LlhV9LrpcAcxdzp/pX0nw7boV2djp0nQU v8aA== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQkCL4QHv/7WAOmlH2NQezI7Q8ohmBHSD/GpxEaOnQA1/mxAsupGkBYMOqkbIVAbDFkVwDyL MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.50.79.202 with SMTP id l10mr20670247igx.7.1439900028572; Tue, 18 Aug 2015 05:13:48 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.107.18.155 with HTTP; Tue, 18 Aug 2015 05:13:48 -0700 (PDT) X-Originating-IP: [203.171.245.240] Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2015 17:43:48 +0530 Message-ID: From: Upal Chakraborty To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0122aaeeb73789051d94d92d X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Dynamically Controlled Bitcoin Block Size Max Cap X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2015 12:13:49 -0000 --089e0122aaeeb73789051d94d92d Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Regarding: http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010295.html I am arguing with the following statement here... *I see problems to this approach. The biggest one I see is that a miner > with 11% of hash power could sabotage block size increases by only ever > mining empty blocks.* First, I would like to argue from economics' point of view. If someone wants to hold back the block size increase with 11% hash power by mining empty blocks, he has to sacrifice Tx fees, which is not economical. 11% hash power will most likely be a pool and pool miners will find out soon that they are losing Tx fees because of pool owner's intention. Hence, they'll switch pool and pool owner will lose out. This is the same reason why 51% attack will never happen, even if a pool gets more than 51% hash power. Next, I would like to propose a slightly modified technical solution to this problem in algorithmic format... If more than 50% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last difficulty period, is more than 90% MaxBlockSize Double MaxBlockSize Else if more than 90% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last difficulty period, is less than 50% MaxBlockSize Half MaxBlockSize Else Keep the same MaxBlockSize This is how, those who want to stop increase, need to have more than 50% hash power. Those who want to stop decrease, need to have more than 10% hash power, but must mine more than 50% of MaxBlockSize in all blocks. In this approach, not only miners, but also the end user have their say. Because, end users will fill up the mempool, from where miners will take Tx to fill up the blocks. Please note that, taking first 2000 of the last 2016 blocks is important to avoid data discrepancy among different nodes due to orphan blocks. It is assumed that a chain can not be orphaned after having 16 confirmation. Looking for comments. --089e0122aaeeb73789051d94d92d Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Regarding:=C2=A0http://lists.linuxfoundati= on.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010295.html


<= /div>
I am arguing with the following statement here...

<= /div>
I see problems to this approach. The biggest = one I see is that a miner with 11% of hash power could sabotage block size = increases by only ever mining empty blocks.

=

First, I would like to argue from economics' point = of view. If someone wants to hold back the block size increase with 11% has= h power by mining empty blocks, he has to sacrifice Tx fees, which is not e= conomical. 11% hash power will most likely be a pool and pool miners will f= ind out soon that they are losing Tx fees because of pool owner's inten= tion. Hence, they'll switch pool and pool owner will lose out. This is = the same reason why 51% attack will never happen, even if a pool gets more = than 51% hash power.


Ne= xt, I would like to propose a slightly modified technical solution to this = problem in algorithmic format...

If more than 50% = of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last difficulty period,= is more than 90% MaxBlockSize
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0= Double MaxBlockSize
Else if more than 90% of block's siz= e, found in the first 2000 of the last difficulty period, is less than 50% = MaxBlockSize
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Half MaxBlockSize<= /div>
Else
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Keep the s= ame MaxBlockSize

This is how, those who want to st= op increase, need to have more than 50% hash power. Those who want to stop = decrease, need to have more than 10% hash power, but must mine more than 50= % of MaxBlockSize in all blocks. In this approach, not only miners, but als= o the end user have their say. Because, end users will fill up the mempool,= from where miners will take Tx to fill up the blocks. Please note that, ta= king first 2000 of the last 2016 blocks is important to avoid data discrepa= ncy among different nodes due to orphan blocks. It is assumed that a chain = can not be orphaned after having 16 confirmation.

= Looking for comments.




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