From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1YQn9m-0007iF-7J for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 26 Feb 2015 01:22:26 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.217.179 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.217.179; envelope-from=pagecr@gmail.com; helo=mail-lb0-f179.google.com; Received: from mail-lb0-f179.google.com ([209.85.217.179]) by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1YQn9l-0000V4-4H for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 26 Feb 2015 01:22:26 +0000 Received: by lbvp9 with SMTP id p9so7803455lbv.0 for ; Wed, 25 Feb 2015 17:22:18 -0800 (PST) X-Received: by 10.112.173.133 with SMTP id bk5mr5275446lbc.94.1424913738732; Wed, 25 Feb 2015 17:22:18 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.25.42.79 with HTTP; Wed, 25 Feb 2015 17:21:58 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: <54EE459B.1090301@purdue.edu> References: <54EE459B.1090301@purdue.edu> From: Chris Page Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2015 20:21:58 -0500 Message-ID: To: Andrew Lapp Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c238163b9b46050ff395c7 X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (pagecr[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1YQn9l-0000V4-4H Cc: "bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net" Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Request for comments on hybrid, PoW/PoS enhancement for Bitcoin X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 26 Feb 2015 01:22:26 -0000 --001a11c238163b9b46050ff395c7 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 I definitely need to have an deeper understanding of that paper before proceeding. Thanks for the reference! On Wed, Feb 25, 2015 at 4:58 PM, Andrew Lapp wrote: > Having stakeholders "endorse" blocks has, according to you, the benefits > of increasing the number of full nodes and making a 51% attack more > expensive. It seems to me it would have the opposite effects and other > negative side effects. Any stakeholder that has "won" could just be running > an SPV client and be informed by a full node that they have won, then > cooperate to collect the reward. You are mistaking proof of stake as a > proof you are running a full node. At the same time, the network becomes > cheaper to attack in proportion to the amount of the block reward that is > paid to "endorsers". Another side effect is that miners would have a bigger > economy of scale. The more stake a miner has, the more they can "endorse" > their own blocks and not others blocks. I recommend reading this: > https://download.wpsoftware.net/bitcoin/pos.pdf > > -Andrew Lapp > --001a11c238163b9b46050ff395c7 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
=C2=A0I definitely need to have an deeper understanding of= that paper before proceeding. =C2=A0=C2=A0Thanks for the reference! =C2=A0=

On Wed, Feb= 25, 2015 at 4:58 PM, Andrew Lapp <lapp0@purdue.edu> wrote:
Having stakeholders "endorse" bl= ocks has, according to you, the benefits of increasing the number of full n= odes and making a 51% attack more expensive. It seems to me it would have t= he opposite effects and other negative side effects. Any stakeholder that h= as "won" could just be running an SPV client and be informed by a= full node that they have won, then cooperate to collect the reward. You ar= e mistaking proof of stake as a proof you are running a full node. At the s= ame time, the network becomes cheaper to attack in proportion to the amount= of the block reward that is paid to "endorsers". Another side ef= fect is that miners would have a bigger economy of scale. The more stake a = miner has, the more they can "endorse" their own blocks and not o= thers blocks. I recommend reading this: https://download.wpsoftware.<= /u>net/bitcoin/pos.pdf
-Andrew Lapp

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