> PS: I consider this attempt at takeover about as foul as it gets. The equivalent of repeating a referendum until a yes is obtained: the reasonable reaction to this is actively blocking said "referendum". There was a fair play alternative which is voting through coinbase scriptSig like plain 8MBers are doing, or like BIP 100 proposes for dynamic adjustment. Once a majority is obtained in this way, devs have to react or if they don't then this sort of foul play would be justified. But this wasn't the case.

I fail to see how voting with version numbers is different than voting with coinbase scriptSig. Other than the fact that the voting XT is doing is formally defined instead of ad-hoc.

On Sat, Aug 15, 2015 at 5:40 PM muyuubyou via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
I posted this to /r/BitcoinMarkets but I thought I might post it here as well.

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Currently 0 mined blocks have voted for XT.

If it ever gets close to even 50%, many things can happen that would reshape the game completely.

For instance:

- Core could start boycotting XT by not relying to them and/or not relying from them.

- Core could appropriate the version string of XT, making it impossible to know how much they are progressing and a losing bet to actually execute the fork.

This kind of node war if the factions were sizeable would make it very risky to transact at all - balances in new addresses could end up vanishing. Usability of the system would plummet.

Note that any disagreement between the network and the biggest economic actors - mainly the exchanges at this point, "wallet services" maybe - would mean BTC plummets. Hard. And so would confidence.

It's a risky game to play.
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PS: I consider this attempt at takeover about as foul as it gets. The equivalent of repeating a referendum until a yes is obtained: the reasonable reaction to this is actively blocking said "referendum". There was a fair play alternative which is voting through coinbase scriptSig like plain 8MBers are doing, or like BIP 100 proposes for dynamic adjustment. Once a majority is obtained in this way, devs have to react or if they don't then this sort of foul play would be justified. But this wasn't the case.

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為せば成る
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