I'd like to submit this paper to the dev-list which analyzes how miner advantages scale with network and mempool properties in a scenario of uncapped block sizes. The work proceeds, in a sense, from where Peter R's work left off correcting a mistake and addressing the critiques made by the community to his work.

The main result of the work is a detailed analysis of mining advantages (defined as the added profit per unit of hash) as a function of miner hashrate. In it, I show how large block subsidies (or better, low mempool fees-to-subsidy ratios) incentivize the pooling of large hashrates due to the steady increasing of marginal profits as hashrates grow. 

The paper also shows that part of the large advantage the large miners have today is due to there being a barrier to entry into a high-efficiency mining class which has access to expected profits an order of magnitude larger than everyone else. As block subsidies decrease, this high-efficiency class is expected to vanish leading to a marginal profit structure which decreases as a function of hashrate.

This work has vacuumed my entire life for the past two weeks leading me to lag behind on a lot of work. I apologize for typos which I may not have seen. I stand by for any comments the community may have and look forward to reigniting consideration of a block size scaling proposal (BIP101) which, due to the XT fork drama, I believe has been placed hastily and undeservedly on the chopping block.

Regards,

Daniele