Regarding: http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010295.htmlI am arguing with the following statement here...I see problems to this approach. The biggest one I see is that a miner with 11% of hash power could sabotage block size increases by only ever mining empty blocks.First, I would like to argue from economics' point of view. If someone wants to hold back the block size increase with 11% hash power by mining empty blocks, he has to sacrifice Tx fees, which is not economical. 11% hash power will most likely be a pool and pool miners will find out soon that they are losing Tx fees because of pool owner's intention. Hence, they'll switch pool and pool owner will lose out. This is the same reason why 51% attack will never happen, even if a pool gets more than 51% hash power.Next, I would like to propose a slightly modified technical solution to this problem in algorithmic format...If more than 50% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last difficulty period, is more than 90% MaxBlockSizeDouble MaxBlockSizeElse if more than 90% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last difficulty period, is less than 50% MaxBlockSizeHalf MaxBlockSizeElseKeep the same MaxBlockSizeThis is how, those who want to stop increase, need to have more than 50% hash power. Those who want to stop decrease, need to have more than 10% hash power, but must mine more than 50% of MaxBlockSize in all blocks. In this approach, not only miners, but also the end user have their say. Because, end users will fill up the mempool, from where miners will take Tx to fill up the blocks. Please note that, taking first 2000 of the last 2016 blocks is important to avoid data discrepancy among different nodes due to orphan blocks. It is assumed that a chain can not be orphaned after having 16 confirmation.Looking for comments.
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