From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5829A89D for ; Tue, 18 Aug 2015 17:26:47 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-yk0-f175.google.com (mail-yk0-f175.google.com [209.85.160.175]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9B79515D for ; Tue, 18 Aug 2015 17:26:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: by ykfw73 with SMTP id w73so111922647ykf.3 for ; Tue, 18 Aug 2015 10:26:46 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :content-type; bh=7UOABCS7Alw+a/Z5rLbot+V06+kJJ4SqeChfscQv0XI=; b=usXXQn/RqXnzSzl/ILSLElors6c0gq22Zy0p+puJoCMqs/B6eJ9rkSPr0+GzVuIuVn bUzALrCL1wHf1CNxvCllQEXW4MBLEQyuOmrMG4moLzh4wAZCZEaVyjA8Jxfkl3+1AUZo SB/wc/kr9S7Ei+Wg4l9MJhF8NvVzyHYeT2FvLzORlgC2hzv1nvo8DcJ9lTYvXAhUmNa4 rw6sc+HF3vVdSJE8QwuzSDuVoT2Ia4Pe2EYud8Eecy3Md6VgC19SPLrdW9z7ab/JcZlH ENjUcB3S1fTsolyhgbe2C/xcPAp7zIf8i5yXNhMAtwzO5R0ruZWDqGnIyvF7jCObChSK wtyg== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.129.81.194 with SMTP id f185mr8566209ywb.41.1439918805914; Tue, 18 Aug 2015 10:26:45 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.37.2.69 with HTTP; Tue, 18 Aug 2015 10:26:45 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2015 13:26:45 -0400 Message-ID: From: Chris Wardell To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11456cbcee9a35051d9938e6 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Dynamically Controlled Bitcoin Block Size Max Cap X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2015 17:26:47 -0000 --001a11456cbcee9a35051d9938e6 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 I'm no authority on the subject, but I don't understand why there is a max block-size, other than anti-spam measures. The only other reason I have heard for a max-block-size is to force people into paying higher fees. This seems like the wrong way to force fees. If you want to force fees, then do exactly that - make fees required, and set a minimum... don't force people to pay fees by limiting transactions per second. That's like shooting yourself in the foot to get free surgery.... On Tue, Aug 18, 2015 at 8:13 AM, Upal Chakraborty via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Regarding: > http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010295.html > > > I am arguing with the following statement here... > > *I see problems to this approach. The biggest one I see is that a miner >> with 11% of hash power could sabotage block size increases by only ever >> mining empty blocks.* > > > > First, I would like to argue from economics' point of view. If someone > wants to hold back the block size increase with 11% hash power by mining > empty blocks, he has to sacrifice Tx fees, which is not economical. 11% > hash power will most likely be a pool and pool miners will find out soon > that they are losing Tx fees because of pool owner's intention. Hence, > they'll switch pool and pool owner will lose out. This is the same reason > why 51% attack will never happen, even if a pool gets more than 51% hash > power. > > > Next, I would like to propose a slightly modified technical solution to > this problem in algorithmic format... > > If more than 50% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last > difficulty period, is more than 90% MaxBlockSize > Double MaxBlockSize > Else if more than 90% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last > difficulty period, is less than 50% MaxBlockSize > Half MaxBlockSize > Else > Keep the same MaxBlockSize > > This is how, those who want to stop increase, need to have more than 50% > hash power. Those who want to stop decrease, need to have more than 10% > hash power, but must mine more than 50% of MaxBlockSize in all blocks. In > this approach, not only miners, but also the end user have their say. > Because, end users will fill up the mempool, from where miners will take Tx > to fill up the blocks. Please note that, taking first 2000 of the last 2016 > blocks is important to avoid data discrepancy among different nodes due to > orphan blocks. It is assumed that a chain can not be orphaned after having > 16 confirmation. > > Looking for comments. > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --001a11456cbcee9a35051d9938e6 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I'm no authority on the subject, but I don't = understand why there is a max block-size, other than anti-spam measures.
The only other reason I have heard for a max-block-size is = to force people into paying higher fees.

This seems like the wrong w= ay to force fees.=C2=A0 If you want to force fees, then do exactly that - m= ake fees required, and set a minimum... don't force people to pay fees = by limiting transactions per second.=C2=A0 That's like shooting yoursel= f in the foot to get free surgery....



On Tue, Aug 18, 2015 at 8:13 AM= , Upal Chakraborty via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
Regarding:=C2=A0http://= lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010295.html=


I am arguing with the following statement here= ...

I see problems to this app= roach. The biggest one I see is that a miner with 11% of hash power could s= abotage block size increases by only ever mining empty blocks.


First, I would like to argue from ec= onomics' point of view. If someone wants to hold back the block size in= crease with 11% hash power by mining empty blocks, he has to sacrifice Tx f= ees, which is not economical. 11% hash power will most likely be a pool and= pool miners will find out soon that they are losing Tx fees because of poo= l owner's intention. Hence, they'll switch pool and pool owner will= lose out. This is the same reason why 51% attack will never happen, even i= f a pool gets more than 51% hash power.


Next, I would like to propose a slightly modified technica= l solution to this problem in algorithmic format...

If more than 50% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last= difficulty period, is more than 90% MaxBlockSize
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 = =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0Double MaxBlockSize
Else if more than 90= % of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last difficulty perio= d, is less than 50% MaxBlockSize
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2= =A0Half MaxBlockSize
Else
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 = =C2=A0 =C2=A0Keep the same MaxBlockSize

This is ho= w, those who want to stop increase, need to have more than 50% hash power. = Those who want to stop decrease, need to have more than 10% hash power, but= must mine more than 50% of MaxBlockSize in all blocks. In this approach, n= ot only miners, but also the end user have their say. Because, end users wi= ll fill up the mempool, from where miners will take Tx to fill up the block= s. Please note that, taking first 2000 of the last 2016 blocks is important= to avoid data discrepancy among different nodes due to orphan blocks. It i= s assumed that a chain can not be orphaned after having 16 confirmation.

Looking for comments.


<= /div>



_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


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