From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 745C5305 for ; Sun, 5 Mar 2017 18:10:18 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wr0-f176.google.com (mail-wr0-f176.google.com [209.85.128.176]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BF149F1 for ; Sun, 5 Mar 2017 18:10:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-wr0-f176.google.com with SMTP id u108so102706103wrb.3 for ; Sun, 05 Mar 2017 10:10:17 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=i4I2ma1TEo2EBHjrgqNx1pVkAsYBZ27RjzIwPp7GouA=; b=Xsoy9C+PBO69IuzpLvbjfd3le1NAdy+A5PKpGFEdhJnXfLrXXwBzCRtTNmIOtN4UuS KqpjyPm7dORTK2gM1LO8emUtYvLuqmD/sp2VHwV0N7Y8+zaD1L0PAKJ4qFey3AAXCOsA sBZCIdXIczOP2S2e1Hy7BukTjmFk3TuOrb3CdeuXsek5b4J+HgdZMqjoueSVDduHAGL/ Km2toKLieny8ozecWE4P6xBlqodSPBZk+l6AkQJwQfbhGxt4ZM4XOBETUJbptwyYZtvH AAHJvQ9whAHWmenS+hslZOp6dLsOzkaWwDhM17G2njMMMMycWsAoSM+nEgywCVInbxBs NaJg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=i4I2ma1TEo2EBHjrgqNx1pVkAsYBZ27RjzIwPp7GouA=; b=GuS8GRrEbDV+Lqlieta1FJEZNxHlhh6Vz5G3F5BsUniQUGy0CgHcIE8MuWUJ1kX8x8 qDFvmLgtQ79XpgnZ0+cfkr5KHfSrD199WDf/Qr6j5V+0TCickv8sqZs1VWS8FEmSncTU Gks8iRcRSSJZ+X6wwXabNRWnG8F4R6TwV80geTkSxV/hi6d1yiML2tl+hIR41T8pYFea 7rO5gJFI3blnNYNarE46rmCaGhTM8oSTK8cFuld3OzeBMoUbN/9lH+w5Z4E0lEQgDjTp u08gW+Lx/3IDnMW/6vfSmD2Bh1Um9Ui/iprKi8sXwu9yStqSb0uXyDap2pfzjC/34BcS 4rUQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AMke39lTR2prIWQiO1WmnL4A8vRxsF2pNBUYfvuJbRT5M56ohmUUcivQ94AaMt3nECTQbZQACIO7gEunlA2cTA== X-Received: by 10.223.136.183 with SMTP id f52mr10589748wrf.68.1488737416048; Sun, 05 Mar 2017 10:10:16 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.28.92.193 with HTTP; Sun, 5 Mar 2017 10:10:15 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.28.92.193 with HTTP; Sun, 5 Mar 2017 10:10:15 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: <0ba5bf9c-5578-98ce-07ae-036d0d71046b@riseup.net> References: <0ba5bf9c-5578-98ce-07ae-036d0d71046b@riseup.net> From: David Vorick Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2017 13:10:15 -0500 Message-ID: To: Bitcoin Dev , Chris Belcher Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11492e06d8f9f60549ffb045 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.0 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Moving towards user activated soft fork activation X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 05 Mar 2017 18:10:18 -0000 --001a11492e06d8f9f60549ffb045 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 I also think that the UASF is a good idea. Hashrate follows coin price. If the UASF has the higher coin price, the other chain will be annihilated. If the UASF has a lower coin price, the user activated chain can still exist (though their coins can be trivially stolen on the majority chain). The success of the UASF depends entirely on the price. And actually, the price is easy to manipulate. If you, as an economically active full node, refuse to acknowledge the old chain and demand that incoming coins arrive over the UASF chain. In doing so, you drive down the utility of the old chain and drive up the utility of the new chain. This ultimately impacts the price. I think it would be pretty easy to get high confidence of the success of a UASF. Basically you need all the major economic hubs to agree to upgrade and then exclusively accept UASF coins. I don't have a comprehensive list, but if we could sign on 75% of the major exchanges and payment processors, and get 75% of the wallets to upgrade, then the UASF would be very likely to successfully obliterate the old rules, as miners would be unable to sell their coins or pay their bills by stubbornly sticking to the old chain. It's less risky than a hard fork by far, because there is zero risk of coin split if the UASF has majority hashrate, which will follow majority economic value. A serious proposal I think would get all the code ready and merged, but without setting a flag day. Then we would get signatures from the major institutions promising to use the software and saying that they are ready for a flag day. After that, you release a patch with a flag day 12 months in the future. People can upgrade immediately, and have a full year to transition. That gives tons of time for people to upgrade, and tons of confidence that the UASF will end up as the majority chain. If we cannot get enough major exchanges, payment processors, and other economic hubs to upgrade, the flag day should remain upset, as the risk of coin split will be non-zero. I would suggest that a carefully executed UASF is much riskier than a soft fork, but far, far less risky than a hard fork. --001a11492e06d8f9f60549ffb045 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I also think that the = UASF is a good idea. Hashrate follows coin price. If the UASF has the highe= r coin price, the other chain will be annihilated. If the UASF has a lower = coin price, the user activated chain can still exist (though their coins ca= n be trivially stolen on the majority chain).

The success of the UASF = depends entirely on the price. And actually, the price is easy to manipulat= e. If you, as an economically active full node, refuse to acknowledge the o= ld chain and demand that incoming coins arrive over the UASF chain. In doin= g so, you drive down the utility of the old chain and drive up the utility = of the new chain. This ultimately impacts the price.

I think it woul= d be pretty easy to get high confidence of the success of a UASF. Basically= you need all the major economic hubs to agree to upgrade and then exclusiv= ely accept UASF coins. I don't have a comprehensive list, but if we cou= ld sign on 75% of the major exchanges and payment processors, and get 75% o= f the wallets to upgrade, then the UASF would be very likely to successfull= y obliterate the old rules, as miners would be unable to sell their coins o= r pay their bills by stubbornly sticking to the old chain. It's less ri= sky than a hard fork by far, because there is zero risk of coin split if th= e UASF has majority hashrate, which will follow majority economic value.
A serious proposal I think would get all the code ready and merged, but = without setting a flag day. Then we would get signatures from the major ins= titutions promising to use the software and saying that they are ready for = a flag day. After that, you release a patch with a flag day 12 months in th= e future. People can upgrade immediately, and have a full year to transitio= n.

That gives tons of time for people to upgrade, and tons of confid= ence that the UASF will end up as the majority chain.

If we cannot ge= t enough major exchanges, payment processors, and other economic hubs to up= grade, =C2=A0the flag day should remain upset, as the risk of coin split wi= ll be non-zero.

I would suggest that a carefully executed UASF is much= riskier than a soft fork, but far, far less risky than a hard fork.
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