Re: [Bitcoin-development] we can all relax now

["Andreas M. Antonopoulos" <andreas@rooteleven.com>]

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Nicholas Weaver is reporting that pools have already started delaying
blocks, something that hints at Selfish Mining, since Nov. 3rd.
https://medium.com/something-like-falling/d321a2ef9317

He dismisses other reasons for delayed block propagation.

Any ideas on whether pools are already mucking around with block delaying
tactics?

I have no idea if this report is accurate or explained by some other issue
in the network, does anyone here have a comment on this?


On Thu, Nov 7, 2013 at 10:28 AM, Daniel Lidstrom <lidstrom83@gmail.com>wrote:

> Hey Peter, something seems wrong with your above analysis: I think a miner
> would withhold his block not because it leads to a greater probability of
> winning the next one, but because it increases his expected revenue.
>
> Suppose a cabal with fraction q of the total hashing power is n blocks
> ahead on a secret branch of that has mined r_tot coins, and let r_next be
> its next block's reward.  If the cabal chooses not to broadcast its secret
> chain until at least the next block, its expected revenue after the next
> block is found is
>
> (1 - (1-q)^(n+1))*(r_tot + r_next)
>
> If it does broadcast, its expected revenue after the next block is found is
>
> r_tot + q * r_next
>
> If the cabal seeks only to maximize immediate revenue, then after a bit of
> algebra we find that it will withhold its chain if
>
> q > 1 - ( 1 + r_tot / r_next )^(-1/n)
>
> So if the cabal has just mined his first block off of the public chain,
> i.e. n = 1, and if the block reward is relatively stable, i.e. r_next =
> r_tot, then it needs q > 50% to profitably withhold, not the 29.2% you
> calculated.
>
> From this formula we can also see that if the miner wins the race and
> withholds again, then he must grow q to compensate for the increase in
> r_tot, and any decrease in n.  So generally publication becomes
> increasingly in the cabal's interest, and secret chains will tend not to
> grow too large (intuition tells me that simulations using the above formula
> should bear this out).
>
> This seem correct to you?
>
>
> On Thu, Nov 7, 2013 at 9:14 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> wrote:
>
>> Once the ASIC race calms down because everyone has one, has more or less
>> optimal power supplies, process improvements aren't easily reachable
>> anymore etc then I'd expect people to dissipate from the large pools
>> because eliminating their fees will become the next lowest hanging fruit to
>> squeeze out extra profit. There's no particular reason we need only a
>> handful of pools that control a major fraction of the hashpower.
>>
>> If we end up with a few hundred pools or lots of miners on p2pool, then a
>> lot of these theoretical attacks become not very relevant (I don't think ID
>> sacrifices will be so common or large as to justify a pile of custom mining
>> code+strategies at any point ...)
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 7, 2013 at 2:24 PM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, Nov 07, 2013 at 02:56:56PM +1000, Gavin Andresen wrote:
>>> > > P.S: If any large pools want to try this stuff out, give me a shout.
>>> You
>>> > > have my PGP key - confidentiality assured.
>>> > >
>>> >
>>> > If I find out one of the large pools decides to run this 'experiment'
>>> on
>>> > the main network, I will make it my mission to tell people to switch
>>> to a
>>> > more responsible pool.
>>>
>>> I hope they listen.
>>>
>>> A few months ago ASICMiner could have made use of that attack if my
>>> memories of their peak hashing power were correct. They certainely could
>>> have used the selfish miner version, (we need better name for that)
>>> although development costs would eat into profits.
>>>
>>> GHash.IO, 22%, says they're a "private Bitfury ASIC mining pool" - dunno
>>> what they mean by that, but they're involved with CEX.IO who has
>>> physical control of a bunch of hashing power so I guess that means their
>>> model is like ASICMiners. They're a bit short of 30%, but maybe some
>>> behind-the-scenes deals would fix that, and/or lowering the barrier with
>>> reactive block publishing. (a better name)
>>>
>>> > And if you think you can get away with driving up EVERYBODY's orphan
>>> rate
>>> > without anybody noticing, you should think again.
>>>
>>> ...and remember, if you only do the attack a little bit, you still can
>>> earn more profit, and only drive up the orphan rate a little bit. So who
>>> knows, maybe the orphans are real, or maybe they're an attack? ASICMiner
>>> was involved with a bunch of orphans a while back...
>>>
>>> You know what this calls for? A witchhunt!
>>>
>>> BURN THE LARGE POOLS!
>>>
>>> > > P.P.S: If you're mining on a pool with more than, like, 1% hashing
>>> > > power, do the math on varience... Seriously, stop it and go mine on a
>>> > > smaller pool, or better yet, p2pool.
>>> > >
>>> >
>>> > That I agree with.
>>>
>>> Glad to hear.
>>>
>>> --
>>> 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
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>>>
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