From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-4.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1VesPG-0001yw-JC for Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 08 Nov 2013 20:11:50 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of antonopoulos.com designates 209.85.214.174 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.214.174; envelope-from=andreas@antonopoulos.com; helo=mail-ob0-f174.google.com; Received: from mail-ob0-f174.google.com ([209.85.214.174]) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1VesPE-0007In-SY for Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 08 Nov 2013 20:11:50 +0000 Received: by mail-ob0-f174.google.com with SMTP id vb8so1947647obc.19 for ; Fri, 08 Nov 2013 12:11:43 -0800 (PST) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:content-type; bh=oCxM/sJUCHhMVVOe8uCd7y7tUlOdcfTT4SGGyLg5+cM=; b=I9Jr3WzJdPoaVTHJZMypBBe1Xtxlf4UnNcMwOxR3m0q8oFmN13LGkfRIzsP3lW3wN+ 3mj6zgXYMQt2TX9u4bNirDtyLmbX2tzu8627CWRpRvktjlh5iELM7ynFND7N3Y8fjvBQ diS2MisIazz5XpndHKVjmZxl4VKhtzbDGdkU00aqOwN0yCCDBUtLoczzvnIqEiW4lp54 E1m/KdiKhiGAvFvtwYkK4TCSp0qU6Jv6usQxCE9eqEySxnQc99Ho0QH0ney4xnfkHEA2 ctCFbqGaHK1UauVljty/DANTngo0yyvRQGSqM9cd795RjrXDhDCzGJ7d5pZ6cyqp/qWM 9i3Q== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQkP6MIUmVa1GmuJ9ONyTr0eg/p2YLoXzx79ZCDLkoohPR2CFjmjuVhya7ZdP8kt5PvDhDje MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.182.28.134 with SMTP id b6mr6480693obh.27.1383940151111; Fri, 08 Nov 2013 11:49:11 -0800 (PST) Sender: andreas@antonopoulos.com Received: by 10.182.231.163 with HTTP; Fri, 8 Nov 2013 11:49:11 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: <5279D49D.5050807@jerviss.org> <20131107034404.GA5140@savin> <20131107132442.GB22476@savin> Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2013 11:49:11 -0800 X-Google-Sender-Auth: cbYxdAcNjw3vh8bdJ99sNC7K0E4 Message-ID: From: "Andreas M. Antonopoulos" To: Bitcoin Dev Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c2903c19077104eaafadb3 X-Spam-Score: -0.4 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. 0.0 URIBL_BLOCKED ADMINISTRATOR NOTICE: The query to URIBL was blocked. See http://wiki.apache.org/spamassassin/DnsBlocklists#dnsbl-block for more information. [URIs: doubleclick.net] -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid 0.0 T_DKIM_INVALID DKIM-Signature header exists but is not valid X-Headers-End: 1VesPE-0007In-SY Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] we can all relax now X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 08 Nov 2013 20:11:50 -0000 --001a11c2903c19077104eaafadb3 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Nicholas Weaver is reporting that pools have already started delaying blocks, something that hints at Selfish Mining, since Nov. 3rd. https://medium.com/something-like-falling/d321a2ef9317 He dismisses other reasons for delayed block propagation. Any ideas on whether pools are already mucking around with block delaying tactics? I have no idea if this report is accurate or explained by some other issue in the network, does anyone here have a comment on this? On Thu, Nov 7, 2013 at 10:28 AM, Daniel Lidstrom wrote: > Hey Peter, something seems wrong with your above analysis: I think a miner > would withhold his block not because it leads to a greater probability of > winning the next one, but because it increases his expected revenue. > > Suppose a cabal with fraction q of the total hashing power is n blocks > ahead on a secret branch of that has mined r_tot coins, and let r_next be > its next block's reward. If the cabal chooses not to broadcast its secret > chain until at least the next block, its expected revenue after the next > block is found is > > (1 - (1-q)^(n+1))*(r_tot + r_next) > > If it does broadcast, its expected revenue after the next block is found is > > r_tot + q * r_next > > If the cabal seeks only to maximize immediate revenue, then after a bit of > algebra we find that it will withhold its chain if > > q > 1 - ( 1 + r_tot / r_next )^(-1/n) > > So if the cabal has just mined his first block off of the public chain, > i.e. n = 1, and if the block reward is relatively stable, i.e. r_next = > r_tot, then it needs q > 50% to profitably withhold, not the 29.2% you > calculated. > > From this formula we can also see that if the miner wins the race and > withholds again, then he must grow q to compensate for the increase in > r_tot, and any decrease in n. So generally publication becomes > increasingly in the cabal's interest, and secret chains will tend not to > grow too large (intuition tells me that simulations using the above formula > should bear this out). > > This seem correct to you? > > > On Thu, Nov 7, 2013 at 9:14 AM, Mike Hearn wrote: > >> Once the ASIC race calms down because everyone has one, has more or less >> optimal power supplies, process improvements aren't easily reachable >> anymore etc then I'd expect people to dissipate from the large pools >> because eliminating their fees will become the next lowest hanging fruit to >> squeeze out extra profit. There's no particular reason we need only a >> handful of pools that control a major fraction of the hashpower. >> >> If we end up with a few hundred pools or lots of miners on p2pool, then a >> lot of these theoretical attacks become not very relevant (I don't think ID >> sacrifices will be so common or large as to justify a pile of custom mining >> code+strategies at any point ...) >> >> >> On Thu, Nov 7, 2013 at 2:24 PM, Peter Todd wrote: >> >>> On Thu, Nov 07, 2013 at 02:56:56PM +1000, Gavin Andresen wrote: >>> > > P.S: If any large pools want to try this stuff out, give me a shout. >>> You >>> > > have my PGP key - confidentiality assured. >>> > > >>> > >>> > If I find out one of the large pools decides to run this 'experiment' >>> on >>> > the main network, I will make it my mission to tell people to switch >>> to a >>> > more responsible pool. >>> >>> I hope they listen. >>> >>> A few months ago ASICMiner could have made use of that attack if my >>> memories of their peak hashing power were correct. They certainely could >>> have used the selfish miner version, (we need better name for that) >>> although development costs would eat into profits. >>> >>> GHash.IO, 22%, says they're a "private Bitfury ASIC mining pool" - dunno >>> what they mean by that, but they're involved with CEX.IO who has >>> physical control of a bunch of hashing power so I guess that means their >>> model is like ASICMiners. They're a bit short of 30%, but maybe some >>> behind-the-scenes deals would fix that, and/or lowering the barrier with >>> reactive block publishing. (a better name) >>> >>> > And if you think you can get away with driving up EVERYBODY's orphan >>> rate >>> > without anybody noticing, you should think again. >>> >>> ...and remember, if you only do the attack a little bit, you still can >>> earn more profit, and only drive up the orphan rate a little bit. So who >>> knows, maybe the orphans are real, or maybe they're an attack? ASICMiner >>> was involved with a bunch of orphans a while back... >>> >>> You know what this calls for? A witchhunt! >>> >>> BURN THE LARGE POOLS! >>> >>> > > P.P.S: If you're mining on a pool with more than, like, 1% hashing >>> > > power, do the math on varience... Seriously, stop it and go mine on a >>> > > smaller pool, or better yet, p2pool. >>> > > >>> > >>> > That I agree with. >>> >>> Glad to hear. >>> >>> -- >>> 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org >>> 0000000000000007bd936f19e33bc8b8f9bb1f4c013b863ef60a7f5a6a5d2112 >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> November Webinars for C, C++, Fortran Developers >>> Accelerate application performance with scalable programming models. >>> Explore >>> techniques for threading, error checking, porting, and tuning. Get the >>> most >>> from the latest Intel processors and coprocessors. See abstracts and >>> register >>> >>> http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=60136231&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Bitcoin-development mailing list >>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net >>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development >>> >>> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> November Webinars for C, C++, Fortran Developers >> Accelerate application performance with scalable programming models. >> Explore >> techniques for threading, error checking, porting, and tuning. Get the >> most >> from the latest Intel processors and coprocessors. See abstracts and >> register >> >> http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=60136231&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk >> _______________________________________________ >> Bitcoin-development mailing list >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development >> >> > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > November Webinars for C, C++, Fortran Developers > Accelerate application performance with scalable programming models. > Explore > techniques for threading, error checking, porting, and tuning. Get the most > from the latest Intel processors and coprocessors. See abstracts and > register > http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=60136231&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > > --001a11c2903c19077104eaafadb3 Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Nicholas Weaver is reporting that pools have alr= eady started delaying blocks, something that hints at Selfish Mining, since= Nov. 3rd.
https://medium.com/something-like-falling/d321a2ef9317

He dismisses other reasons for delayed block propagation.
Any ideas on whether pools are already mucking around with block delaying = tactics?

I have no idea if this report is accurate or explain= ed by some other issue in the network, does anyone here have a comment on t= his?


On Thu,= Nov 7, 2013 at 10:28 AM, Daniel Lidstrom <lidstrom83@gmail.com>= wrote:
Hey Peter, s= omething seems wrong with your above=20 analysis: I think a miner would withhold his block not because it leads to a greater probability of winning the next one, but because it=20 increases his expected revenue.

Suppose a cabal with fraction q of the total hashing power is n=20 blocks ahead on a secret branch of that has mined r_tot coins, and let=20 r_next be its next block's reward.=A0 If the cabal chooses not to=20 broadcast its secret chain until at least the next block, its expected=20 revenue after the next block is found is

(1 - (1-q)^(n+1))*(r_tot + r_next)

If it does broadcast, its exp= ected revenue after the next block is found is

r_tot + q * r_next

If the cabal seeks only to maximize immediate revenue, then after a bit of al= gebra we find that it will withhold its chain if

q > 1 - ( 1 + r_tot / r_next )^(-1/n)

So if the ca= bal has just mined his first block off of the public chain, i.e. n =3D 1, a= nd if the block reward is relatively stable, i.e. r_next =3D r_tot, then it= needs q > 50% to profitably withhold, not the 29.2% you calculated.

From this formula we can also see that if the miner wins the= race and withholds again, then he must grow q to compensate for the increa= se in r_tot, and any decrease in n.=A0 So generally publication becomes inc= reasingly in the cabal's interest, and secret chains will tend not to g= row too large (intuition tells me that simulations using the above formula = should bear this out).

This seem correct to you?


On Thu, Nov 7, 2013 at 9:14 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.= net> wrote:
Once the ASIC race calms do= wn because everyone has one, has more or less optimal power supplies, proce= ss improvements aren't easily reachable anymore etc then I'd expect= people to dissipate from the large pools because eliminating their fees wi= ll become the next lowest hanging fruit to squeeze out extra profit. There&= #39;s no particular reason we need only a handful of pools that control a m= ajor fraction of the hashpower.=A0

If we end up with a few hundred pools or lots of miners on p= 2pool, then a lot of these theoretical attacks become not very relevant (I = don't think ID sacrifices will be so common or large as to justify a pi= le of custom mining code+strategies at any point ...)


On Thu, Nov 7, 2013 at 2:24 PM, Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>= wrote:
On Thu, Nov 07, 2= 013 at 02:56:56PM +1000, Gavin Andresen wrote:
> > P.S: If any large pools want to try this stuff out, give me a sho= ut. You
> > have my PGP key - confidentiality assured.
> >
>
> If I find out one of the large pools decides to run this 'experime= nt' on
> the main network, I will make it my mission to tell people to switch t= o a
> more responsible pool.

I hope they listen.

A few months ago ASICMiner could have made use of that attack if my
memories of their peak hashing power were correct. They certainely could have used the selfish miner version, (we need better name for that)
although development costs would eat into profits.

GHash.IO, 22%, says they're a "private Bitfury ASIC mining pool&qu= ot; - dunno
what they mean by that, but they're involved with CEX.IO who has
physical control of a bunch of hashing power so I guess that means their model is like ASICMiners. They're a bit short of 30%, but maybe some behind-the-scenes deals would fix that, and/or lowering the barrier with reactive block publishing. (a better name)

> And if you think you can get away with driving up EVERYBODY's orph= an rate
> without anybody noticing, you should think again.

...and remember, if you only do the attack a little bit, you still ca= n
earn more profit, and only drive up the orphan rate a little bit. So who knows, maybe the orphans are real, or maybe they're an attack? ASICMine= r
was involved with a bunch of orphans a while back...

You know what this calls for? A witchhunt!

BURN THE LARGE POOLS!

> > P.P.S: If you're mining on a pool with more than, like, 1% ha= shing
> > power, do the math on varience... Seriously, stop it and go mine = on a
> > smaller pool, or better yet, p2pool.
> >
>
> That I agree with.

Glad to hear.

--
'peter'[:-1]@pet= ertodd.org
0000000000000007bd936f19e33bc8b8f9bb1f4c013b863ef60a7f5a6a5d2112

----------------------------------------= --------------------------------------
November Webinars for C, C++, Fortran Developers
Accelerate application performance with scalable programming models. Explor= e
techniques for threading, error checking, porting, and tuning. Get the most=
from the latest Intel processors and coprocessors. See abstracts and regist= er
http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gam= pad/clk?id=3D60136231&iu=3D/4140/ostg.clktrk
___________________= ____________________________
Bitcoin-development mailing list
Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-de= velopment



-----------------------------------------------------------------------= -------
November Webinars for C, C++, Fortran Developers
Accelerate application performance with scalable programming models. Explor= e
techniques for threading, error checking, porting, and tuning. Get the most=
from the latest Intel processors and coprocessors. See abstracts and regist= er
http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gam= pad/clk?id=3D60136231&iu=3D/4140/ostg.clktrk
___________________= ____________________________
Bitcoin-development mailing list
Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-de= velopment



-----------------------------------------------------------= -------------------
November Webinars for C, C++, Fortran Developers
Accelerate application performance with scalable programming models. Explor= e
techniques for threading, error checking, porting, and tuning. Get the most=
from the latest Intel processors and coprocessors. See abstracts and regist= er
http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gam= pad/clk?id=3D60136231&iu=3D/4140/ostg.clktrk
___________________= ____________________________
Bitcoin-development mailing list
Bitcoin-develo= pment@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-de= velopment


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