From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1YqqtE-0007OG-7R for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 08 May 2015 22:37:04 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.214.179 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.214.179; envelope-from=joel.kaartinen@gmail.com; helo=mail-ob0-f179.google.com; Received: from mail-ob0-f179.google.com ([209.85.214.179]) by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1YqqtC-0008Lm-8z for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 08 May 2015 22:37:04 +0000 Received: by obcus9 with SMTP id us9so36082638obc.2 for ; Fri, 08 May 2015 15:36:56 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.182.81.137 with SMTP id a9mr195468oby.9.1431124616799; Fri, 08 May 2015 15:36:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.202.49.16 with HTTP; Fri, 8 May 2015 15:36:56 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <20150508165144.GC27417@savin.petertodd.org> References: <16096345.A1MpJQQkRW@crushinator> <20150508165144.GC27417@savin.petertodd.org> Date: Sat, 9 May 2015 01:36:56 +0300 Message-ID: From: Joel Joonatan Kaartinen To: Peter Todd Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7b2e3e5869ecc6051599aa51 X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (joel.kaartinen[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1YqqtC-0008Lm-8z Cc: Bitcoin Development Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposed alternatives to the 20MB step function X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 08 May 2015 22:37:04 -0000 --047d7b2e3e5869ecc6051599aa51 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 such a contract is a possibility, but why would big owners give an exclusive right to such pools? It seems to me it'd make sense to offer those for any miner as long as the get paid a little for it. Especially when it's as simple as offering an incomplete transaction with the appropriate SIGHASH flags. a part of the reason I like this idea is because it will allow stakeholders a degree of influence on how large the fees are. At least from the surface, it looks like incentives are pretty well matched. They have an incentive to not let the fees drop too low so the network continues to be usable and they also have an incentive to not raise them too high because it'll push users into using other systems. Also, there'll be competition between stakeholders, which should keep the fees reasonable. I think this would at least be preferable to the "let the miner decide" model. - Joel On Fri, May 8, 2015 at 7:51 PM, Peter Todd wrote: > On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 03:32:00PM +0300, Joel Joonatan Kaartinen wrote: > > Matt, > > > > It seems you missed my suggestion about basing the maximum block size on > > the bitcoin days destroyed in transactions that are included in the > block. > > I think it has potential for both scaling as well as keeping up a > constant > > fee pressure. If tuned properly, it should both stop spamming and > increase > > block size maximum when there are a lot of real transactions waiting for > > inclusion. > > The problem with gating block creation on Bitcoin days destroyed is > there's a strong potential of giving big mining pools an huge advantage, > because they can contract with large Bitcoin owners and buy dummy > transactions with large numbers of Bitcoin days destroyed on demand > whenever they need more days-destroyed to create larger blocks. > Similarly, with appropriate SIGHASH flags such contracting can be done > by modifying *existing* transactions on demand. > > Ultimately bitcoin days destroyed just becomes a very complex version of > transaction fees, and it's already well known that gating blocksize on > total transaction fees doesn't work. > > -- > 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org > 00000000000000000f53e2d214685abf15b6d62d32453a03b0d472e374e10e94 > --047d7b2e3e5869ecc6051599aa51 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
such a contract is a possibility, but why would big owners= give an exclusive right to such pools? It seems to me it'd make sense = to offer those for any miner as long as the get paid a little for it. Espec= ially when it's as simple as offering an incomplete transaction with th= e appropriate SIGHASH flags.

a part of the reason I like= this idea is because it will allow stakeholders a degree of influence on h= ow large the fees are. At least from the surface, it looks like incentives = are pretty well matched. They have an incentive to not let the fees drop to= o low so the network continues to be usable and they also have an incentive= to not raise them too high because it'll push users into using other s= ystems. Also, there'll be competition between stakeholders, which shoul= d keep the fees reasonable.

I think this would at = least be preferable to the "let the miner decide" model.

- Joel

On Fri, May 8, 2015 at 7:51 PM, Peter T= odd <pete@petertodd.org> wrote:
On Fri, May 08, 2015 at 03:32:00PM +0300, Joel Joon= atan Kaartinen wrote:
> Matt,
>
> It seems you missed my suggestion about basing the maximum block size = on
> the bitcoin days destroyed in transactions that are included in the bl= ock.
> I think it has potential for both scaling as well as keeping up a cons= tant
> fee pressure. If tuned properly, it should both stop spamming and incr= ease
> block size maximum when there are a lot of real transactions waiting f= or
> inclusion.

The problem with gating block creation on Bitcoin days destroyed is<= br> there's a strong potential of giving big mining pools an huge advantage= ,
because they can contract with large Bitcoin owners and buy dummy
transactions with large numbers of Bitcoin days destroyed on demand
whenever they need more days-destroyed to create larger blocks.
Similarly, with appropriate SIGHASH flags such contracting can be done
by modifying *existing* transactions on demand.

Ultimately bitcoin days destroyed just becomes a very complex version of transaction fees, and it's already well known that gating blocksize on<= br> total transaction fees doesn't work.

--
'peter'[:-1]@pet= ertodd.org
00000000000000000f53e2d214685abf15b6d62d32453a03b0d472e374e10e94

--047d7b2e3e5869ecc6051599aa51--