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[2607:f8b0:4864:20::1129]) by gmr-mx.google.com with ESMTPS id d2e1a72fcca58-730749bae68si258375b3a.5.2025.02.10.13.22.12 for (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Mon, 10 Feb 2025 13:22:12 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of stewart.chris1234@gmail.com designates 2607:f8b0:4864:20::1129 as permitted sender) client-ip=2607:f8b0:4864:20::1129; Received: by mail-yw1-x1129.google.com with SMTP id 00721157ae682-6f4bc408e49so38999047b3.1 for ; Mon, 10 Feb 2025 13:22:12 -0800 (PST) X-Gm-Gg: ASbGncswZ03Eba5pIR66NgDNZ1HRmI+U0U2sUPIU0FO4H0TQNdYCQyvj2MBVXoHO1LW T1BqFVx62+kDxi1goWEHX91LNhgStHlxUARfZKo25T3hW14ZCD6lmDlULZRjBMABPIqF1Pwhq X-Received: by 2002:a05:690c:4986:b0:6f7:3e01:8a49 with SMTP id 00721157ae682-6f9b29e61c4mr145086177b3.26.1739222530472; Mon, 10 Feb 2025 13:22:10 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: Chris Stewart Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2025 15:21:59 -0600 X-Gm-Features: AWEUYZkeEbEMWHXCMjaZKknsHxocLoyglyP0rKrXghMuPQjPKBycxHqKXljIUIE Message-ID: Subject: Re: [bitcoindev] Update on the Great Consensus Cleanup Revival To: Antoine Poinsot Cc: Bitcoin Development Mailing List Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000001d485c062dd04d64" X-Original-Sender: stewart.chris1234@gmail.com X-Original-Authentication-Results: gmr-mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@gmail.com header.s=20230601 header.b="IsABK/iK"; spf=pass (google.com: domain of stewart.chris1234@gmail.com designates 2607:f8b0:4864:20::1129 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=stewart.chris1234@gmail.com; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=gmail.com; dara=pass header.i=@googlegroups.com Precedence: list Mailing-list: list bitcoindev@googlegroups.com; contact bitcoindev+owners@googlegroups.com List-ID: X-Google-Group-Id: 786775582512 List-Post: , List-Help: , List-Archive: , List-Unsubscribe: , X-Spam-Score: -0.5 (/) --0000000000001d485c062dd04d64 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi everyone! Excited to see this work moving forward. I've taken the liberty of carving off the 64 byte transaction portion of this proposal and drafted a BIP. You can view a rendered draft with references here: https://github.com/Christewart/bips/blob/2024-12-20-64bytetxs/bip-XXXX.medi= awiki 
  BIP: ?
  Layer: Consensus (soft fork)
  Title: Disallow 64 byte transactions
  Author: Chris Stewart 
  Status: Draft
  Type: Specification
  License: BSD-3-Clause
  Created: ?
=3D=3DAbstract=3D=3D This BIP describes the rationale for disallowing transactions that are serialized to 64 bytes without the transaction's witness. We describe the weaknesses to the merkle tree included in bitcoin block headers, various exploits for those weaknesses. =3D=3DMotivation=3D=3D Bitcoin block headers include a commitment to the set of transactions in a given block, which is implemented by constructing a Merkle tree of transaction id=E2=80=99s (double-SHA256 hash of a transaction) and including the root of the tree in the block header. This in turn allows for proving to a Bitcoin light client that a given transaction is in a given block by providing a path through the tree to the transaction. However, Bitcoin=E2=80=99s particular construction of the Merk= le tree has several security weaknesses, including at least two forms of block malleability that have an impact on the consensus logic of Bitcoin Core, and an attack o= n light clients, where an invalid transaction could be =E2=80=9Dproven=E2=80= =9D to appear in a block by doing substantially less work than a SHA256 hash collision would require= . This has been prevented by relay policy since 2018[ https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/11423/commits/7485488e907e236133a01= 6ba7064c89bf9ab6da3 PR #11423 disallows 64 byte transactions in bitcoin core relay] =3D=3DSpecification=3D=3D This BIP disallows bitcoin transactions that are serialized to 64 bytes in length without it's witness. =3D=3DRationale=3D=3D =3D=3D=3D Block malleability =3D=3D=3D 64 byte transactions introduce block malleability. Malicious peers can construct consensus valid and invalid 64 byte transactions that have the same serialization as the concatenation of 2 nodes in the merkle tree. Assume we have a valid bitcoin block with 2 transactions in it - T0 and T1. The merkle root for this block is H(T0||T1). A user could find a malicious 64 byte transaction Tm that serializes to T0||T1. Next the malicious user relays the block containing the malicious Tm rather than the valid bitcoin transactions T0 and T1. =3D=3D=3D=3D Block malleability with consensus INVALID transactions =3D=3D= =3D=3D The peer receiving the malicious block marks the block as invalid as Tm is not a valid transaction according to network consensus rules. Other peers on the network receive the valid block containing T0 and T1 add the block to their blockchain. Peers that receive the invalid block before the valid block will never come to consensus with their peers due to the malicious user finding a collision within the block's merkle root. Finding this collision approximately 22 bits worth of work[ https://github.com/Christewart/bips/blob/2024-12-20-64bytetxs/bip-XXXX/2-Bi= tcoinMerkle.pdf to produce a block that has a Merkle root which is a hash of a 64-byte quantity that deserializes validly, it=E2= =80=99s enough to just do 8 bits of work to find a workable coinbase (which will hash to the first 32 bytes), plus another =E2=89=8822 bits of work ((1/5) =E2=88=97224, so sl= ightly less) to find a workable second transaction which will hash to the second 32 bytes) =E2= =80=93 a very small amount of computation.] This attack vector was fixed in 0.6.2[ https://bitcoin.org/en/alert/2012-05-14-dos#risks CVE-2012-2459], re-introduced in 0.13.x[https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/7225 #7225] and patched again in 0.14[https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/9765 #9765] of bitcoin core. =3D=3D=3D=3D Block malleability with consensus VALID transactions =3D=3D=3D= =3D Producing a valid bitcoin transaction Tm that adheres to network consesnsus rules requires 224 bits of work[ https://github.com/Christewart/bips/blob/2024-12-20-64bytetxs/bip-XXXX/2-Bi= tcoinMerkle.pdf Note that the first transaction in a block must be a coinbase, and as discussed above, that largely constrains the first 32 bytes of the first transaction: only the 4 version bytes are unconstrained. So it would take at least 28*8=3D 22= 4 bits of work to find the first node in a given row of the tree that would match the first half of a coinbase, in addition to the amount of work required to grind the second half of the transaction to something meaningful (which is much easier =E2=80=93 only 16 bytes or so are constrained, so approximately 128 bits of work to find a collision). Of course, any of the rows in the Merkle tree could be used, but it nevertheless seems clear that this should be computationally infeasible.]. This is computationally and financially expensive but theoretically possible. This can lead to a persistent chain split on the network. =3D=3D=3D Attack on SPV clients =3D=3D=3D BIP37[https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0037.mediawiki BIP37]provides a partial merkle tree format[ https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0037.mediawiki#user-content= -Partial_Merkle_branch_format Partial Merkle Tree Format] that allows you to verify your bitcoin transaction is included in a merkle root embedded in a bitcoin block header. Notably this format does not commit to the height of the merkle tree. Suppose a (valid) 64-byte transaction T is included in a block with the property that the second 32 bytes (which are less constrained than the first 32 bytes) are constructed so that they collide with the hash of some other fake, invalid transaction F. The attacker can fool the SPV client into believing that F was included in a bitcoin block rather than T with 81 bits[ https://github.com/Christewart/bips/blob/2024-12-20-64bytetxs/bip-XXXX/2-Bi= tcoinMerkle.pdf An attacker who can do 81 bits of work (followed by another 40 bits of work, to construct the funding transaction whose coins will be spent by this one) is able to fool an SPV client in this way.] of work. This also reduces implementation complexity of SPV wallets[ https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/great-consensus-cleanup-revival/710/43 The steps needed to make sure a merkle proof for a transaction is secure.]. This could be mitigated by knowing the depth of the merkle tree. Requiring SPV clients to request both the coinbase transaction could mitigate this attack. To produce a valid coinbase transaction at the same depth that our fake transaction F occurs at would require 224 bits of work. As mentioned above, this is computionally and financially expensive, but theoretically possible. =3D=3DBackward compatibility=3D=3D There have been 5 64 byte transactions that have occcurred in the bitcoin blockchain as of this writing [ https://github.com/Christewart/bips/blob/2024-12-20-64bytetxs/64byte-tx-mai= nnet.txt 64 byte transactions in the bitcoin blockchain] With the last transaction 7f2efc6546011ad3227b2da678be0d30c7f4b08e2ce57b5edadd437f9e27a612[ https://mempool.space/tx/7f2efc6546011ad3227b2da678be0d30c7f4b08e2ce57b5eda= dd437f9e27a612 Last 64 byte transaction in the bitcoin blockchain] occurring at block height 419,606[ https://mempool.space/block/000000000000000000308f1efc24419f34a3bafcc2b53c3= 2dd57e4502865fd84 Block 419,606]. TODO =3D=3DReference implementation=3D=3D /** * We want to enforce certain rules (specifically the 64-byte transaction check) * before we call CheckBlock to check the merkle root. This allows us to enforce * malleability checks which may interact with other CheckBlock checks. * This is currently called both in AcceptBlock prior to writing the block to * disk and in ConnectBlock. * Note that as this is called before merkle-tree checks so must never return a * non-malleable error condition. */ static bool ContextualBlockPreCheck(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, const ChainstateManager& chainman, const CBlockIndex* pindexPrev) { if (DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_64BYTETX)) { for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) { if (::GetSerializeSize(TX_NO_WITNESS(tx)) =3D=3D 64) { return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "64-byte-transaction", strprintf("size of tx %s without witness is 64 bytes", tx->GetHash().ToString())); } } } return true; } https://github.com/bitcoin-inquisition/bitcoin/pull/24/files =3D=3D Rationale =3D=3D =3D=3DCopyright=3D=3D This BIP is licensed under the [https://opensource.org/license/BSD-3-Clause BSD-3-Clause License]. =3D=3DAcknowledgements=3D=3D Suhas Daftuar, AJ Towns, Sergio Demian Lerner, Greg Maxwell, Matt Corallo, Antoine Poinsont, Dave Harding and Erik Voskuil On Wed, Feb 5, 2025 at 6:57=E2=80=AFPM 'Antoine Poinsot' via Bitcoin Develo= pment Mailing List wrote: > Hi everyone, > > A bit over a year ago i started working on revisiting the 2019 Great > Consensus Cleanup proposal from > Matt Corallo [0]. His proposal included: > - making <=3D64 bytes transactions invalid to fix merkle tree weaknesses; > - making non-pushonly scriptSigs, FindAndDelete matches, OP_CODESEPARATOR > and non-standard sighash > types fail script validation to mitigate the worst case block validatio= n > time; > - restrict the nTime field of the first block in each difficulty > adjustment interval to be no less > than 600 seconds lower than the previous block's; > > I set out to research the impact of each of the vulnerabilities this > intended to patch, the > alternative fixes possible for each and finally if there was any other > protocol bug fix we'd want to > include if we went through the considerable effort of soft forking Bitcoi= n > already. > > Later in March i shared some first findings on Delving [1] and advertized > the effort on this mailing > list [2]. I also created a companion thread on Delving, kept private, to > discuss the details of the > worst case block validation time [3]. As one would expect due to the > larger design space available > to fix this issue, this private thread is where most of the discussion > would happen. Thank you to > everyone who contributed feedback, insights, ideas and argumented opinion= s > on the different issues > all along the process. > > Now i would like to update the broader Bitcoin development community on > the outcome of this effort. > I believe a Consensus Cleanup proposal should include the following. > - A fix for vulnerabilities surrounding the use of timestamps in the > difficulty adjustment > algorithm. In particular, a fix for the timewarp attack with a 7200 > seconds grace period as well > as a fix for the Murch-Zawy attack [4] by making invalid any difficulty > adjustment period with a > negative duration. > - A fix for long block validation times with a minimal "confiscation > surface", by introducing a > per-transaction limit on the number of legacy sigops in the inputs. > - A fix for merkle tree weaknesses by making transactions which serialize > to exactly 64 bytes > invalid. > - A fix for duplicate transactions to supplement BIP34 in order to avoid > resuming unnecessary BIP30 > validation in the future. This is achieved by mandating the nLockTime > field of coinbase > transaction to be set to the height of their block minus 1. > > I have started drafting a BIP draft with the detailed specs for this. > > Antoine Poinsot > > > [0] > https://github.com/TheBlueMatt/bips/blob/7f9670b643b7c943a0cc6d2197d3eabe= 661050c2/bip-XXXX.mediawiki > [1] https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/great-consensus-cleanup-revival/710 > [2] https://groups.google.com/g/bitcoindev/c/CAfm7D5ppjo/m/bYJ3BiOuAAAJ > [3] https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/worst-block-validation-time-inquiry/711 > [4] > https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/zawy-s-alternating-timestamp-attack/1062#var= iant-on-zawys-attack-2 > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/jiyMlvTX8BnG71f75SqChQZxyhZD= Q65kldcugeIDJVJsvK4hadCO3GT46xFc7_cUlWdmOCG0B_WIz0HAO5ZugqYTuX5qxnNLRBn3Mop= uATI%3D%40protonmail.com > . > --=20 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "= Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an e= mail to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/= CAGL6%2BmFYCKjhD8O1G9diC4pbM%3D_XubW0YxTfeqyyRpDe9t2fng%40mail.gmail.com. --0000000000001d485c062dd04d64 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi everyone! Excited to see this work moving forward. I= 9;ve taken the=20 liberty of carving off the 64 byte transaction portion of this proposal and= drafted a BIP. You can view a rendered draft with references here: https://github.com/Christewart/bips/blob/2024-12-20-64by= tetxs/bip-XXXX.mediawiki

<pre>
=C2=A0 BIP: ?
=C2=A0 = Layer: Consensus (soft fork)
=C2=A0 Title: Disallow 64 byte transactions=
=C2=A0 Author: Chris Stewart <stewart.chris1234@gmail.com>
=C2=A0 Status: Draft
=C2= =A0 Type: Specification
=C2=A0 License: BSD-3-Clause
=C2=A0 Created: = ?
</pre>

=3D=3DAbstract=3D=3D

This BIP describes the= rationale for disallowing transactions that are serialized to 64 bytes wit= hout the transaction's witness.
We describe the weaknesses to the m= erkle tree included in bitcoin block headers, various exploits for those we= aknesses.

=3D=3DMotivation=3D=3D

Bitcoin block headers includ= e a commitment to the set of transactions in a given
block, which is imp= lemented by constructing a Merkle tree of transaction id=E2=80=99s
(doub= le-SHA256 hash of a transaction) and including the root of the tree in the<= br>block header. This in turn allows for proving to a Bitcoin light client = that a
given transaction is in a given block by providing a path through= the tree to the
transaction. However, Bitcoin=E2=80=99s particular cons= truction of the Merkle tree has
several security weaknesses, including a= t least two forms of block malleability
that have an impact on the conse= nsus logic of Bitcoin Core, and an attack on
light clients, where an inv= alid transaction could be =E2=80=9Dproven=E2=80=9D to appear in a block
= by doing substantially less work than a SHA256 hash collision would require= .
This has been prevented by relay policy since 2018<ref>[https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/11423/comm= its/7485488e907e236133a016ba7064c89bf9ab6da3 PR #11423 disallows 64 byt= e transactions in bitcoin core relay]</ref>

=3D=3DSpecificatio= n=3D=3D

This BIP disallows bitcoin transactions that are serialized = to 64 bytes in length without it's witness.

=3D=3DRationale=3D= =3D

=3D=3D=3D Block malleability =3D=3D=3D

64 byte transactio= ns introduce block malleability. Malicious peers can construct consensus va= lid and invalid 64 byte
transactions that have the same serialization as= the concatenation of 2 nodes in the merkle tree.

Assume we have a v= alid bitcoin block with 2 transactions in it - T<sub>0</sub> an= d T<sub>1</sub>.
The merkle root for this block is H(T<su= b>0</sub>||T<sub>1</sub>).
A user could find a mali= cious 64 byte transaction T<sub>m</sub> that serializes to T<= ;sub>0</sub>||T<sub>1</sub>.
Next the malicious use= r relays the block containing the malicious T<sub>m</sub> rathe= r than the
valid bitcoin transactions T<sub>0</sub> and T<= ;sub>1</sub>.

=3D=3D=3D=3D Block malleability with consensu= s INVALID transactions =3D=3D=3D=3D

The peer receiving the malicious= block marks the block as invalid as T<sub>m</sub>
is not a= valid transaction according to network consensus rules.
Other peers on = the network receive the valid block containing T<sub>0</sub> an= d T<sub>1</sub>
add the block to their blockchain. Peers tha= t receive the invalid block before the valid block
will never come to co= nsensus with their peers due to the malicious user finding a collision
w= ithin the block's merkle root. Finding this collision approximately 22 = bits worth of work<ref>[https://github.co= m/Christewart/bips/blob/2024-12-20-64bytetxs/bip-XXXX/2-BitcoinMerkle.pdf to produce a block that has a Merkle
root which is a hash of a 64-byt= e quantity that deserializes validly, it=E2=80=99s enough
to just do 8 b= its of work to find a workable coinbase (which will hash to the first
32= bytes), plus another =E2=89=8822 bits of work ((1/5) =E2=88=97224, so slig= htly less) to find
a workable second transaction which will hash to the = second 32 bytes) =E2=80=93 a very
small amount of computation.]</ref&= gt;

This attack vector was fixed in 0.6.2<ref>[https://bitcoin.org/en/alert= /2012-05-14-dos#risks CVE-2012-2459]</ref>, re-introduced in 0.13= .x<ref>[http= s://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/7225 #7225]</ref> and patched= again in
0.14<ref>[https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/9765 #9765]</ref&= gt; of bitcoin core.

=3D=3D=3D=3D Block malleability with consensus = VALID transactions =3D=3D=3D=3D

Producing a valid bitcoin transactio= n T<sub>m</sub> that adheres to network consesnsus
rules req= uires 224 bits of work<ref>[https://githu= b.com/Christewart/bips/blob/2024-12-20-64bytetxs/bip-XXXX/2-BitcoinMerkle.p= df Note that the first transaction in a block must be a coinbase, and a= s discussed
above, that largely constrains the first 32 bytes of the fir= st transaction: only
the 4 version bytes are unconstrained. So it would = take at least 28*8=3D 224 bits
of work to find the first node in a given= row of the tree that would match the
first half of a coinbase, in addit= ion to the amount of work required to grind the
second half of the trans= action to something meaningful (which is much easier =E2=80=93
only 16 b= ytes or so are constrained, so approximately 128 bits of work to find a col= lision). Of course, any of the rows in the Merkle tree could be used, but i= t nevertheless seems clear that this should be computationally infeasible.]= </ref>.
This is computationally and financially expensive but theo= retically possible. This can lead to a persistent chain split on the networ= k.

=3D=3D=3D Attack on SPV clients =3D=3D=3D

BIP37<ref>= [https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0037.mediawiki BIP37]&= lt;/ref>provides a partial merkle tree format<ref>[https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-= 0037.mediawiki#user-content-Partial_Merkle_branch_format Partial Merkle= Tree Format]</ref>
that allows you to verify your bitcoin transac= tion is included in a merkle root embedded in a bitcoin block header.
No= tably this format does not commit to the height of the merkle tree.

= Suppose a (valid) 64-byte transaction T is included in a block with the pro= perty that the second 32 bytes (which
are less constrained than the firs= t 32 bytes) are constructed so that they collide
with the hash of some o= ther fake, invalid transaction F. The attacker can fool the SPV client into= believing that F
was included in a bitcoin block rather than T with 81 = bits<ref>[https://github.com/Christewart/= bips/blob/2024-12-20-64bytetxs/bip-XXXX/2-BitcoinMerkle.pdf An attacker= who can do 81 bits of work (followed by another 40 bits of work, to
con= struct the funding transaction whose coins will be spent by this one) is ab= le
to fool an SPV client in this way.]</ref> of work. This also re= duces implementation complexity of SPV wallets<ref>[https://delv= ingbitcoin.org/t/great-consensus-cleanup-revival/710/43 The steps neede= d to make sure a merkle proof for a transaction is secure.]</ref>.
This could be mitigated by knowing the depth of the merkle tree. Requi= ring SPV clients to request both the coinbase transaction could mitigate th= is attack.
To produce a valid coinbase transaction at the same depth tha= t our fake transaction F occurs at would require 224 bits of work.
As me= ntioned above, this is computionally and financially expensive, but theoret= ically possible.

=3D=3DBackward compatibility=3D=3D

There hav= e been 5 64 byte transactions that have occcurred in the bitcoin blockchain= as of this
writing <ref>[https://github.com/= Christewart/bips/blob/2024-12-20-64bytetxs/64byte-tx-mainnet.txt 64 byt= e transactions in the bitcoin blockchain]</ref>
With the last tran= saction 7f2efc6546011ad3227b2da678be0d30c7f4b08e2ce57b5edadd437f9e27a612<= ;ref>[https://mempool.space/tx/7f2efc6546011a= d3227b2da678be0d30c7f4b08e2ce57b5edadd437f9e27a612 Last 64 byte transac= tion in the bitcoin blockchain]</ref>
occurring at block height 41= 9,606<ref>[https://mempool.space/block/= 000000000000000000308f1efc24419f34a3bafcc2b53c32dd57e4502865fd84 Block = 419,606]</ref>.

TODO

=3D=3DReference implementation=3D= =3D

<source lang=3D"cpp">
/**
=C2=A0* We want = to enforce certain rules (specifically the 64-byte transaction check)
= =C2=A0* before we call CheckBlock to check the merkle root. This allows us = to enforce
=C2=A0* malleability checks which may interact with other Che= ckBlock checks.
=C2=A0* This is currently called both in AcceptBlock pri= or to writing the block to
=C2=A0* disk and in ConnectBlock.
=C2=A0* = Note that as this is called before merkle-tree checks so must never return = a
=C2=A0* non-malleable error condition.
=C2=A0*/
static bool Cont= extualBlockPreCheck(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& stat= e, const ChainstateManager& chainman, const CBlockIndex* pindexPrev){
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 if (DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman, Consens= us::DEPLOYMENT_64BYTETX)) {
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 for (const auto& tx= : block.vtx) {
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 if (::GetSeria= lizeSize(TX_NO_WITNESS(tx)) =3D=3D 64) {
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2= =A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_= MUTATED, "64-byte-transaction", strprintf("size of tx %s wit= hout witness is 64 bytes", tx->GetHash().ToString()));
=C2=A0 = =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 }
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 }
= =C2=A0 =C2=A0 }

=C2=A0 =C2=A0 return true;
}
</source>
https://github.com/bitcoin-inquisition/bitcoin/pull/24/files
=3D=3D Rationale =3D=3D

<references />

=3D=3DCopyright= =3D=3D
This BIP is licensed under the [https://opensource.org/license/BSD-3-Clause BSD-= 3-Clause License].

=3D=3DAcknowledgements=3D=3D

Suhas Daftuar= , AJ Towns, Sergio Demian Lerner, Greg Maxwell, Matt Corallo, Antoine Poins= ont, Dave Harding and Erik Voskuil

On Wed, Feb 5, = 2025 at 6:57=E2=80=AFPM 'Antoine Poinsot' via Bitcoin Development M= ailing List <bitcoindev@g= ooglegroups.com> wrote:
Hi everyone,

A bit over a year ago i started working on revisiting the 2019 Great Consen= sus Cleanup proposal from
Matt Corallo [0]. His proposal included:
- making <=3D64 bytes transactions invalid to fix merkle tree weaknesses= ;
- making non-pushonly scriptSigs, FindAndDelete matches, OP_CODESEPARATOR a= nd non-standard sighash
=C2=A0 types fail script validation to mitigate the worst case block valida= tion time;
- restrict the nTime field of the first block in each difficulty adjustment= interval to be no less
=C2=A0 than 600 seconds lower than the previous block's;

I set out to research the impact of each of the vulnerabilities this intend= ed to patch, the
alternative fixes possible for each and finally if there was any other prot= ocol bug fix we'd want to
include if we went through the considerable effort of soft forking Bitcoin = already.

Later in March i shared some first findings on Delving [1] and advertized t= he effort on this mailing
list [2]. I also created a companion thread on Delving, kept private, to di= scuss the details of the
worst case block validation time [3]. As one would expect due to the larger= design space available
to fix this issue, this private thread is where most of the discussion woul= d happen. Thank you to
everyone who contributed feedback, insights, ideas and argumented opinions = on the different issues
all along the process.

Now i would like to update the broader Bitcoin development community on the= outcome of this effort.
I believe a Consensus Cleanup proposal should include the following.
- A fix for vulnerabilities surrounding the use of timestamps in the diffic= ulty adjustment
=C2=A0 algorithm.=C2=A0 In particular, a fix for the timewarp attack with a= 7200 seconds grace period as well
=C2=A0 as a fix for the Murch-Zawy attack [4] by making invalid any difficu= lty adjustment period with a
=C2=A0 negative duration.
- A fix for long block validation times with a minimal "confiscation s= urface", by introducing a
=C2=A0 per-transaction limit on the number of legacy sigops in the inputs.<= br> - A fix for merkle tree weaknesses by making transactions which serialize t= o exactly 64 bytes
=C2=A0 invalid.
- A fix for duplicate transactions to supplement BIP34 in order to avoid re= suming unnecessary BIP30
=C2=A0 validation in the future. This is achieved by mandating the nLockTim= e field of coinbase
=C2=A0 transaction to be set to the height of their block minus 1.

I have started drafting a BIP draft with the detailed specs for this.

Antoine Poinsot


[0] https://github.com/TheBlueMatt/bips/blob/7f9670b643b7c943a0cc6d2197d3ea= be661050c2/bip-XXXX.mediawiki
[1] https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/gre= at-consensus-cleanup-revival/710
[2] https://groups.google.com/g/b= itcoindev/c/CAfm7D5ppjo/m/bYJ3BiOuAAAJ
[3] https://delvingbitcoin.org/t= /worst-block-validation-time-inquiry/711
[4] h= ttps://delvingbitcoin.org/t/zawy-s-alternating-timestamp-attack/1062#varian= t-on-zawys-attack-2

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