From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6272C6C for ; Wed, 12 Jul 2017 19:19:07 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from so254-16.mailgun.net (so254-16.mailgun.net [198.61.254.16]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 333991E8 for ; Wed, 12 Jul 2017 19:19:05 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: a=rsa-sha256; v=1; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=suredbits.com; q=dns/txt; s=mailo; t=1499887145; h=Content-Type: To: Subject: Message-ID: Date: From: References: In-Reply-To: MIME-Version: Sender; bh=4ASHU6hvzH6cGsvuUxkGKEaxL69bOZ0IASvGqRr4Po0=; b=G6Sj96gc82WRuDlGyVCzup4hHukSYxfnC4KsUzMT7vmdCWywc1ltymFCzTSxbpC7OX3vy6kg EsuvoPOjtdzjjKS6o58oNxe91CQhLzrhOGGQqw7dQdJYgy3Hnw9ODvwZbd2Zt5nLQcPsjkhj mODwnAkJpydGEVgRu2iw+vgPNqQ= DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=suredbits.com; s=mailo; q=dns; h=Sender: MIME-Version: In-Reply-To: References: From: Date: Message-ID: Subject: To: Content-Type; b=WdYSFgG2FKW0zXeFQw2QHLtTSUQ+/IUBUwCQPZc+2blR03HddsUl5/Yge6mwC4TDKWYYl9 9wUiHa1VpyeObgdA13+76wc9hqOh3b5+T7f3DoR5DgIpLDMQcDiSl3jKki1VYA1KUHOn0UTI gYf//d4BoUR8q+WBTtqtWIXf51sDw= Sender: chris@suredbits.com X-Mailgun-Sending-Ip: 198.61.254.16 X-Mailgun-Sid: WyI5MGYzNyIsICJiaXRjb2luLWRldkBsaXN0cy5saW51eGZvdW5kYXRpb24ub3JnIiwgIjJjMTQxIl0= Received: from mail-it0-f43.google.com (mail-it0-f43.google.com [209.85.214.43]) by mxa.mailgun.org with ESMTP id 59667628.7ff8f42fe670-smtp-out-n02; Wed, 12 Jul 2017 19:19:04 -0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-it0-f43.google.com with SMTP id v202so18983541itb.0 for ; Wed, 12 Jul 2017 12:19:04 -0700 (PDT) X-Gm-Message-State: AIVw110x5NLPEIBDvugZmCBqoZ3Jctkeq/a7d9OBLIsr8ZoYqysimtVY uKZs39Fpgp2PkBUukFmdRoikd3BF/Q== X-Received: by 10.36.26.200 with SMTP id 191mr15635657iti.7.1499887144018; Wed, 12 Jul 2017 12:19:04 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.107.174.131 with HTTP; Wed, 12 Jul 2017 12:19:03 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <0119661e-a11a-6d4b-c9ec-fd510bd4f144@gmail.com> <1c1d06a9-2e9f-5b2d-42b7-d908ada4b09e@gmail.com> <08078429-089f-9315-2f76-a08121c5378c@gmail.com> From: Chris Stewart Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 14:19:03 -0500 X-Gmail-Original-Message-ID: Message-ID: To: Tao Effect , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="001a1143ea806c534a055423b0a4" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.0 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 19:26:03 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Updating the Scaling Roadmap X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 19:19:07 -0000 --001a1143ea806c534a055423b0a4 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Hi Greg, >Here, you admit that the security of the sidechains allows miners to steal bitcoins, something they cannot do currently. If I put my coins in an anyone can spend output, a miner will take them. They can do this today. I suggest you try it if you don't believe me :-). You have to be more specific with contract types instead of generically talking about 'all contracts ever'. > Drivechain is an unmistakeable weakening of Bitcoin's security guarantees. This you have not denied. I think this is an unfair characterization. You have to opt into using drivechains. Other outputs such as P2PKH/Multisig etc are unaffected by a drivechain output. As Pieter Wuille stated earlier in this thread (and Paul has stated all along), drivechain outputs have a different security model than other contracts. Namely they are controlled by miners. I think we can all agree this is unfortunate, but it is the current reality we live in. I look forward to the day we can solve the 'ownership' problem so we can have trustless interoperable blockchains, but that day is not today. As a reminder, most users will not have to go through the drivechain withdrawal process. Most withdrawals will be done via atomic swaps. >There is no reason to weaken Bitcoin's security in such a dramatic fashion. Better options are being worked on, they just take time. Care to share? I'm unaware if there is. > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-June/014600.html Everyone should re-read this email though, this is something that could happen. Paul's design makes it so that if this occurs it is *VERY* obvious. I guess we can argue if there is any difference between an obvious robbery vs a hidden robbery, but I think if we have to pick one or the other the choice is clear to me. Other designs (that I'm aware of) for sidechains had attack vectors that weren't so obvious. -Chris On Tue, Jul 11, 2017 at 6:12 PM, Tao Effect via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Paul, > > There is a difference between replying to an email, and addressing the > issues that were brought up in it. > > I did read your reply, and I chose not to respond to it because it did not > address anything I said. > > Here's an example: > > It would not be accurate to say that miners have "total" control. Miners > do control the destination of withdrawals, but they do not control the > withdrawal-duration nor the withdrawal-frequency. > > So, if miners wish to 'steal' from a sidechain, they _can_ initiate a > theft, but they can not change the fact that their malfeasance will be > [a] obvious, and [b] on display for a long period of time. > > > Here, you admit that the security of the sidechains allows miners to steal > bitcoins, something they cannot do currently. > > You next tried to equate three different types of theft, what you called > "Classic Theft", "Channel Theft", and "Drivechain Theft", saying: > > I do not think that any of the three stands out as being categorically > worse than the others > > > To anyone who understands bitcoin, there is a very clear, unmistakeable > difference between double-spending ("Classic Theft"), and *ownership* of > the private key controlling the bitcoins. > > Similarly, to anyone who understands bitcoin, there is also a very clear, > unmistakeable difference between censorship ("Channel Theft"), and > *ownership* of the private key controlling the bitcoins. > > The entire email was a very long-form way of admitting to all of the > issues that were raised in the previous email, while making it sound like > you had addressed the issues. > > I am not sure how else to respond to that email, given that none of the > issues were really addressed. > > Drivechain is an unmistakeable weakening of Bitcoin's security guarantees. > This you have not denied. > > There is no reason to weaken Bitcoin's security in such a dramatic > fashion. Better options are being worked on, they just take time. > > Kind regards, > Greg Slepak > > -- > Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable also sharing with > the NSA. > > On Jul 11, 2017, at 3:57 PM, Paul Sztorc wrote: > > On 7/11/2017 6:41 PM, Tao Effect wrote: > > Dear Paul, > > Drivechain has several issues that you've acknowledged but have not, > IMO, adequately (at all really) addressed [1]. > > > I replied to your email at length, at [2]. You should read that email, > and then reply to it with your outstanding objections, if you still have > them (per the usual customs of a mailing list). > > [2] > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/ > 2017-June/014609.html > > Adopting DC would be an irreversible course of action, > > > This is false -- it is easily reversible with a second soft fork. > > Also, I would say to everyone that, (in my opinion as the OP) this > conversation will go off-topic if it veers exclusively into 'drivechain > review'. > > Paul > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --001a1143ea806c534a055423b0a4 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi Greg,

>Here, you admit that the security= of the sidechains allows miners to steal bitcoins, something they cannot d= o currently.

If I put my coins in an anyone can spend out= put, a miner will take them. They can do this today. I suggest you try it i= f you don't believe me :-). You have to be more specific with contract = types instead of generically talking about 'all contracts ever'.

> Drivechain is an unmistakeable weakening of Bitcoin&#= 39;s security guarantees. This you have not denied.

I think th= is is an unfair characterization. You have to opt into using drivechains. O= ther outputs such as P2PKH/Multisig etc are unaffected by a drivechain outp= ut. As Pieter Wuille stated earlier in this thread (and Paul has stated all= along), drivechain outputs have a different security model than other cont= racts. Namely they are controlled by miners. I think we can all agree this = is unfortunate, but it is the current reality we live in. I look forward to= the day we can solve the 'ownership' problem so we can have trustl= ess interoperable blockchains, but that day is not today.

=
As a reminder, most users will not have to go through the drivec= hain withdrawal process. Most withdrawals will be done via atomic swaps.
>There is no reason to weaken Bitcoin's security in such a dra= matic=20 fashion. Better options are being worked on, they just take time.

Everyone should re-read this email though, th= is is something that could happen. Paul's design makes it so that if th= is occurs it is *VERY* obvious. I guess we can argue if there is any differ= ence between an obvious robbery vs a hidden robbery, but I think if we have= to pick one or the other the choice is clear to me. Other designs (that I&= #39;m aware of) for sidechains had attack vectors that weren't so obvio= us.

-Chris


<= /div>

On Tue, Jul = 11, 2017 at 6:12 PM, Tao Effect via bitcoin-dev <bitco= in-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
Paul,

= There is a difference between replying to an email, and addressing the issu= es that were brought up in it.

I did read your rep= ly, and I chose not to respond to it because it did not address anything I = said.

Here's an example:

<= blockquote type=3D"cite">It would not be accurate to say that miners have &= quot;total" control. Miners
do control the destination of withdrawa= ls, but they do not control the
withdrawal-duration nor the withdrawal-f= requency.

So, if miners wish to 'steal' from a sidechain, th= ey _can_ initiate a
theft, but they can not change the fact that their m= alfeasance will be
[a] obvious, and [b] on display for a long = period of time.

Here, you admit th= at the security of the sidechains allows miners to steal bitcoins, somethin= g they cannot do currently.

You next tried to equa= te three different types of theft, what you called "Classic Theft"= ;, "Channel Theft", and "Drivechain Theft", saying:

I do not think t= hat any of the three stands out as being categorically
worse than= the others

To anyone who understands bitcoin, there is = a very clear, unmistakeable difference between double-spending ("Class= ic Theft"), and *ownership* of the private key controlling the bitcoin= s.

Similarly, to anyone who understands bitcoin, t= here is also a very clear, unmistakeable difference between censorship (&qu= ot;Channel Theft"), and *ownership* of the private key controlling the= bitcoins.

The entire email was a very long-form w= ay of admitting to all of the issues that were raised in the previous email= , while making it sound like you had addressed the issues.

I am not sure how else to respond to that email, given that none o= f the issues were really addressed.

Drivechain is = an unmistakeable weakening of Bitcoin's security guarantees. This you h= ave not denied.

There is no reason to weaken Bitco= in's security in such a dramatic fashion. Better options are being work= ed on, they just take time.

Kind regards,
Greg Slepak

--
Please do not email me anything that you are not comfortable = also sharing=C2=A0with the NSA.

On Jul 11, = 2017, at 3:57 PM, Paul Sztorc <truthcoin@gmail.com> wrote:

On 7/11/2017 6:41 PM, T= ao Effect wrote:
Dear Paul,

Drivechain = has several issues that you've acknowledged but have not,
IMO, adequ= ately (at all really) addressed [1].

I replied to your = email at length, at [2]. You should read that email,
and then reply to i= t with your outstanding objections, if you still have
them (per the usua= l customs of a mailing list).

[2]
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-Ju= ne/014609.html

Adopting DC would be an= irreversible course of action,

This is false -- it is = easily reversible with a second soft fork.

Also, I would say to ever= yone that, (in my opinion as the OP) this
conversation will go off-topic= if it veers exclusively into 'drivechain
review'.

Paul




___= ____________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org= /mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


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