From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from silver.osuosl.org (smtp3.osuosl.org [140.211.166.136]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DED77C0177 for ; Mon, 23 Mar 2020 18:39:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by silver.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C94B420380 for ; Mon, 23 Mar 2020 18:39:21 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org Received: from silver.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id SQIz61twij-s for ; Mon, 23 Mar 2020 18:39:20 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ed1-f45.google.com (mail-ed1-f45.google.com [209.85.208.45]) by silver.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2D15E20349 for ; Mon, 23 Mar 2020 18:39:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-ed1-f45.google.com with SMTP id bd14so3623410edb.10 for ; Mon, 23 Mar 2020 11:39:20 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=e87WuEefDDJEBNHlG1ENaNM45+6lS1ZweFJ10twIXWg=; b=QbmdhR1ke/9QiYTLb5uyONIXX2oxwxznHx+1bZOtp57xH9c63SlehsS+fmdNrtasSl WFhyTHQMCLr2v5N+o4IBHDXGjn2HlUQkOLj1QOTD7N3VfVMnk+EV/W4uS/9OfEt1vYPI OWref6MdeAl6t6Q/LxdIKImP8b0vvsiLqQIW9TONRAH2HcHLWwNGQmoiZasXHdcz1lU0 FhY8eKnXgKWd438XNdxH8+EqY/YBKdYqiDaXtH0delCxqIeKzRVPExQn7N5cbp88DjNC LwB+nJLHvfXMw/sst+RkBOwU0blQEzaQ4KQcyq8Fav8FzJg18p8kFXCe8mkKXCEJLo0R qNgg== X-Gm-Message-State: ANhLgQ2IGj2gg1X4oV2+NEu2M4CKjsC5BZJONCJZuryME5tUYdZu/dOP q4obweechc8c8hYRPuqLy4rMkw9hzfCwMGDqi+zVUGVe X-Google-Smtp-Source: ADFU+vsnxjyha96fx59uE96EatoNgxP9xgIKgGrQYIalxPZ5DPmy6ksSJ/8aY+w9MByHc1IPiiccGr4mY/j/22YZvos= X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:1ba1:: with SMTP id r1mr21303481ejg.297.1584988758449; Mon, 23 Mar 2020 11:39:18 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20200323125922.GA29881@canndrew.org> In-Reply-To: <20200323125922.GA29881@canndrew.org> From: Dave Scotese Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2020 11:39:05 -0700 Message-ID: To: Andrew Cann Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000eba2f405a189f355" Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block solving slowdown question/poll X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2020 18:39:22 -0000 --000000000000eba2f405a189f355 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" I believe this isn't something we need to address. The fact is that every byte stored in the blockchain is already valuable to everyone who downloads the blockchain because of what it allows them to prove - by adding more bytes to it. Over time, the value per byte will increase. Perhaps there will be holding companies with specialized scripts that cost $500 - $1000 to add to the blockchain and allow those companies to handle transactions for thousands of customers, kind of like a community lightning channel. Anyway, yes, your idea is fundamentally broken because a zero block reward happens because creating even one more satoshi will push the amount of bitcoin over 21,000,0000, breaking the meaning of "bitcoin," or, if you like, creating a fundamental contradiction in our use of the term. On Mon, Mar 23, 2020 at 5:59 AM Andrew Cann wrote: > Hi, noob question here: Is there a long-term plan for if the block reward > drops > too low to ensure the security of the network? > > IIUC miners only make profit from block rewards and transaction fees, and > once > the block reward drop to zero we're merely hoping that transaction fees > will > keep mining expensive enough to stop a state actor or someone from buying > enough hash power to attack the network. If that's the case, should we > start > making plans now to change the protocol to allow an adjustable block > reward? > > Here's a half-baked idea I had of how that could work: Since the block > reward > dilutes the value of the currency bitcoin holders have an incentive to > keep the > reward low. However, since the block reward is also (partly) what > incentivizes > mining, bitcoin holders also have an incentive to keep the reward high > enough > to keep the network secure. So if bitcoin holders were able to vote to > decide > the block reward they "should", hypothetically, reliably choose a value > that > balances these two concerns. You could implement this voting by adding an > optional extra field to every txout that signals what the holder thinks the > inflation rate should be. If the field is missing you just assume the > default > value based on the current protocol. Then, whenever a new block is mined, > you > take the median inflation rate of all the pre-existing utxos, weighted by > the > utxo value, to calculate the block's reward. > > Is this idea fundamentally broken somehow? Or are there already better > ideas > for how to tackle this problem (I don't follow this list very closely)? Or > is > this actually a non-issue to start with? > > - Andrew > > -- I like to provide some work at no charge to prove my value. Do you need a techie? I own Litmocracy and Meme Racing (in alpha). I'm the webmaster for The Voluntaryist which now accepts Bitcoin. I also code for The Dollar Vigilante . "He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules" - Satoshi Nakamoto --000000000000eba2f405a189f355 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I believe this isn't something we need to address.=C2= =A0 The fact is that every byte stored in the blockchain is already valuabl= e to everyone who downloads the blockchain because of what it allows them t= o prove - by adding more bytes to it.=C2=A0 Over time, the value per byte w= ill increase.=C2=A0 Perhaps there will be holding companies with specialize= d scripts that cost $500 - $1000 to add to the blockchain and allow those c= ompanies to handle transactions for thousands of customers, kind of like a = community lightning channel.

Anyway, yes, your idea is f= undamentally broken because a zero block reward happens because creating ev= en one more satoshi will push the amount of bitcoin over 21,000,0000, break= ing the meaning of "bitcoin," or, if you like, creating a fundame= ntal contradiction in our use of the term.

On Mon, Mar 23, 2020 at 5:5= 9 AM Andrew Cann <shum@canndrew.org= > wrote:
= Hi, noob question here: Is there a long-term plan for if the block reward d= rops
too low to ensure the security of the network?

IIUC miners only make profit from block rewards and transaction fees, and o= nce
the block reward drop to zero we're merely hoping that transaction fees= will
keep mining expensive enough to stop a state actor or someone from buying enough hash power to attack the network. If that's the case, should we = start
making plans now to change the protocol to allow an adjustable block reward= ?

Here's a half-baked idea I had of how that could work: Since the block = reward
dilutes the value of the currency bitcoin holders have an incentive to keep= the
reward low. However, since the block reward is also (partly) what incentivi= zes
mining, bitcoin holders also have an incentive to keep the reward high enou= gh
to keep the network secure. So if bitcoin holders were able to vote to deci= de
the block reward they "should", hypothetically, reliably choose a= value that
balances these two concerns. You could implement this voting by adding an optional extra field to every txout that signals what the holder thinks the=
inflation rate should be. If the field is missing you just assume the defau= lt
value based on the current protocol. Then, whenever a new block is mined, y= ou
take the median inflation rate of all the pre-existing utxos, weighted by t= he
utxo value, to calculate the block's reward.

Is this idea fundamentally broken somehow? Or are there already better idea= s
for how to tackle this problem (I don't follow this list very closely)?= Or is
this actually a non-issue to start with?

=C2=A0- Andrew



--
I like to provide some work at = no charge to prove my value. Do you need a techie?=C2=A0
I own Litmocracy and Meme Racing (in alpha)= .
I'm the webmaster for The Voluntaryist which now accepts Bitcoin.
I also co= de for The Dollar= Vigilante.
"He ought to find it more profitable to play by the= rules" - Satoshi Nakamoto
--000000000000eba2f405a189f355--