From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 27FC41168 for ; Tue, 29 Dec 2015 19:00:00 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ob0-f177.google.com (mail-ob0-f177.google.com [209.85.214.177]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 10348164 for ; Tue, 29 Dec 2015 18:59:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-ob0-f177.google.com with SMTP id ba1so164649941obb.3 for ; Tue, 29 Dec 2015 10:59:59 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject :from:to:cc:content-type; bh=yiK1AP+MI97CEAfSA27BoL2LTl3/b2yTsGWuI1rrra4=; b=1CKPyh/JwCvtHbt9Rp8qoa0yZpkEhP9wCJ1K4F0U3mETmZKRgnNaeEkMKPsMEAKI/v EAJYV5kn0Ew+OOxxALu1wGVYyhDp+iffVLFfS6ufxiwz2GnNsQEScW4y09nuRXcDCQ+7 9O0TJD632N9qaKfDuVb94riCXFGGsP3fHZINdwF4rfH19bFmQZ9zEq04aOVi4b68orsf vWrwAjK7qmXwLcDdOn0cdqhkmPyaHlG3CBKxTN81KwbVTfYcVvvUnU5hCADhk8ai9uiB iWwEziHvqpV4W2MaWhOB0zm0yGiLf8WdoCCKZstRN7ZtIrNzJX5ogEaBRyTqygP1uwqE NGPA== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.182.66.137 with SMTP id f9mr10473277obt.42.1451415598373; Tue, 29 Dec 2015 10:59:58 -0800 (PST) Sender: dscotese@gmail.com Received: by 10.60.125.35 with HTTP; Tue, 29 Dec 2015 10:59:58 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: <20151219184240.GB12893@muck> <4882BD35-D890-4860-9222-5C23AEB6AE89@mattcorallo.com> <20151220044450.GA23942@muck> <20151228191228.GC12298@muck> Date: Tue, 29 Dec 2015 10:59:58 -0800 X-Google-Sender-Auth: s2Ue-HSFiEZ2wGEQShcDY-vjNdM Message-ID: From: Dave Scotese To: Ivan Brightly Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0160c35a29a32405280e07fd X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] We need to fix the block withholding attack X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 29 Dec 2015 19:00:00 -0000 --089e0160c35a29a32405280e07fd Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 There have been no decent objections to altering the block-selection mechanism (when two block solutions appear at nearly the same time) as described at http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/39226 Key components are: - Compute BitcoinDaysDestroyed using only transactions that have been in your mempool for some time as oBTCDD ("old BTCDD"). - Use "nearly the same time" to mean separated in time by your guess of the average duration of block propagation times. - When two block solutions come in at nearly the same time, build on the one that has the most oBTCDD, rather than the one that came in first. The goal of this change is to reduce the profitability of withholding block solutions by severely reducing the chances that a block solved a while ago can orphan one solved recently. "Came in first" seems more easily gamed than "most oBTCDD". As I wrote there, "*old coins* is always a dwindling resource and *global nodes willing to help cheat* is probably a growing one." I will write a BIP if anyone agrees it's a good idea. On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 12:26 PM, Ivan Brightly via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 2:12 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev < >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >> Far more concerning is network propagation effects between large and >> small miners. For that class of issues, if you are in an environemnt >> where selfish mining is possible - a fairly flat, easily DoS/sybil >> attacked network topology - the profitability difference between small >> and large miners even *without* attacks going on is a hugely worrying >> problem. OTOH, if you're blocksize is small enough that propagation time >> is negligable to profitability, then selfish mining attacks with <30% >> hashing power aren't much of a concern - they'll be naturally defeated >> by anti-DoS/anti-sybil measures. >> > > Let's agree that one factor in mining profitability is bandwidth/network > reliability/stability. Why focus on that vs electricity contracts or > vertically integrated chip manufacturers? Surely, sufficient network > bandwidth is a more broadly available commodity than <$0.02/kwh > electricity, for example. I'm not sure that your stranded hydroelectric > miner is any more desirable than thousands of dorm room miners with access > to 10gbit university connections and free electricity. > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > -- I like to provide some work at no charge to prove my value. Do you need a techie? I own Litmocracy and Meme Racing (in alpha). I'm the webmaster for The Voluntaryist which now accepts Bitcoin. I also code for The Dollar Vigilante . "He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules" - Satoshi Nakamoto --089e0160c35a29a32405280e07fd Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
There have been no decent objections to altering the = block-selection mechanism (when two block solutions appear at nearly the sa= me time) as described at

http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/39226
=
Key components are:
  • Compute BitcoinDaysDestroyed using= only transactions that have been in your mempool for some time as oBTCDD (= "old BTCDD").
  • Use "nearly the same time" to mea= n separated in time by your guess of the average duration of block propagat= ion times.
  • When two block solutions come in at nearly the same = time, build on the one that has the most oBTCDD, rather than the one that c= ame in first.

The goal of this change is to reduce the profitab= ility of withholding block solutions by severely reducing the chances that = a block solved a while ago can orphan one solved recently.=C2=A0 "Came= in first" seems more easily gamed than "most oBTCDD".=C2=A0= As I wrote there, "old coins is always a dwindling resource = and global nodes willing to help cheat is probably a growing one.&= quot;

I will write a BIP if anyone agrees it's a good idea.


On Mo= n, Dec 28, 2015 at 12:26 PM, Ivan Brightly via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
On Mon, Dec 28, 2015= at 2:12 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev=C2=A0<bitcoin= -dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>=C2=A0wrote:
Far more concerning is network propagation effects between large and
small miners. For that class of issues, if you are in an environemnt
where selfish mining is possible - a fairly flat, easily DoS/sybil
attacked network topology - the profitability difference between small
and large miners even *without* attacks going on is a hugely worrying
problem. OTOH, if you're blocksize is small enough that propagation tim= e
is negligable to profitability, then selfish mining attacks with <30% hashing power aren't much of a concern - they'll be naturally defea= ted
by anti-DoS/anti-sybil measures.

Let's agree that one factor in mining profitability is bandwidth/netwo= rk reliability/stability. Why focus on that vs electricity contracts or ver= tically integrated chip manufacturers? Surely, sufficient network bandwidth= is a more broadly available commodity than <$0.02/kwh electricity, for = example. I'm not sure that your stranded hydroelectric miner is any mor= e desirable than thousands of dorm room miners with access to 10gbit univer= sity connections and free electricity.

_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev




--
I like to provide some work at no charge to pr= ove my value. Do you need a techie?=C2=A0
I own Litmocracy and Meme Racing (in alpha).
I'm th= e webmaster for T= he Voluntaryist which now accepts Bitcoin.
I also code for The Dollar Vigilante= .
"He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules" -= Satoshi Nakamoto
--089e0160c35a29a32405280e07fd--