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From: Dave Scotese <dscotese@litmocracy.com>
To: "Rune K. Svendsen" <runesvend@gmail.com>
Cc: "bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org"
	<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Hash of UTXO set as consensus-critical
Date: Sat, 19 Sep 2015 17:48:19 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGLBAhetQ0A39ca=DKH=V0pYoeKyXG08t6GWSZzDx9f+fO9Mdg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <F59E7FFD-D4C7-45D3-8224-4C1D62D8AAB6@gmail.com>

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It seems there should be a practical limit to the size of a re-org - I mean
a practical limit that is smaller than the current height.  Vincent's
proposal suggests that a year's worth of blocks is such a practical limit.
I agree.  There are probably lower limits that are practical too, but I
like an entire year just to be conservative.  As Vincent points out, "An
attacker will need to have hidden hashing power to overwrite a years worth
of blocks."

TL;DR for the rest of this: Txns that lose confirmations from a reorg and
then show up in the mempool but not in any of the next few blocks indicate
malicious mining.

I see a blind spot here.  We are seeing the rule that says the longest
chain is the valid chain as impossible to break, but it isn't.  We broke it
to fix the BerkelyDB problem.  The code itself would have prevented us from
doing that IF 51% of the hashpower had been used to build on the wrong
chain, but it wasn't.

Justus' question about what malicious means is key here.  The blind spot is
a bit more complex than just viewing the longest chain as impossible to
break except with more than 51% of the hash power.  The blind spot is our
inability to distinguish between malicious blocks and honest blocks.

Rune suggests that empty blocks indicate malice.  I like that (which is why
I advocate using BitcoinDaysDestroyed to decide between blocks at the same
height that appear at nearly the same time, rather than first-seen).  There
are other methods we can use to distinguish between malicious blocks and
honest ones.  I'm inventing one right now, but I'm sure better ones can be
found.

Here's mine: Once a transaction has been confirmed, its originator
generally takes on the responsibility of re-broadcasting it if it gets
re-org'd out of its confirmation(s).  Many mempools will see that
re-broadcast, *if it happens*.  Any malice in a 51% attack would come in
the form of failing to include such transactions.  If we have a history of
orphaned blocks, then we can check to see which ones have been included in
non-orphaned blocks since they got reorg'd out.  Such transactions should
be top-priority after a reorg, even if they have zero fees.  When there is
a transaction that doesn't appear in a new block within a couple hours of a
reorg, that indicates dishonesty, usually in the sender (but that could be
negligence), but possibly in the miner.  Looking at the mempool would
determine which, wouldn't it?

notplato

On Sat, Sep 19, 2015 at 1:11 PM, Rune K. Svendsen via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> An honest miner is a miner that supports the network by building on top of
> the best valid chain. A malicious miner is one who wants to disrupt the
> Bitcoin network, not support it, for example by executing a 51% attack
> which mines empty blocks on top of the best chain.
>
>
> /Rune
>
> > Den 19/09/2015 kl. 19.19 skrev Justus Ranvier <
> justus@openbitcoinprivacyproject.org>:
> >
> >> On 19/09/15 10:45, Rune Kjær Svendsen wrote:
> >> We need to distinguish between two different things here:
> >>
> >> 1) A 51% attack, where the majority of mining power is *malicious*
> (hence “attack”)
> >
> > What does "malicious" mean?
> >
> > In other words, If miner A is mining honestly, and miner B is mining
> > maliciously, what are some of the possible difference in their behaviour
> > we would observe?
> >
> >
> > --
> > Justus Ranvier
> > Open Bitcoin Privacy Project
> > http://www.openbitcoinprivacyproject.org/
> > justus@openbitcoinprivacyproject.org
> > E7AD 8215 8497 3673 6D9E 61C4 2A5F DA70 EAD9 E623
> > <0xEAD9E623.asc>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>



-- 
I like to provide some work at no charge to prove my value. Do you need a
techie?
I own Litmocracy <http://www.litmocracy.com> and Meme Racing
<http://www.memeracing.net> (in alpha).
I'm the webmaster for The Voluntaryist <http://www.voluntaryist.com> which
now accepts Bitcoin.
I also code for The Dollar Vigilante <http://dollarvigilante.com/>.
"He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules" - Satoshi
Nakamoto

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  reply	other threads:[~2015-09-20  0:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-09-18 19:05 [bitcoin-dev] Hash of UTXO set as consensus-critical Rune Kjær Svendsen
2015-09-18 19:43 ` Patrick Strateman
2015-09-18 20:07   ` Alex Morcos
2015-09-18 20:11     ` Matt Corallo
2015-09-18 20:17   ` Rune Kjær Svendsen
2015-09-18 20:37     ` Jorge Timón
2015-09-18 20:38       ` Jorge Timón
2015-09-18 22:22         ` Vincent Truong
2015-09-19  2:30     ` Justus Ranvier
2015-09-19 15:45       ` Rune Kjær Svendsen
2015-09-19 17:19         ` Justus Ranvier
2015-09-19 20:11           ` Rune K. Svendsen
2015-09-20  0:48             ` Dave Scotese [this message]
2015-09-21 17:15             ` Justus Ranvier

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