Re: [bitcoin-dev] A Comparison Of LN and Drivechain Security In The Presence Of 51% Attackers

[Billy Tetrud <billy.tetrud@gmail.com>]

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> m is how much people want to kill a sidechain, 0 = everybody would be sad
if it died and would rather burn all their BTC forever than continue living

Math is brutal

On Sat, Feb 26, 2022, 01:39 ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

>
> Good morning Paul,
>
>
> > I don't think I can stop people from being ignorant about Drivechain.
> But I can at least allow the Drivechain-knowledgable to identify each other.
> >
> > So here below, I present a little "quiz". If you can answer all of these
> questions, then you basically understand Drivechain:
> >
> > 0. We could change DC to make miner-theft impossible, by making it a
> layer1 consensus rule that miners never steal. Why is this cure worse than
> the disease?
>
> Now miners are forced to look at all sideblocks, not optionally do so if
> it is profitable for them.
>
> > 1. If 100% hashrate wanted to steal coins from a DC sidechain *as
> quickly as possible*, how long would this take (in blocks)?
>
> 13,150 (I think this is how you changed it after feedback from this list,
> I think I remember it was ~3000 before or thereabouts.)
>
> > 2. Per sidechain per year (ie, per 52560 blocks), how many DC
> withdrawals can take place (maximum)? How many can be attempted?
> >      (Ie, how does the 'train track metaphor' work, from ~1h5m in the
> "Overview and Misconceptions" video)?
>
> I hate watching videos, I can read faster than anyone can talk (except
> maybe Laolu, he speaks faster than I can process, never mind read).
>
> ~4 times (assuming 52560 block per year, which may vary due to new miners,
> hashrate drops, etc)
>
> > 3. Only two types of people should ever be using the DC withdrawal
> system at all.
> >   3a. Which two?
>
> a.  Miners destroying the sidechain because the sidechain is no longer
> viable.
> b.  Aggregators of sidechain-to-minechain transfers and large whales.
>
> >   3b. How is everyone else, expected to move their coins from chain to
> chain?
>
> Cross-system atomic swaps.
> (I use "System" here since the same mechanism works for Lightning
> channels, and channels are not blockchains.)
>
> >   3c. (Obviously, this improves UX.) But why does it also improve
> security?
>
> Drivechain-based pegged transfers are aggregates of many smaller transfers
> and thus every transfer out from the sidechain contributes its "fee" to the
> security of the peg.
>
> > --
> > 4. What do the parameters b and m stand for (in the DC security model)?
>
> m is how much people want to kill a sidechain, 0 = everybody would be sad
> if it died and would rather burn all their BTC forever than continue
> living, 1 = do not care, > 1 people want to actively kill the sidechain.
>
> b is how much profit a mainchain miner expects from supporting a sidechain
> (do not remember the unit though).
> Something like u = a + b where a is the mainchain, b is the sidechain, u
> is the total profit.
> Or fees?  Something like that.
>
> > 5. How can m possibly be above 1? Give an example of a
> sidechain-attribute which may cause this situation to arise.
>
> The sidechain is a total scam.
> A bug may be found in the sidechain that completely negates any security
> it might have, thus removing any desire to protect the sidechain and
> potentially make users want to destroy it completely rather than let it
> continue.
> People end up hating sidechains completely.
>
> > 6. For which range of m, is DC designed to deter sc-theft?
>
> m <= 1
>
> > 7. If DC could be changed to magically deter theft across all ranges of
> m, why would that be bad for sidechain users in general?
>
> Because the sidechain would already be part of mainchain consensus.
>
> > --
> > 8. If imminent victims of a DC-based theft, used a mainchain UASF to
> prohibit the future theft-withdrawal, then how would this affect non-DC
> users?
>
> If the non-DC users do not care, then they are unaffected.
> If the non-DC users want to actively kill the sidechain, they will
> counterattack with an opposite UASF and we have a chainsplit and sadness
> and mutual destruction and death and a new subreddit.
>
> > 9. In what ways might the BTC network one day become uncompetitive? And
> how is this different from caring about a sidechain's m and b?
>
> If it does not enable scaling technology fast enough to actually be able
> to enable hyperbitcoinization.
>
> Sidechains are not a scaling solution, so caring about m and b is
> different because your focus is not on scaling.
>
> > --
> > 10. If DC were successful, Altcoin-investors would be harmed. Two
> Maximalist-groups would also be slightly harmed -- who are these?
>
> Dunno!
>
>
> Regards,
> ZmnSCPxj
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