From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.osuosl.org (smtp1.osuosl.org [140.211.166.138]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6B15CC000E for ; Wed, 30 Jun 2021 19:30:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp1.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 550D683B63 for ; Wed, 30 Jun 2021 19:30:54 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.098 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.098 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: smtp1.osuosl.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from smtp1.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp1.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Ms71Smyd9ur2 for ; Wed, 30 Jun 2021 19:30:52 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 Received: from mail-ej1-x636.google.com (mail-ej1-x636.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::636]) by smtp1.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1810583B60 for ; Wed, 30 Jun 2021 19:30:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-ej1-x636.google.com with SMTP id o5so6138406ejy.7 for ; Wed, 30 Jun 2021 12:30:51 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=nzsN7jioKifv66qEeiKluuiHa0Zr6uYtqoVJZJeQEBk=; b=K5L2bpWhJLaN/yAuglvUzIFeAHJdlyg4K2PalFyXTTWavmtwIte6aqpRA8YEbt/Kdp 7jTxNY712QFZH6LtDzKpdjA8gG/NYUSK5k9PZhi1+lTRBVfp+VHNttNXv+hf5XFMe1b7 cwNPN7Zk7JIeSJplARaGA3O/P+aYyLcb6zqdOSnxSf3iKiXrvo4FjJYTBsOiXnbYNbkJ fTKCYfoArBDpTBWBp+B/GCrh9Ggkc1ja6Opkr99ruRDyge3Y3ApgJIELM9F17H+1LEAg 4lfKAZoXMmrBmG0t+UQtT1k8wHplAwYDxD82GMONI2r67TdfYBs8czsuJsBszR0vltmm cy5w== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=nzsN7jioKifv66qEeiKluuiHa0Zr6uYtqoVJZJeQEBk=; b=r4Sjk0E6rKoO4mCX/KZ2T6fvXa3eXiWy74xT7laxqv1CIoDZsx6dh+ZkI9cIdyVQSl XYh2yom5iDN/1ifTSA4K7cczMoiYNDGqZ+Qtamf97EQWs4aJjOuSthPy3NarQYEOBTAh 4FJoVDPPc0ytKmjUpbNcrNGtTMEAIdIKGPtUjp9k23hCjkaF3vhyNGjkvXNBn17SdoLh GHs8+FzSzbb6EtBTZTXznvTOY88sGTULLxWRLDR2GnGe98Bb6/sLrwvnwy3sywfoD9SK dftUw75edsYRvAKF5J9zFuvK/VYVP4pIG3JrLnlWBQSEakySUI034k/JvPN4NtSlEXxk f2rw== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM531WOe1pIhV+W6bGflUy39YF8X8ziOV2YaXkSg5D8mb3XKbWnErK l/J1FLlyOaKrwIFTEtgytTG4k0GywEAb6K/ayhY= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxsbUe9cKGyvtCvnesnYDYZ5zPRuDa7gQNZFUq3o9Uu/yJUDuPDjF12YIk7aI/X0/H9AaZgquEbgUHegdJZl00= X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:a2da:: with SMTP id by26mr27114427ejb.152.1625081450180; Wed, 30 Jun 2021 12:30:50 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <2368396E-6964-4F12-B50F-2BE477D0C7D8@voskuil.org> <028901d76d95$abb883f0$03298bd0$@voskuil.org> In-Reply-To: <028901d76d95$abb883f0$03298bd0$@voskuil.org> From: Billy Tetrud Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2021 12:30:33 -0700 Message-ID: To: Eric Voskuil Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="00000000000091b36305c600c296" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Wed, 30 Jun 2021 20:01:43 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Trinary Version Signaling for softfork upgrades X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2021 19:30:54 -0000 --00000000000091b36305c600c296 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable @Jorge > I disagree... I would oppose such a change no matter what other users or miners say. I don't know why you think we disagree on that point. I agree that I would oppose a change to 1GB blocks no matter what other users or miners say. You must have misunderstood me there. >> Are you really saying that we should just hard fork every time instead of soft fork? > No So what are you advocating for then, exactly? >> Are you not at all worried about the costs associated with an increased orphan rate and reorg rate? > Orphan blocks are bad, yes, not sure what the point of your question is. The point is that if we just deployed with BIP8 LOT=3Dtrue (as that seems t= o be the kind of thing you're advocating for) and only 60% of miners had upgraded to the new update by the time it activates, orphans and reorg rate and depths would greatly increase. The point of the question is: shouldn't we avoid that "when possible"? > What do you think of bip99? I haven't read it before, but after reading it, it seems like a reasonable discussion of possibilities and types of forks. It looks like you advocated that "miner voting" is appropriate for some of the types of forks. And yet, from the way you're talking in this thread, it sounds like you don't think any consensus rule change deployment should consider miner signaling. So I'm confused because it seems like the things you're saying here conflict with some of the things you wrote in BIP99. What specifically did you want me to get out of BIP99 in this context? @Eric > I=E2=80=99d also question the use of the term =E2=80=9Cmajority=E2=80=9D I just want to clarify that by "economic majority" I mean a set of users that presently accept more than 50% of the volume of payments in a given period of time. I definitely agree that no majority of any kind is needed for a split. On Wed, Jun 30, 2021 at 2:52 AM wrote: > > From: Jorge Tim=C3=B3n > > >> "Soft forks aren=E2=80=99t compatible without miner enforcement" > > Compatible with what? > > There is a good summary of what is meant by this term in BIP141: > https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0141.mediawiki > > "Backward compatibility > As a soft fork, older software will continue to operate without > modification. Non-upgraded nodes, however, will not see nor validate the > witness data and will consider all witness programs as anyone-can-spend > scripts (except a few edge cases where the witness programs are equal to = 0, > which the script must fail). Wallets should always be wary of > anyone-can-spend scripts and treat them with suspicion. Non-upgraded node= s > are strongly encouraged to upgrade in order to take advantage of the new > features." > > The explanation is however incomplete. If majority hash power does not > enforce the new rules, the above is incorrect. Granted the word "operate" > is vague, but clearly what is intended is that "non-upgraded" nodes will > not be on a different coin. But in fact they would be. The underlying > presumption is that BIP141 is not only signaled, but enforced by majority > hash power. > > >> "Soft forks without miner support cause splits". > > No, what causes splits are 3 things: > > > > 1) bugs > > 2) coordination mistakes > > 3) people wanting different rules. > > #3 (and possibly #4) is what we're talking about, so it's not at all clea= r > why you said "no". > > People change their rules, because #3. If majority hash power does not > enforce this (soft) change, it's a chain split. > > > Let me give an example. Let's say all users want change A. > > > > Only 60% miners want it. > > When it activates with LOT=3Dtrue, will this cause a split? > > No, regardless of percentage adoption. You've proposed that it' is > majority hash power enforced. > > Furthermore, the term compatibility (see above) implies that not everyone > (your impossible presumption of 100%) is aligned. > > This is not a debatable subject as far as I'm concerned, but it's worth > discussion for those who aren't familiar. > > e > > --00000000000091b36305c600c296 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
@Jorge
> I disagree...=C2=A0 I would oppo= se such a change no matter what other users or miners say.

I don't know why you think we disagree on that point. I agree that I= would oppose a change to 1GB blocks no matter what other users or miners s= ay. You must have misunderstood me there.

>>= =C2=A0=C2=A0Are you really saying that we should just hard fork every tim= e instead of soft fork?
> No

So what are you advocating for then, exactly?
>>=C2=A0A= re you not at all worried about the costs associated with an increased orph= an rate and reorg rate?
>=C2=A0Orphan blocks are bad, yes, not sure what the point of yo= ur question is.

The point is that if we just deplo= yed with BIP8 LOT=3Dtrue (as that seems to be the kind of thing you're= =C2=A0advocating for) and only 60% of miners had upgraded to the new update= by the time it activates, orphans and reorg rate and depths would greatly = increase. The point of the question is: shouldn't we avoid that "w= hen possible"?=C2=A0

> What do you think o= f bip99?

I haven't read it before, but after r= eading it, it seems like a reasonable discussion of possibilities and types= of forks. It looks like you advocated that "miner voting" is app= ropriate for some of the types of forks. And yet, from the way you're t= alking in this thread, it sounds like you don't think any consensus rul= e change deployment should consider miner signaling. So I'm confused be= cause it seems like the things=C2=A0you're saying here conflict with so= me of the things you wrote in BIP99.=C2=A0

What sp= ecifically did you want me to get out of BIP99 in this context?

@Eric
> I=E2=80=99d also question the us= e of the term =E2=80=9Cmajority=E2=80=9D

I just wa= nt to clarify that by "economic majority" I mean a set of users t= hat presently accept more than 50% of the volume of payments in a given per= iod of time. I definitely agree that no majority of any kind is needed for = a split.=C2=A0


On Wed, Jun 30, 2021 at 2:52 AM <eric@voskuil.org> = wrote:
> From= : Jorge Tim=C3=B3n <jtimon@jtimon.cc>

>> "Soft forks aren=E2=80=99t compatible without miner enforceme= nt"
> Compatible with what?

There is a good summary of what is meant by this term in BIP141:
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/m= aster/bip-0141.mediawiki

"Backward compatibility
As a soft fork, older software will continue to operate without modificatio= n. Non-upgraded nodes, however, will not see nor validate the witness data = and will consider all witness programs as anyone-can-spend scripts (except = a few edge cases where the witness programs are equal to 0, which the scrip= t must fail). Wallets should always be wary of anyone-can-spend scripts and= treat them with suspicion. Non-upgraded nodes are strongly encouraged to u= pgrade in order to take advantage of the new features."

The explanation is however incomplete. If majority hash power does not enfo= rce the new rules, the above is incorrect. Granted the word "operate&q= uot; is vague, but clearly what is intended is that "non-upgraded"= ; nodes will not be on a different coin. But in fact they would be. The und= erlying presumption is that BIP141 is not only signaled, but enforced by ma= jority hash power.

>> "Soft forks without miner support cause splits".
> No, what causes splits are 3 things:
>
> 1) bugs
> 2) coordination mistakes
> 3) people wanting different rules.

#3 (and possibly #4) is what we're talking about, so it's not at al= l clear why you said "no".

People change their rules, because #3. If majority hash power does not enfo= rce this (soft) change, it's a chain split.

> Let me give an example. Let's say all users want change A.
>
> Only 60% miners want it.
> When it activates with LOT=3Dtrue, will this cause a split?

No, regardless of percentage adoption. You've proposed that it' is = majority hash power enforced.

Furthermore, the term compatibility (see above) implies that not everyone (= your impossible presumption of 100%) is aligned.

This is not a debatable subject as far as I'm concerned, but it's w= orth discussion for those who aren't familiar.

e

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