From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp3.osuosl.org (smtp3.osuosl.org [IPv6:2605:bc80:3010::136]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 17217C002D for ; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 03:56:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp3.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D764160BFD for ; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 03:56:15 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp3.osuosl.org D764160BFD Authentication-Results: smtp3.osuosl.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20210112 header.b=hPjxIQgK X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.199 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.199 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_40=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp3.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp3.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id j02tg02b7THD for ; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 03:56:14 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp3.osuosl.org 5F4EE60BE3 Received: from mail-vs1-xe34.google.com (mail-vs1-xe34.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::e34]) by smtp3.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5F4EE60BE3 for ; Tue, 28 Jun 2022 03:56:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-vs1-xe34.google.com with SMTP id i186so10837982vsc.9 for ; Mon, 27 Jun 2022 20:56:14 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=J9/++H7dPA4Tmn6xnBIOjO/pW2kNBK7fvOflzqrWMK4=; b=hPjxIQgKbIKwQtFM472LZlwHCLTdolV4B+/ac1rj+oIcrazBwDtarwy+KdWRI3uTNq N4XA3FMulkbz1bJJNiNcV2eOZHiExFEdvfH9wdSnk2qx1ddYWLef5mJLVccKSCFku0Hw uDV1DGd2MzsG7oounmcMdvPTsia5eDodNmPlT82oenZOUaLTejH4ezntOLojptSU3Z9T GNhMbWWrXD0r1fmMYUvQHJEv7xVyF569ag62CDobChg40JMxssysRrTM3UHrRfK4rIth eSC8hKHnROEl9CLVpriZKGuhnzs2o5Goxh+PRihhxfqeslIlKWj/j8OY7NvRYf3Fr0yl lZog== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=J9/++H7dPA4Tmn6xnBIOjO/pW2kNBK7fvOflzqrWMK4=; b=Rb/o1B894LWVmjFkjuKadSMoiC6H1liy5XLSpUDY9DYV1Lng/f97dPCCykiamDAtPr /j0JFl8AbAdDHkrWu148WRC1RTawzw+8EXm8zTdqsr46cVNDqzpoXfwfWH5c30heks3W pWlcvn/5r/DXVkuHZIXiMw4wkcMNB85CV5EK8j1WGS1u5COLFGBqSvleqMRCRAC6RRsI VsZD04FvAT+dWBWcD4TpCB/EKQZtjsWjKcO5xm1HU1fn1XeUn7dpCX0+BHsTn5wI75LF o/SjQRZvTDji7tL3rh69d3MvroTvDq9JtNnESkuQxFVoBrLolgrsJ3z0RYXnSgqmga5n Ad5w== X-Gm-Message-State: AJIora+kI1GNmQJo6y/CatQtx9ZUNvyqMFWo7n1ZIaap6kdcxR55Iis8 OnFz3qTJwsEqKnPNpdYK9X1Z9HPDGU3oW0bKwho= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGRyM1s5XdwT1QgFv7U/jXhG/QqSqiEAz1oMDeIsVV8T7I75A97sMR9xRQ/MZn/HPmSquyo7G7ieARlSwEtZhzv7Vgo= X-Received: by 2002:a67:6ac1:0:b0:356:1b28:ff51 with SMTP id f184-20020a676ac1000000b003561b28ff51mr952913vsc.81.1656388573119; Mon, 27 Jun 2022 20:56:13 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: Billy Tetrud Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 22:55:56 -0500 Message-ID: To: Peter Todd , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="00000000000082c9c705e27a04fc" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 08:43:37 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Bitcoin covenants are inevitable X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 03:56:16 -0000 --00000000000082c9c705e27a04fc Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" @Eric > People who transact are realizing the benefit of money - the avoidance of barter costs. I'm very confident you're incorrect that holders don't receive any benefit and you're certainly not correct that every spend is receiving the same benefit. As I'm sure you're aware, one of the primary components of a currency's value and purpose is as a store of value. Storing value happens while you're holding it, not while you're spending it. Consider the following two scenarios: one person holds onto 10 bitcoin for 10 years and then spends those 10 bitcoins in some way in 2 transactions. Another person spends 4 bitcoins to buy something, then sells it for 6 bitcoins, and then buys something else for that 6 bitcoins and then never acquires any bitcoin for 10 years. Both people spent 10 bitcoins over 2 transactions. Over that 10 year period, only one of those people utilized bitcoin's utility as a store of value. Who benefited more from their use of bitcoin? > Those who never transact, never realize any benefit. While that's true, its not relevant and basically a red herring. You need to compare those who transact often and rarely hold, to those who hold a lot but rarely transact. Its not helpful to consider those who throw their bitcoin into a bottomless pit and never retrieve them. On an idealistic level, I agree with Keagan that it would make sense to have "a balance of fees to that effect". I think doing that would be technically/economically optimal. However, I think there is an enormous benefit to having a cultural aversion to monetary inflation and the consequences of convincing the bitcoin community that inflation is ok could have unintended negative consequences (not to mention how difficult convincing the community would be in the first place). There's also the economic distortion that inflation causes that has a negative effect which should also be considered. The idea of decaying utxo value is interesting to consider, but it would not solve the economic distortion that monetary inflation causes, because that distortion is a result of monetary devaluation (which decaying utxos would be a form of). Then again, maybe in this case the distortion of inflation would actually be a correction - correcting for the externality of benefit received by holders. I'm stream-of-consciousnessing a bit, but anyways, I suspect its not worth the trouble to perfect the distribution of bitcoin blockchain security costs to include holders. Tho, if I were to go back in time and influence how bitcoin was designed, I might advocate for it. @Peter > demurrage and inflation have identical economic properties. The distortion of incentives is identical, however there is also the effect it has on a currency's property as a useful unit of account. Decaying utxos would mean that it would contribute substantially less to market prices needing to change. I suspect this effect would be bordering on negligible tho. On Thu, Jun 23, 2022 at 2:17 PM Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > On Tue, Jun 21, 2022 at 01:00:07PM -0600, Keagan McClelland via > bitcoin-dev wrote: > > > The PoW security of Bitcoin benefits all Bitcoin users, proportional to > > the > > value of BTC they hold; if Bitcoin blocks aren't reliably created the > value > > of > > *all* BTC goes down. It doesn't make sense for the entire cost of that > > security > > to be paid for on a per-tx basis. And there's a high chance paying for it > > on a > > per-tx basis won't work anyway due to lack of consistent demand. > > > > FWIW I prefer the demurrage route. Having something with finite supply > as a > > means of measuring economic activity is unprecedented and I believe > deeply > > important. I'm sympathetic to the argument that the security of the chain > > should not be solely the responsibility of transactors. We realize the > > value of money on receipt, hold *and* spend and it would be appropriate > for > > there to be a balance of fees to that effect. While inflation may be > > simpler to implement (just chop off the last few halvings), I think it > > would be superior (on the assumption that such a hodl tax was necessary) > to > > keep the supply fixed and have people's utxo balances decay, at least at > > the level of the UX. > > Demurrage makes protocols like Lightning much more complex, and isn't > compatible with existing implementations. While demurrage could in theory > be > implemented in a soft-fork by forcing txs to contain an output with the > demurrage-taxed amount, spending to a pool of future mining fees, I really > don't think it's practical to actually do that. > > Anyway, demurrage and inflation have identical economic properties. They're > both a tax on savings. The only difference is the way that tax is > implemented. > > -- > https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > --00000000000082c9c705e27a04fc Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
@Eric
>=C2=A0 People who transact are realizing the benefit of money - the avoidance of b= arter costs.=C2=A0

I'm very confident you're inc= orrect that=C2=A0holders=C2=A0don't receive any benefit and you're = certainly not correct that=C2=A0every=C2=A0spend is receiving the same bene= fit. As I'm sure you're aware, one of the primary components of a c= urrency's value and purpose is as a store of=C2=A0value. Storing value = happens while you're holding it, not while you're spending it. Cons= ider the following two scenarios: one person holds onto 10 bitcoin for 10 y= ears and then spends those 10 bitcoins in=C2=A0some way in 2 transactions. = Another person spends 4 bitcoins to buy something, then sells it for 6 bitc= oins, and then buys something else for that 6 bitcoins and then never acqui= res any bitcoin for 10 years.=C2=A0

Both people sp= ent 10 bitcoins over 2 transactions. Over that 10 year period, only one of = those people utilized bitcoin's utility as a store of value. Who benefi= ted more from their use of bitcoin?=C2=A0

> Tho= se who never transact, never realize any benefit.

= While that's true, its not relevant and basically a red herring. You ne= ed to compare those who transact often and rarely hold, to those who hold a= lot but rarely transact. Its=C2=A0not helpful to consider those who throw = their bitcoin into a bottomless pit and never retrieve them.

=
On an idealistic level, I agree with Keagan that it would make s= ense to have "a balance of fees to that effect". I think doing th= at would be technically/economically optimal. However, I think there is an = enormous benefit to having a cultural aversion to monetary inflation and th= e consequences of convincing the bitcoin community that inflation is ok cou= ld have unintended negative consequences (not to mention how difficult conv= incing the community would be in the first place). There's also the eco= nomic distortion that inflation causes that has a negative effect which sho= uld also be considered. The idea of decaying utxo value is interesting to c= onsider, but it would not solve the economic distortion that monetary=C2=A0= inflation causes,=C2=A0because that=C2=A0distortion is a result of monetary= devaluation (which decaying=C2=A0utxos would be a form of). Then again, ma= ybe in this case the distortion of inflation would actually be a correction= - correcting for the externality of benefit received by holders. I'm s= tream-of-consciousnessing=C2=A0a bit, but anyways, I suspect its not worth = the trouble to perfect the distribution of bitcoin blockchain security cost= s to include holders. Tho, if I were to go back in time and influence how b= itcoin was designed, I might advocate for it.

@Pet= er
> demurrage and inflation have identical economic prope= rties.=C2=A0

The distortion of incentives is ident= ical, however there is also the effect it has on a currency's property = as a useful unit of account. Decaying utxos would mean that it would contri= bute substantially less to market prices needing to change. I suspect this = effect would be bordering on negligible tho.=C2=A0

On Thu, Jun 23, 202= 2 at 2:17 PM Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wro= te:
On Tue, Jun = 21, 2022 at 01:00:07PM -0600, Keagan McClelland via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > The PoW security of Bitcoin benefits all Bitcoin users, proportio= nal to
> the
> value of BTC they hold; if Bitcoin blocks aren't reliably created = the value
> of
> *all* BTC goes down. It doesn't make sense for the entire cost of = that
> security
> to be paid for on a per-tx basis. And there's a high chance paying= for it
> on a
> per-tx basis won't work anyway due to lack of consistent demand. >
> FWIW I prefer the demurrage route. Having something with finite supply= as a
> means of measuring economic activity is unprecedented and I believe de= eply
> important. I'm sympathetic to the argument that the security of th= e chain
> should not be solely the responsibility of transactors. We realize the=
> value of money on receipt, hold *and* spend and it would be appropriat= e for
> there to be a balance of fees to that effect. While inflation may be > simpler to implement (just chop off the last few halvings), I think it=
> would be superior (on the assumption that such a hodl tax was necessar= y) to
> keep the supply fixed and have people's utxo balances decay, at le= ast at
> the level of the UX.

Demurrage makes protocols like Lightning much more complex, and isn't compatible with existing implementations. While demurrage could in theory b= e
implemented in a soft-fork by forcing txs to contain an output with the
demurrage-taxed amount, spending to a pool of future mining fees, I really<= br> don't think it's practical to actually do that.

Anyway, demurrage and inflation have identical economic properties. They= 9;re
both a tax on savings. The only difference is the way that tax is implement= ed.

--
http= s://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
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