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From: Billy Tetrud <billy.tetrud@gmail.com>
To: Erik Aronesty <erik@q32.com>
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
	<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>,
	SatoshiSingh <SatoshiSingh@protonmail.com>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Opinion on proof of stake in future
Date: Fri, 21 May 2021 11:45:12 -1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGpPWDbnEo7QiVU1Y-XNCjv=DYESAyCC-xnKzz4uOBJcxh+3bg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAJowKgKHWe8BVCto1UdhmsZB4cOXN8pn09bFxt0LcW14FAx0Pw@mail.gmail.com>

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@Erik
>  it also solves the "nothing at stake" problem

A. the "nothing at stake" problem can be and has been solved by PoS
consensus mechanisms (unless you mean it more broadly than I'm taking it),
and B. Proof of Burn should have just as much "nothing at stake" issues as
PoS. Both consensus mechanisms depend on the current state of the chain to
determine whether someone's stake or burn would allow the creation of a
block. But I am curious, how does proof of burn solve the "nothing at
stake" problem in your view?

On Fri, May 21, 2021 at 10:58 AM Erik Aronesty <erik@q32.com> wrote:

> proof of burn has all the benefits of proof of stake (if there are any)
>
> but it also solves the "nothing at stake" problem
>
> the incentive in POB is that you're making a long-term investment in
> mining, and you want a stable protocol, quality network, etc.... to
> pay off your investment.
>
> On Thu, May 20, 2021 at 8:04 PM Billy Tetrud <billy.tetrud@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > I think there is a lot of misinformation and bias against Proof of
> Stake. Yes there have been lots of shady coins that use insecure PoS
> mechanisms. Yes there have been massive issues with distribution of PoS
> coins (of course there have also been massive issues with PoW coins as
> well). However, I want to remind everyone that there is a difference
> between "proved to be impossible" and "have not achieved recognized success
> yet". Most of the arguments levied against PoS are out of date or rely on
> unproven assumptions or extrapolation from the analysis of a particular PoS
> system. I certainly don't think we should experiment with bitcoin by
> switching to PoS, but from my research, it seems very likely that there is
> a proof of stake consensus protocol we could build that has substantially
> higher security (cost / capital required to execute an attack) while at the
> same time costing far less resources (which do translate to fees on the
> network) *without* compromising any of the critical security properties
> bitcoin relies on. I think the critical piece of this is the disagreements
> around hardcoded checkpoints, which is a critical piece solving attacks
> that could be levied on a PoS chain, and how that does (or doesn't) affect
> the security model.
> >
> > @Eric Your proof of stake fallacy seems to be saying that PoS is worse
> when a 51% attack happens. While I agree, I think that line of thinking
> omits important facts:
> > * The capital required to 51% attack a PoS chain can be made
> substantially greater than on a PoS chain.
> > * The capital the attacker stands to lose can be substantially greater
> as well if the attack is successful.
> > * The effectiveness of paying miners to raise the honest fraction of
> miners above 50% may be quite bad.
> > * Allowing a 51% attack is already unacceptable. It should be considered
> whether what happens in the case of a 51% may not be significantly
> different. The currency would likely be critically damaged in a 51% attack
> regardless of consensus mechanism.
> >
> > > Proof-of-stake tends towards oligopolistic control
> >
> > People repeat this often, but the facts support this. There is no
> centralization pressure in any proof of stake mechanism that I'm aware of.
> IE if you have 10 times as much coin that you use to mint blocks, you
> should expect to earn 10x as much minting revenue - not more than 10x. By
> contrast, proof of work does in fact have clear centralization pressure -
> this is not disputed. Our goal in relation to that is to ensure that the
> centralization pressure remains insignifiant. Proof of work also clearly
> has a lot more barriers to entry than any proof of stake system does. Both
> of these mean the tendency towards oligopolistic control is worse for PoW.
> >
> > > Energy usage, in-and-of-itself, is nothing to be ashamed of!!
> >
> > I certainly agree. Bitcoin's energy usage at the moment is I think quite
> warranted. However, the question is: can we do substantially better. I
> think if we can, we probably should... eventually.
> >
> > > Proof of Stake is only resilient to ⅓ of the network demonstrating a
> Byzantine Fault, whilst Proof of Work is resilient up to the ½ threshold
> >
> > I see no mention of this in the pos.pdf you linked to. I'm not aware of
> any proof that all PoS systems have a failure threshold of 1/3. I know that
> staking systems like Casper do in fact have that 1/3 requirement. However
> there are PoS designs that should exceed that up to nearly 50% as far as
> I'm aware. Proof of work is not in fact resilient up to the 1/2 threshold
> in the way you would think. IE, if 100% of miners are currently honest and
> have a collective 100 exahashes/s hashpower, an attacker does not need to
> obtain 100 exahashes/s, but actually only needs to accumulate 50
> exahashes/s. This is because as the attacker accumulates hashpower, it
> drives honest miners out of the market as the difficulty increases to
> beyond what is economically sustainable. Also, its been shown that the best
> proof of work can do is require an attacker to obtain 33% of the hashpower
> because of the selfish mining attack discussed in depth in this paper:
> https://arxiv.org/abs/1311.0243. Together, both of these things reduce
> PoW's security by a factor of about 83% (1 - 50%*33%).
> >
> >  > Proof of Stake requires other trade-offs which are incompatible with
> Bitcoin's objective (to be a trustless digital cash) — specifically the
> famous "security vs. liveness" guarantee
> >
> > Do you have a good source that talks about why you think proof of stake
> cannot be used for a trustless digital cash?
> >
> > > You cannot gain tokens without someone choosing to give up those coins
> - a form of permission.
> >
> > This is not a practical constraint. Just like in mining, some nodes may
> reject you, but there will likely be more that will accept you, some
> sellers may reject you, but most would accept your money as payment for
> bitcoins. I don't think requiring the "permission" of one of millions of
> people in the market can be reasonably considered a "permissioned currency".
> >
> > > 2. Proof of stake must have a trusted means of timestamping to
> regulate overproduction of blocks
> >
> > Both PoW and PoS could mine/mint blocks twice as fast if everyone agreed
> to double their clock speeds. Both systems rely on an honest majority
> sticking to standard time.
> >
> >
> > On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 5:32 AM Michael Dubrovsky via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >>
> >> Ah sorry, I didn't realize this was, in fact, a different thread! :)
> >>
> >> On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 10:07 AM Michael Dubrovsky <mike@powx.org>
> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> Folks, I suggest we keep the discussion to PoW, oPoW, and the BIP
> itself. PoS, VDFs, and so on are interesting but I guess there are other
> threads going on these topics already where they would be relevant.
> >>>
> >>> Also, it's important to distinguish between oPoW and these other
> "alternatives" to Hashcash. oPoW is a true Proof of Work that doesn't alter
> the core game theory or security assumptions of Hashcash and actually
> contains SHA (can be SHA3, SHA256, etc hash is interchangeable).
> >>>
> >>> Cheers,
> >>> Mike
> >>>
> >>> On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 4:55 PM Erik Aronesty via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> 1. i never suggested vdf's to replace pow.
> >>>>
> >>>> 2. my suggestion was specifically *in the context of* a working
> >>>> proof-of-burn protocol
> >>>>
> >>>> - vdfs used only for timing (not block height)
> >>>> - blind-burned coins of a specific age used to replace proof of work
> >>>> - the required "work" per block would simply be a competition to
> >>>> acquire rewards, and so miners would have to burn coins, well in
> >>>> advance, and hope that their burned coins got rewarded in some far
> >>>> future
> >>>> - the point of burned coins is to mimic, in every meaningful way, the
> >>>> value gained from proof of work... without some of the security
> >>>> drawbacks
> >>>> - the miner risks losing all of his burned coins (like all miners risk
> >>>> losing their work in each block)
> >>>> - new burns can't be used
> >>>> - old burns age out (like ASICs do)
> >>>> - other requirements on burns might be needed to properly mirror the
> >>>> properties of PoW and the incentives Bitcoin uses to mine honestly.
> >>>>
> >>>> 3. i do believe it is *possible* that a "burned coin + vdf system"
> >>>> might be more secure in the long run, and that if the entire space
> >>>> agreed that such an endeavor was worthwhile, a test net could be spun
> >>>> up, and a hard-fork could be initiated.
> >>>>
> >>>> 4. i would never suggest such a thing unless i believed it was
> >>>> possible that consensus was possible.  so no, this is not an "alt
> >>>> coin"
> >>>>
> >>>> On Tue, May 18, 2021 at 10:02 AM Zac Greenwood <zachgrw@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>>> >
> >>>> > Hi ZmnSCPxj,
> >>>> >
> >>>> > Please note that I am not suggesting VDFs as a means to save
> energy, but solely as a means to make the time between blocks more constant.
> >>>> >
> >>>> > Zac
> >>>> >
> >>>> >
> >>>> > On Tue, 18 May 2021 at 12:42, ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>>> >>
> >>>> >> Good morning Zac,
> >>>> >>
> >>>> >> > VDFs might enable more constant block times, for instance by
> having a two-step PoW:
> >>>> >> >
> >>>> >> > 1. Use a VDF that takes say 9 minutes to resolve (VDF being
> subject to difficulty adjustments similar to the as-is). As per the
> property of VDFs, miners are able show proof of work.
> >>>> >> >
> >>>> >> > 2. Use current PoW mechanism with lower difficulty so finding a
> block takes 1 minute on average, again subject to as-is difficulty
> adjustments.
> >>>> >> >
> >>>> >> > As a result, variation in block times will be greatly reduced.
> >>>> >>
> >>>> >> As I understand it, another weakness of VDFs is that they are not
> inherently progress-free (their sequential nature prevents that; they are
> inherently progress-requiring).
> >>>> >>
> >>>> >> Thus, a miner which focuses on improving the amount of energy that
> it can pump into the VDF circuitry (by overclocking and freezing the
> circuitry), could potentially get into a winner-takes-all situation,
> possibly leading to even *worse* competition and even *more* energy
> consumption.
> >>>> >> After all, if you can start mining 0.1s faster than the
> competition, that is a 0.1s advantage where *only you* can mine *in the
> entire world*.
> >>>> >>
> >>>> >> Regards,
> >>>> >> ZmnSCPxj
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> >>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> >>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> --
> >>> Michael Dubrovsky
> >>> Founder; PoWx
> >>> www.PoWx.org
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >> Michael Dubrovsky
> >> Founder; PoWx
> >> www.PoWx.org
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

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  reply	other threads:[~2021-05-21 21:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-05-07 17:17 [bitcoin-dev] Opinion on proof of stake in future SatoshiSingh
2021-05-07 23:04 ` Eric Voskuil
2021-05-08 14:33   ` Karl
2021-05-09 10:21     ` R E Broadley
2021-05-09 10:59       ` Karl
2021-05-07 23:19 ` Jeremy
2021-05-08  2:40   ` honest69abe
2021-05-08 14:42     ` Karl
2021-05-09 19:07       ` Cloud Strife
2021-05-08 13:44 ` Eric Martindale
2021-05-09 11:30   ` R E Broadley
2021-05-10 14:08 ` Erik Aronesty
2021-05-10 15:01   ` Keagan McClelland
2021-05-10 21:22     ` LORD HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES HRMH
2021-05-10 21:51     ` Jeremy
2021-05-17 16:58       ` Erik Aronesty
2021-05-18  7:06         ` ZmnSCPxj
2021-05-18 10:16           ` Zac Greenwood
2021-05-18 10:42             ` ZmnSCPxj
2021-05-18 14:02               ` Zac Greenwood
2021-05-18 18:52                 ` Erik Aronesty
2021-05-19 14:07                   ` Michael Dubrovsky
2021-05-19 15:30                     ` Michael Dubrovsky
2021-05-21  0:04                       ` Billy Tetrud
2021-05-21  9:42                         ` vizeet srivastava
2021-05-21 20:57                         ` Erik Aronesty
2021-05-21 21:45                           ` Billy Tetrud [this message]
2021-05-23  3:41                         ` Lloyd Fournier
2021-05-23 19:10                           ` Billy Tetrud
2021-05-23 19:28                             ` Billy Tetrud
2021-05-24 13:47                           ` Erik Aronesty
2021-05-24 20:43                             ` Billy Tetrud
2021-05-24 21:49                               ` Erik Aronesty
2021-05-25  1:52                                 ` Billy Tetrud
2021-05-25 13:00                                   ` Erik Aronesty
2021-05-25 20:01                                     ` Billy Tetrud
2021-05-25 21:10                                       ` befreeandopen
2021-05-26  6:53                                         ` Billy Tetrud
2021-05-26 13:11                                           ` befreeandopen
2021-05-26 22:07                                             ` Erik Aronesty
2021-05-28 14:40                                               ` befreeandopen
2021-05-28 20:06                                                 ` Erik Aronesty
2021-05-28 21:40                                                   ` Billy Tetrud
2021-06-01  8:21                                                   ` befreeandopen
2021-06-01 16:33                                                     ` Erik Aronesty
2021-06-01 19:26                                                       ` befreeandopen
2021-06-01 20:28                                                         ` Erik Aronesty
2021-06-03  5:30                                                           ` SatoshiSingh
2021-06-07  6:15                                                             ` Billy Tetrud
2021-05-27 10:08                                             ` Billy Tetrud
2021-05-27 13:11                                               ` Erik Aronesty
2021-05-28 14:36                                               ` befreeandopen
2021-05-25  8:22                               ` befreeandopen
2021-06-15 11:13                           ` James MacWhyte
2021-06-17  1:48                             ` Lloyd Fournier
2021-06-17  3:31                             ` Cloud Strife
2021-06-22 17:45                               ` Billy Tetrud
2021-06-23 18:14                                 ` Keagan McClelland
2021-06-24  0:14                                   ` Billy Tetrud
2021-06-24  0:37                                     ` Keagan McClelland
2021-06-24 17:34                                     ` yanmaani
2021-06-24 21:50                                       ` Erik Aronesty
2021-06-25  0:29                                         ` yanmaani
2021-06-25 16:08                                           ` Ruben Somsen
     [not found]                                             ` <MN2PR10MB4030EBD14EF82E29CFEDD00FB1069@MN2PR10MB4030.namprd10.prod.outlook.com>
2021-06-26 16:26                                               ` Billy Tetrud
2021-05-08 10:21 Prayank
     [not found] <mailman.100801.1624522329.32591.bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
2021-06-24  8:59 ` Carlo Spiller

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