From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0023525A for ; Sun, 28 Aug 2016 02:50:24 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-qt0-f181.google.com (mail-qt0-f181.google.com [209.85.216.181]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 56E5A11D for ; Sun, 28 Aug 2016 02:50:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-qt0-f181.google.com with SMTP id u25so54730540qtb.1 for ; Sat, 27 Aug 2016 19:50:24 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=0H+8f5Cn4u87g2zEu1Etzix3QDqjEypPYRt+RuuXCJw=; b=qC8lOOnwKDxPp03OhKZJH0/GQcBiuXVaqydcqUnM9OJe3FvRrNhdy4onUYkKMbB8Z5 TPWwW3TB5mHIylKLXpmgG+RVLBLGz880gU3NrcKj1ZaoFaBiWM/dJm6AH9qvBFpZdehc zSs1sZRiCouBqghs8f9ViIsh3RoZ5XerT8wvV55vKhQ9ADyb1zaRKxhT/AIjwc3EXNxR Q5NshX0Mhe7V1lLyJWtCuLCPQW8dmcfNmCW34RmHVK2UNYpuuZtsAECN2t9L2byiFdlf uccQlEmeUE4AGJCADKWugete+zX5FSHqjXlshaSt0IRKsvrA0aUkpDPqozgQJAg4qxe1 0jyQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to; bh=0H+8f5Cn4u87g2zEu1Etzix3QDqjEypPYRt+RuuXCJw=; b=kMqY18IUgNysBCVi6RbGOB6ndP5SwYhTk54ABjE8ZcZSsRELp2TpgC6A10ScEOYGM8 SMYUj5wl2z4ADHPXr3YLcK78ght8rFWhI5Xpqm8lNbvJiHZJRg+PBZTIryZt29mqOQ2T dRURChGooCGG+3IQ+7RaQd5oMoNNZa35i/bAXO6Q6lc0XQOGQQrQovVKoYwCVlB3/rZi vZPHKdM0H+euTjmU32vlZS3OlDzRuPIPcfLfQFVMHKWVXVkPb/gZlICNGnT4KaL+kufy E4m5u8aBt5eRnepQLK4xKTx5OoZQaxcdmHcx73gDM/G4oOb2kjxGfuJ4meEuMl0pCCUm vZmQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AE9vXwPj1WQzUZCFeZrXlJaR7ZO4+3eAU9pUDHSy/pauNrq6Dm5544nBG9WxGuQcJGu2gAlEJ9HwuYNhxBagIQ== X-Received: by 10.237.37.99 with SMTP id w32mr11526061qtc.59.1472352623526; Sat, 27 Aug 2016 19:50:23 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20160824014634.GA19905@fedora-21-dvm> <20160825142732.GA11295@nex> In-Reply-To: From: James MacWhyte Date: Sun, 28 Aug 2016 02:50:12 +0000 Message-ID: To: Gregory Maxwell , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion , Christian Decker Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11420f821c16e4053b18cf67 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Capital Efficient Honeypots w/ "Scorched Earth" Doublespending Protection X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 28 Aug 2016 02:50:25 -0000 --001a11420f821c16e4053b18cf67 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Why not just have a single 1-of-m multisig transaction, with one key on each server? Based on which key is used you would know which server is compromised, and (in my opinion) it wouldn't look nearly as suspicious. On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 11:26 AM Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 2:27 PM, Christian Decker via bitcoin-dev > wrote: > > If however > > he is planning to use it as a foothold to further compromise your > > company, send spam or similar, he will likely try to avoid these > > tripwires. [...] > > Depends on the value of their activity compared to the value of the coins. > Spamming doesn't pay much. > > Covert tripwires would obviously be better, but if shared tripwires > allow you to have 100x the funds available it could be a good > trade-off. > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > --001a11420f821c16e4053b18cf67 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Why not just have a single 1-of-m multisig transaction, wi= th one key on each server? Based on which key is used you would know which = server is compromised, and (in my opinion) it wouldn't look nearly as s= uspicious.

On Thu, Aug= 25, 2016 at 11:26 AM Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.o= rg> wrote:
On Thu, Aug 25, 2= 016 at 2:27 PM, Christian Decker via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> If however
> he is planning to use it as a foothold to further compromise your
> company, send spam or similar, he will likely try to avoid these
> tripwires. [...]

Depends on the value of their activity compared to the value of the coins.<= br> Spamming doesn't pay much.

Covert tripwires would obviously be better, but if shared tripwires
allow you to have 100x the funds available it could be a good
trade-off.
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bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
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