From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-2.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1YsamQ-0005fu-5F for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 13 May 2015 17:49:14 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.212.171 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.212.171; envelope-from=dgomez1092@gmail.com; helo=mail-wi0-f171.google.com; Received: from mail-wi0-f171.google.com ([209.85.212.171]) by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1YsamM-0002b0-Tl for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 13 May 2015 17:49:14 +0000 Received: by widdi4 with SMTP id di4so209051488wid.0 for ; Wed, 13 May 2015 10:49:04 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.180.99.39 with SMTP id en7mr41303314wib.31.1431539344867; Wed, 13 May 2015 10:49:04 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.28.144.68 with HTTP; Wed, 13 May 2015 10:49:04 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 10:49:04 -0700 Message-ID: From: Damian Gomez To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=f46d041828082203b40515fa3a93 X-Spam-Score: -0.0 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (dgomez1092[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 0.2 FREEMAIL_ENVFROM_END_DIGIT Envelope-from freemail username ends in digit (dgomez1092[at]gmail.com) 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature 0.3 AWL AWL: Adjusted score from AWL reputation of From: address X-Headers-End: 1YsamM-0002b0-Tl Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Long-term mining incentives X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 17:49:14 -0000 --f46d041828082203b40515fa3a93 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I hope to keep continuing this conversations. Pardon my absence, but I don't alway feel like I have much to contribute especially if it's not techincal. On my part I have been a proponent, of an alterrnativ consensus, that begins shifting away from teh current cooinbase reward system in order to reduce mining on the whole and thus limit those who do mine to do so on a level of integrity. I took a look at the ethereum blog on weak subjectivity, it does seem to be a good transtition to use a gravity schema to be implemented in a Log Structured Merge tree in order to find doscrepancy in forks. Using this sama data structure could still be used in a consensus model. In terms of how nodes communicate on teh network their speed and latency communication are at least halfway solved based off their intereactions (kernel software changes) with how nodes write and read memory { smp_wrb() || smp_rmb() } This would allow for a connection on the Let me provide a use case: Say that we wanted to begin a new model for integrity, then the current value for integrity would utilize a OTS from the previous hash in order to establish the previous owner address of the block it was previously part of. THE MAIN ISSUE here is being able to verify, which value of integrity is useful for being able to establish a genesis block. A paper by Lee & Ewe (2001) called *The Byzantine General's Problem* gives insight as to how a O(n^c) model is suitable to send a message w/ value through out the system, each node is then sent a read-invalidate request in order to change their cache logs for old system memory in a new fixed address. Upon consensus of this value the rest of the "brainer" {1st recipeients} nodes would be able to send a forward propagation of the learnt value and, after acceptance the value would then be backpropagated to the genesis block upoon every round in orderr to set a deterministic standard for the dynamic increase of integrity of the system. In POW systems the nonce generated would be the accumulation of the integrity within a system and what their computatiuonal exertion in terms of the overall rate of integrity increase in the system as the new coinbase -> this value then is assigned and signed to the hash and teh Merkel Root as two layers encoded to its base and then reencrypted using EDCSA from the 256 to 512 bit transformation so that the new address given has a validity that cannot be easily fingerprinted and the malleability of teh transaction becomes much more difficult due to the overall 2 ^ 28 verification stamp provided to the new hash. The parameters T T r P (Trust value) -> foud in the new coinbase or the scriptSig ( Hidden) -> found in the Hash, and the merkel root hash (TRust overall) R =3D within the target range for new nonces and address locations Paradigm (integrity) =3D held within the genesis block as a backpropogated solution Using this signature then the nodes would then be able to communicate and transition the memory resevres for previous transaction on the block based on the byzantine consensus. What noone has yet mentioned which I have forgotten too, is how these datacenters of pool woul be supported w/out fees. I will thrw that one out to all of you. The current consensus system leaves room for orp[haned transactions if there were miltiple signature requests the queue would be lined up based off integrity values in order to have the most effective changes occcur first. I have some more thoughts and will continue working on the techinical vernacular and how a noob developer and decent computer science student could make such an mplementation a reality. Thanks in advance for listengin to this. And to Krzysztof Okupsi and Paul McKenny(Memory Barriers Hardware View for Software hackers) for their help in nudging my brain and the relentles people behind the scenes who make all our minds possible. On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 4:26 AM, < bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net> wrote: > Send Bitcoin-development mailing list submissions to > bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > bitcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net > > You can reach the person managing the list at > bitcoin-development-owner@lists.sourceforge.net > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Bitcoin-development digest..." > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Long-term mining incentives (Thomas Voegtlin) > 2. Re: Long-term mining incentives (Tier Nolan) > 3. Re: Long-term mining incentives (Alex Mizrahi) > 4. Re: Proposed alternatives to the 20MB step function (Tier > Nolan) > 5. Re: Block Size Increase (Oliver Egginger) > 6. Re: Block Size Increase (Angel Leon) > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Thomas Voegtlin > To: Gavin Andresen , Bitcoin Dev < > bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net> > Cc: > Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 11:49:13 +0200 > Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Long-term mining incentives > > Le 12/05/2015 18:10, Gavin Andresen a =C3=A9crit : > > Added back the list, I didn't mean to reply privately: > > > > Fair enough, I'll try to find time in the next month or three to write = up > > four plausible future scenarios for how mining incentives might work: > > > > 1) Fee-supported with very large blocks containing lots of tiny-fee > > transactions > > 2) Proof-of-idle supported (I wish Tadge Dryja would publish his > > proof-of-idle idea....) > > 3) Fees purely as transaction-spam-prevention measure, chain security v= ia > > alternative consensus algorithm (in this scenario there is very little > > mining). > > 4) Fee supported with small blocks containing high-fee transactions > moving > > coins to/from sidechains. > > > > Would that be helpful, or do you have some reason for thinking that we > > should pick just one and focus all of our efforts on making that one > > scenario happen? > > > > I always think it is better, when possible, not to "bet on one horse." > > > > Sorry if I did not make myself clear. It is not about betting on one > single horse, or about making one particular scenario happen. It is not > about predicting whether something else will replace PoW in the future, > and I am in no way asking you to focus your efforts in one particular > direction at the expenses of others. Various directions will be explored > by various people, and that's great. > > I am talking about what we know today. I would like an answer to the > following question: Do we have a reason to believe that Bitcoin can work > in the long run, without involving technologies that have not been > invented yet? Is there a single scenario that we know could work? > > Exotic and unproven technologies are not an answer to that question. The > reference scenario should be as boring as possible, and as verifiable as > possible. I am not asking what you think is the most likely to happen, > but what is the most likely to work, given the knowledge we have today. > > If I was asking: "Can we send humans to the moon by 2100?", I guess your > answer would be: "Yes we can, because it has been done in the past with > chemical rockets, and we know how to build them". You would probably not > use a space elevator in your answer. > > The reason I am asking that is, there seems to be no consensus among > core developers on how Bitcoin can work without miner subsidy. How it > *will* work is another question. > > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Tier Nolan > To: > Cc: Bitcoin Dev > Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 11:14:06 +0100 > Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Long-term mining incentives > On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 10:49 AM, Thomas Voegtlin > wrote: > >> >> The reason I am asking that is, there seems to be no consensus among >> core developers on how Bitcoin can work without miner subsidy. How it >> *will* work is another question. >> > > The position seems to be that it will continue to work for the time being= , > so there is still time for more research. > > Proof of stake has problems with handling long term reversals. The main > proposal is to slightly weaken the security requirements. > > With POW, a new node only needs to know the genesis block (and network > rules) to fully determine which of two chains is the strongest. > > Penalties for abusing POS inherently create a time horizon. A suggested > POS security model would assume that a full node is a node that resyncs > with the network regularly (every N blocks). N would be depend on the > network rules of the coin. > > The alternative is that 51% of the holders of coins at the genesis block > can rewrite the entire chain. The genesis block might not be the first > block, a POS coin might still use POW for minting. > > > https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/11/25/proof-stake-learned-love-weak-subjec= tivity/ > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Alex Mizrahi > To: Bitcoin Dev > Cc: > Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 13:31:47 +0300 > Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Long-term mining incentives > > >> With POW, a new node only needs to know the genesis block (and network >> rules) to fully determine which of two chains is the strongest. >> > > But this matters if a new node has access to the globally strongest chain= . > If attacker is able to block connections to legitimate nodes, a new node > will happily accept attacker's chain. > > So PoW, by itself, doesn't give strong security guarantees. This problem > is so fundamental people avoid talking about it. > > In practice, Bitcoin already embraces "weak subjectivity" e.g. in form of > checkpoints embedded into the source code. So it's hard to take PoW puris= ts > seriously. > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Tier Nolan > To: > Cc: Bitcoin Development > Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 11:43:08 +0100 > Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposed alternatives to the 20MB step > function > On Sat, May 9, 2015 at 4:36 AM, Gregory Maxwell > wrote: > >> An example would >> be tx_size =3D MAX( real_size >> 1, real_size + 4*utxo_created_size - >> 3*utxo_consumed_size). > > > This could be implemented as a soft fork too. > > * 1MB hard size limit > * 900kB soft limit > > S =3D block size > U =3D UTXO_adjusted_size =3D S + 4 * outputs - 3 * inputs > > A block is valid if S < 1MB and U < 1MB > > A 250 byte transaction with 2 inputs and 2 outputs would have an adjusted > size of 252 bytes. > > The memory pool could be sorted by fee per adjusted_size. > > Coin selection could be adjusted so it tries to have at least 2 inputs > when creating transactions, unless the input is worth more than a thresho= ld > (say 0.001 BTC). > > This is a pretty weak incentive, especially if the block size is > increased. Maybe it will cause a "nudge" > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Oliver Egginger > To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > Cc: > Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 12:37:17 +0200 > Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Block Size Increase > 08.05.2015 at 5:49 Jeff Garzik wrote: > > To repeat, the very first point in my email reply was: "Agree that 7 tp= s > > is too low" > > For interbank trading that would maybe enough but I don't know. > > I'm not a developer but as a (former) user and computer scientist I'm > also asking myself what is the core of the problem? Personally, for > privacy reasons I do not want to leave a footprint in the blockchain for > each pizza. And why should this expense be good for trivial things of > everyday life? > > If one encounters the block boundary, he or she will do more effort or > give up. I'm thinking most people will give up because their > transactions are not really economical. It is much better for them to > use third-partys (or another payment system). > > And that's where we are at the heart of the problem. The Bitcoin > third-party economy. With few exceptions this is pure horror. More worse > than any used car dealer. And the community just waits that things get > better. But that will never happen of its own accord. We are living in a > Wild West Town. So we need a Sheriff and many other things. > > We need a small but good functioning economy around the blockchain. To > create one, we have to accept a few unpleasant truths. I do not know if > the community is ready for it. > > Nevertheless, I know that some companies do a good job. But they have to > prevail against their dishonest competitors. > > People take advantage of the blockchain, because they no longer trust > anyone. But this will not scale in the long run. > > - oliver > > > > > > > > > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Angel Leon > To: Oliver Egginger > Cc: Bitcoin Dev > Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 07:25:47 -0400 > Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Block Size Increase > > Personally, for privacy reasons I do not want to leave a footprint in > the blockchain for each pizza. And why should this expense be good for > trivial things of everyday life? > > Then what's the point? > Isn't this supposed to be an Open transactional network, it doesn't matte= r > if you don't want that, what matters is what people want to do with it, a= nd > there's nothing you can do to stop someone from opening a wallet and buyi= ng > a pizza with it, except the core of the problem you ask yourself about, > which is, the minute this goes mainstream and people get their wallets ou= t > the whole thing will collapse, regardless of what you want the blockchain > for. > > Why talk about the billions of unbanked and all the romantic vision if yo= u > can't let them use their money however they want in a decentralized > fashion. Otherwise let's just go back to centralized banking because the > minute you want to put things off chain, you need an organization that wi= ll > need to respond to government regulation and that's the end for the > billions of unbanked to be part of the network. > > > http://twitter.com/gubatron > > On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 6:37 AM, Oliver Egginger > wrote: > >> 08.05.2015 at 5:49 Jeff Garzik wrote: >> > To repeat, the very first point in my email reply was: "Agree that 7 t= ps >> > is too low" >> >> For interbank trading that would maybe enough but I don't know. >> >> I'm not a developer but as a (former) user and computer scientist I'm >> also asking myself what is the core of the problem? Personally, for >> privacy reasons I do not want to leave a footprint in the blockchain for >> each pizza. And why should this expense be good for trivial things of >> everyday life? >> >> If one encounters the block boundary, he or she will do more effort or >> give up. I'm thinking most people will give up because their >> transactions are not really economical. It is much better for them to >> use third-partys (or another payment system). >> >> And that's where we are at the heart of the problem. The Bitcoin >> third-party economy. With few exceptions this is pure horror. More worse >> than any used car dealer. And the community just waits that things get >> better. But that will never happen of its own accord. We are living in a >> Wild West Town. So we need a Sheriff and many other things. >> >> We need a small but good functioning economy around the blockchain. To >> create one, we have to accept a few unpleasant truths. I do not know if >> the community is ready for it. >> >> Nevertheless, I know that some companies do a good job. But they have to >> prevail against their dishonest competitors. >> >> People take advantage of the blockchain, because they no longer trust >> anyone. But this will not scale in the long run. >> >> - oliver >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------= ------ >> One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud >> Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications >> Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable Insights >> Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight. >> http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y >> _______________________________________________ >> Bitcoin-development mailing list >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development >> > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------= ----- > One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud > Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications > Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable Insights > Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight. > http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > > --f46d041828082203b40515fa3a93 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I hope to keep continuing this conversations. Pardon my ab= sence, but I don't alway feel like I have much to contribute especially= if it's not techincal.=C2=A0

On my part I have been= a proponent, of an alterrnativ consensus, that begins shifting away from t= eh current cooinbase reward system in order to reduce mining on the whole a= nd thus limit those who do mine to do so on a level of integrity.=C2=A0


I took a look at the ethereum blog on = weak subjectivity, it does seem to be a good transtition to use a gravity s= chema to be implemented in a Log Structured Merge tree =C2=A0in order to fi= nd doscrepancy in forks.


Using this= sama data structure could still be used in a consensus model. In terms of = how nodes communicate on teh network their speed and latency communication = are at least halfway solved based off their intereactions (kernel software = changes) with how nodes write and read memory { smp_wrb() =C2=A0|| smp_rmb(= ) } This would allow for a connection on the


<= /div>
Let me provide a use case: =C2=A0Say that we wanted to begin a ne= w model for
integrity, then the current value for integrity would= utilize a OTS from the previous hash in order to establish the previous ow= ner address of the block it was previously part of.=C2=A0 THE MAIN ISSUE he= re is being able to verify, which value of integrity is useful for being ab= le to establish a genesis block. A paper by Lee & Ewe (2001) called = The Byzantine General's Problem=C2=A0gives insight as to how a =C2= =A0O(n^c) model is suitable to send a message w/ value through out the syst= em, each node is then sent a read-invalidate request in order to change the= ir cache logs for old system memory in a new fixed address. Upon consensus = of this value the rest of the "brainer" {1st recipeients} nodes w= ould be able to send a forward propagation of =C2=A0the learnt value and, a= fter acceptance the value would then be backpropagated to the genesis block= upoon every round in orderr to set a deterministic standard for the dynami= c increase of integrity of the system. =C2=A0

In P= OW systems the nonce generated would be the accumulation of the integrity w= ithin a system and what their computatiuonal exertion in terms of the overa= ll rate of integrity increase in the system as the new coinbase -> this = value then is assigned and signed to the hash and teh Merkel Root =C2=A0as = two layers encoded to its base and then reencrypted using EDCSA from the 25= 6 to 512 bit transformation so that the new address given has a validity th= at cannot be easily fingerprinted and the malleability of teh transaction b= ecomes much more difficult due to the overall =C2=A02 ^ 28 verification sta= mp provided to the new hash. =C2=A0 The parameters =C2=A0T T r P=C2=A0

(Trust value) =C2=A0-> foud in the new coinbase or = the scriptSig
( Hidden) -> found in the Hash, and the merkel r= oot hash=C2=A0
(TRust overall) =C2=A0R =3D within the target rang= e for =C2=A0new nonces and address locations
Paradigm (integrity)= =3D held within the genesis block as a backpropogated solution
<= br>


Using this signature then the = =C2=A0nodes would then be able to communicate and transition the memory res= evres for previous transaction on the block based on the byzantine consensu= s. What noone has yet mentioned which I have forgotten too, is how these da= tacenters of pool woul be supported w/out fees. I will thrw that one out to= all of you.=C2=A0 The current consensus system leaves room for orp[haned t= ransactions if there were miltiple signature requests the queue would be li= ned up based off integrity values in order to have the most effective chang= es occcur first. =C2=A0

I have some more thoughts = and will continue working on the techinical vernacular and how a noob devel= oper and decent computer science student could make such an mplementation a= reality.=C2=A0 Thanks in advance for listengin to this. =C2=A0
<= br>


<Thank you to Greg Maxwell f= or allowing us to liosten to his talk online, was hearing while writing thi= s.> =C2=A0And to Krzysztof Okupsi and Paul McKenny(Memory Barriers Hardw= are View for Software hackers) for their help in nudging my brain and the r= elentles people behind the scenes who make all our minds possible.=C2=A0







On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 4:26 AM, <b= itcoin-development-request@lists.sourceforge.net> wrote:
<= blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px= #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Send Bitcoin-development mailing list submiss= ions to
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 https://lists.sourceforge.n= et/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 bitcoin-development-request@lists.s= ourceforge.net

You can reach the person managing the list at
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 bitcoin-development-owner@lists.sourc= eforge.net

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of Bitcoin-development digest..."

Today's Topics:

=C2=A0 =C2=A01. Re: Long-term mining incentives (Thomas Voegtlin)
=C2=A0 =C2=A02. Re: Long-term mining incentives (Tier Nolan)
=C2=A0 =C2=A03. Re: Long-term mining incentives (Alex Mizrahi)
=C2=A0 =C2=A04. Re: Proposed alternatives to the 20MB step=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2= =A0 =C2=A0 function (Tier Nolan)
=C2=A0 =C2=A05. Re: Block Size Increase (Oliver Egginger)
=C2=A0 =C2=A06. Re: Block Size Increase (Angel Leon)


---------- Forwarded message ----------
From:=C2=A0Thomas Voegtl= in <thomasv@el= ectrum.org>
To:=C2=A0Gavin Andresen <gavinandresen@gmail.com>, Bitcoi= n Dev <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Cc:=C2= =A0
Date:=C2=A0Wed, 13 May 2015 11:49:13 +0200
Subject:=C2=A0Re: [Bit= coin-development] Long-term mining incentives

Le 12/05/2015 18:10, Gavin Andresen a =C3=A9crit :
> Added back the list, I didn't mean to reply privately:
>
> Fair enough, I'll try to find time in the next month or three to w= rite up
> four plausible future scenarios for how mining incentives might work:<= br> >
> 1) Fee-supported with very large blocks containing lots of tiny-fee > transactions
> 2) Proof-of-idle supported (I wish Tadge Dryja would publish his
> proof-of-idle idea....)
> 3) Fees purely as transaction-spam-prevention measure, chain security = via
> alternative consensus algorithm (in this scenario there is very little=
> mining).
> 4) Fee supported with small blocks containing high-fee transactions mo= ving
> coins to/from sidechains.
>
> Would that be helpful, or do you have some reason for thinking that we=
> should pick just one and focus all of our efforts on making that one > scenario happen?
>
> I always think it is better, when possible, not to "bet on one ho= rse."
>

Sorry if I did not make myself clear. It is not about betting on one
single horse, or about making one particular scenario happen. It is not
about predicting whether something else will replace PoW in the future,
and I am in no way asking you to focus your efforts in one particular
direction at the expenses of others. Various directions will be explored by various people, and that's great.

I am talking about what we know today. I would like an answer to the
following question: Do we have a reason to believe that Bitcoin can work in the long run, without involving technologies that have not been
invented yet? Is there a single scenario that we know could work?

Exotic and unproven technologies are not an answer to that question. The reference scenario should be as boring as possible, and as verifiable as possible. I am not asking what you think is the most likely to happen,
but what is the most likely to work, given the knowledge we have today.

If I was asking: "Can we send humans to the moon by 2100?", I gue= ss your
answer would be: "Yes we can, because it has been done in the past wit= h
chemical rockets, and we know how to build them". You would probably n= ot
use a space elevator in your answer.

The reason I am asking that is, there seems to be no consensus among
core developers on how Bitcoin can work without miner subsidy. How it
*will* work is another question.




---------- Forwarded message ----------
From:=C2=A0Tier Nolan &l= t;tier.nolan@gmai= l.com>
To:=C2=A0
Cc:=C2=A0Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-developm= ent@lists.sourceforge.net>
Date:=C2=A0Wed, 13 May 2015 11:14:06 += 0100
Subject:=C2=A0Re: [Bitcoin-development] Long-term mining incentives=
= On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 10:49 AM, Thomas Voegtlin <thomasv@electrum.org= > wrote:

The reason I am asking that is, there seems to be no consensus among
core developers on how Bitcoin can work without miner subsidy. How it
*will* work is another question.

The po= sition seems to be that it will continue to work for the time being, so the= re is still time for more research.

Proof of stake has pr= oblems with handling long term reversals.=C2=A0 The main proposal is to sli= ghtly weaken the security requirements.

With POW, a new n= ode only needs to know the genesis block (and network rules) to fully deter= mine which of two chains is the strongest.

Penalties for = abusing POS inherently create a time horizon.=C2=A0 A suggested POS securit= y model would assume that a full node is a node that resyncs with the netwo= rk regularly (every N blocks).=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 N would be depend on the n= etwork rules of the coin.

The alternative is that 51% of = the holders of coins at the genesis block can rewrite the entire chain.=C2= =A0 The genesis block might not be the first block, a POS coin might still = use POW for minting.


---------- Forwarded message ----------
From:=C2=A0Alex Mizrahi = <alex.mizrah= i@gmail.com>
To:=C2=A0Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development@lis= ts.sourceforge.net>
Cc:=C2=A0
Date:=C2=A0Wed, 13 May 2015 13:3= 1:47 +0300
Subject:=C2=A0Re: [Bitcoin-development] Long-term mining ince= ntives
=C2=A0
With POW, a new node= only needs to know the genesis block (and network rules) to fully determin= e which of two chains is the strongest.

But this matters if a new node has access to the g= lobally strongest chain.
If attacker is able to block connections= to legitimate nodes, a new node will happily accept attacker's chain.<= /div>

So PoW, by itself, doesn't give strong securit= y guarantees. This problem is so fundamental people avoid talking about it.=

In practice, Bitcoin already embraces "weak = subjectivity" e.g. in form of checkpoints embedded into the source cod= e. So it's hard to take PoW purists seriously.


---------- Forwarded message ----------
From:=C2=A0Tier Nolan &l= t;tier.nolan@gmai= l.com>
To:=C2=A0
Cc:=C2=A0Bitcoin Development <bitcoin-= development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Date:=C2=A0Wed, 13 May 2015 11= :43:08 +0100
Subject:=C2=A0Re: [Bitcoin-development] Proposed alternativ= es to the 20MB step function
On Sat, May 9, 2015 at 4:36 AM, Gregory Maxwell= <gmaxwell@gmail.com> wrote:
An example would
be tx_size =3D MAX( real_size >> 1,=C2=A0 real_size + 4*utxo_created_= size -
3*utxo_consumed_size).=C2=A0

This could be = implemented as a soft fork too.

* 1MB hard size limit
=
* 900kB soft limit

S =3D block size
<= div>U =3D UTXO_adjusted_size =3D S + 4 * outputs - 3 * inputs

=
A block is valid if S < 1MB and U < 1MB

A 250 = byte transaction with 2 inputs and 2 outputs would have an adjusted size of= 252 bytes.

The memory pool could be sorted by= fee per adjusted_size.=C2=A0

=C2=A0Coin sele= ction could be adjusted so it tries to have at least 2 inputs when creating= transactions, unless the input is worth more than a threshold (say 0.001 B= TC).

This is a pretty weak incentive, especially if the b= lock size is increased.=C2=A0 Maybe it will cause a "nudge"


---------- Forwarded message ----------
From:=C2=A0Oliver Egging= er <bitcoin@oliv= ere.de>
To:=C2=A0bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc:=C2=A0
Date:=C2=A0Wed, 13 May 2015 12:37:17 +0200
Subject:=C2= =A0Re: [Bitcoin-development] Block Size Increase
08.05.2015 at 5:49 Jeff= Garzik wrote:
> To repeat, the very first point in my email reply was: "Agree tha= t 7 tps
> is too low"

For interbank trading that would maybe enough but I don't know.

I'm not a developer but as a (former) user and computer scientist I'= ;m
also asking myself what is the core of the problem? Personally, for
privacy reasons I do not want to leave a footprint in the blockchain for each pizza. And why should this expense be good for trivial things of
everyday life?

If one encounters the block boundary, he or she will do more effort or
give up. I'm thinking most people will give up because their
transactions are not really economical. It is much better for them to
use third-partys (or another payment system).

And that's where we are at the heart of the problem. The Bitcoin
third-party economy. With few exceptions this is pure horror. More worse than any used car dealer. And the community just waits that things get
better. But that will never happen of its own accord. We are living in a Wild West Town. So we need a Sheriff and many other things.

We need a small but good functioning economy around the blockchain. To
create one, we have to accept a few unpleasant truths. I do not know if
the community is ready for it.

Nevertheless, I know that some companies do a good job. But they have to prevail against their dishonest competitors.

People take advantage of the blockchain, because they no longer trust
anyone. But this will not scale in the long run.

- oliver











---------- Forwarded message ----------
From:=C2=A0Angel Leon &l= t;gubatron@gmail.co= m>
To:=C2=A0Oliver Egginger <bitcoin@olivere.de>
Cc:=C2=A0Bitcoin Dev &= lt;bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Date:=C2=A0Wed,= 13 May 2015 07:25:47 -0400
Subject:=C2=A0Re: [Bitcoin-development] Bloc= k Size Increase
> Per= sonally, for=C2=A0privacy reasons I d= o not want to leave a footprint in the blockchain for=C2=A0each pizza. And =C2=A0why should this expense be good= for trivial things of=C2=A0everyday = life?

Then what's the point?
Isn't this supposed to be an= Open transactional network, it doesn't matter if you don't want th= at, what matters is what people want to do with it, and there's nothing= you can do to stop someone from opening a wallet and buying a pizza with i= t, except the core of the problem you ask yourself about, which is, the min= ute this goes mainstream and people get their wallets out the whole thing w= ill collapse, regardless of what you want the blockchain for.

Why t= alk about the billions of unbanked and all the romantic vision if you can&#= 39;t let them use their money however they want in a decentralized fashion.= Otherwise let's just go back to centralized banking because the minute= you want to put things off chain, you need an organization that will need = to respond to government regulation and that's the end for the billions= of unbanked to be part of the network.



On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 6:37 AM, Oliver Eggi= nger <bitcoin@olivere.de> wrote:
08.05.2015 at 5:49 Jeff Garzik wrote:
> To repeat, the very first point in my email reply was: "Agree tha= t 7 tps
> is too low"

For interbank trading that would maybe enough but I don't know.

I'm not a developer but as a (former) user and computer scientist I'= ;m
also asking myself what is the core of the problem? Personally, for
privacy reasons I do not want to leave a footprint in the blockchain for each pizza. And why should this expense be good for trivial things of
everyday life?

If one encounters the block boundary, he or she will do more effort or
give up. I'm thinking most people will give up because their
transactions are not really economical. It is much better for them to
use third-partys (or another payment system).

And that's where we are at the heart of the problem. The Bitcoin
third-party economy. With few exceptions this is pure horror. More worse than any used car dealer. And the community just waits that things get
better. But that will never happen of its own accord. We are living in a Wild West Town. So we need a Sheriff and many other things.

We need a small but good functioning economy around the blockchain. To
create one, we have to accept a few unpleasant truths. I do not know if
the community is ready for it.

Nevertheless, I know that some companies do a good job. But they have to prevail against their dishonest competitors.

People take advantage of the blockchain, because they no longer trust
anyone. But this will not scale in the long run.

- oliver








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One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud Widest out-of-the-box monitoring support with 50+ applications
Performance metrics, stats and reports that give you Actionable Insights Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight.
http://ad.doubleclick.net/ddm/clk/290420510;117567292;y
= _______________________________________________
Bitcoin-development mailing list
Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-de= velopment


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