Hi Vjudeu,

Perhaps this could make sense in some setting. e.g. instead of a hardware device which protects your secret key via pin you use a pinless device but you create a strong password and use a proper password hash to create another key and put them in a 2-of-2. But make sure you don't use sha256 to hash the password. Use a proper password hash. Keep in mind there's also bip39 passwords which do a similar but this does involve entering them into the possibly malicious hardware device.

Cheers,

LL

On Mon, 2 May 2022 at 03:56, vjudeu via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
It seems that Taproot allows us to protect each individual public key with a password. It could work in this way: we have some normal, Taproot-based public key, that is generated in a secure and random way, as it is today in Bitcoin Core wallet. Then, we can create another public key, just by taking password from the user, executing SHA-256 on that, and using it as a private key, so the second key will be just a brainwallet. Then, we can combine them in a Schnorr signature, forming 2-of-2 multisig, where the first key is totally random, and the second key is just a brainwallet that takes a password chosen by the user. By default, each key can be protected with the same password, used for the whole wallet, but it could be possible to choose different passwords for different addresses, if needed. Descriptors should handle that nicely, in the same way as they can be used to handle any other 2-of-2 multisig.
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