From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp3.osuosl.org (smtp3.osuosl.org [IPv6:2605:bc80:3010::136]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 11D2DC002D for ; Thu, 7 Jul 2022 13:24:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp3.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E779F60C30 for ; Thu, 7 Jul 2022 13:24:53 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp3.osuosl.org E779F60C30 Authentication-Results: smtp3.osuosl.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=synonym-to.20210112.gappssmtp.com header.i=@synonym-to.20210112.gappssmtp.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20210112 header.b=ZlQk60EF X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.897 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.897 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp3.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp3.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id CW0lWTXTsE-A for ; Thu, 7 Jul 2022 13:24:52 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp3.osuosl.org E78F560A70 Received: from mail-pf1-x42e.google.com (mail-pf1-x42e.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::42e]) by smtp3.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E78F560A70 for ; Thu, 7 Jul 2022 13:24:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-pf1-x42e.google.com with SMTP id e16so6581846pfm.11 for ; Thu, 07 Jul 2022 06:24:51 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=synonym-to.20210112.gappssmtp.com; s=20210112; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=uh3d5jXDLw5A5GNp4MiWm02laFBX6h3aR2NRFzpYJ/4=; b=ZlQk60EFYXL9VWCkvmKCMrG+k+TGxX4E0MoY2OOTfdRptrVLZPtwucrWucjooMDp0H 1ApXqyGn1Yp5XEnX9PwwsgUr4FAYaoS3FIr+1S/dO6eLNc82FuR5GISfkd+W2ozY0c91 qqbY70eY2NrHsT90VWIvg/e8RmnY/SxXr+4/5zgz9QhoT+oUo6fTrwnwRNkLiCyKDbQG wqJVQ980j9PZ9JylLAhhSsi9lgrAy6UmANoyBoG5INlms5rubqgm//Pd+TcuDhLP73Xs C9xQpzjMM06UW+UeZEQIQh/WGVQm+cFYYbN8BOY0WLBn9qfA6LuKJczTT2riv/mbrDEe gE/g== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to; bh=uh3d5jXDLw5A5GNp4MiWm02laFBX6h3aR2NRFzpYJ/4=; b=6GImAih0m1q9I8OZ5fYhcd95arRJlmN7R+r27uoXwxjah9C0ofbZtt5j8A3d6i/i7t qFKv/DspMPaJIxeqJTy1ieNthlclCQZltLbh3SBSYYMMYv2hJh44xFVtlQJNN/l61/LW jxrNWfuSb2l4H00iyX0yvfKkkXaVhBXCL9WjxtxaFoPNnSKt6TIXaL2Ht7YpXmrQtp6q MYFv4PiNYItKwjxKiO9M8aEu+RzPsm1TYAYnYSmgwlD8GI1MFyCDZZb+srONys6OR8QL O5Vn1MyeTDWNOo5XHE05Fr5axTu2oudb25K7NTRwe/+ixB/jPXzYvwS+qOXi858U5LwN 9rqA== X-Gm-Message-State: AJIora+SP49H7GLSR0inw8/wRQDqDXkf1TNyptly1YGD8lEKftURzLRc EUrLpIrMLwoYxtxb4Q7fqkHC3MpedL/L6HaS1kxg2gZwmzQ3ZNrX X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGRyM1u07y1YsEsKPwRFZ/UbLMmFJgPBrjzED176pTUlP8h3Lxtq926hOlZKpgAgaPfL4voPHH6ORvEZnPpXa6FWxo0= X-Received: by 2002:a17:90b:3ec5:b0:1ef:688:8568 with SMTP id rm5-20020a17090b3ec500b001ef06888568mr5287544pjb.38.1657200290405; Thu, 07 Jul 2022 06:24:50 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: John Carvalho Date: Thu, 7 Jul 2022 14:24:39 +0100 Message-ID: To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000a1b84b05e33702f5" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Thu, 07 Jul 2022 13:55:43 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Bitcoin covenants are inevitable X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 07 Jul 2022 13:24:54 -0000 --000000000000a1b84b05e33702f5 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Billy, Proof of work and the difficulty adjustment function solve literally everything you are talking about already. Bitcoin does not need active economic governanance by devs or meddlers. Please stop spamming this list with this nonsensical thread. Love, John On Thu, Jul 7, 2022 at 1:00 PM < bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Send bitcoin-dev mailing list submissions to > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > You can reach the person managing the list at > bitcoin-dev-owner@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of bitcoin-dev digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: Bitcoin covenants are inevitable (Billy Tetrud) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 17:46:15 -0700 > From: Billy Tetrud > To: vjudeu@gazeta.pl, Bitcoin Protocol Discussion > > Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Bitcoin covenants are inevitable > Message-ID: > 3GgLQ@mail.gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > @Corey > > > Currently there is zero feedback in the Bitcoin system between what we > might think is the optimum amount of security and what actually exists. > > I basically agree with this. The pedantic part of my mind does want to > point out that the link between block subsidy and bitcoin's price does > actually give somewhat of a feedback loop, in that the higher the price, > the more valuable bitcoin is as a whole (at least as viewed by the active > market), and therefore the more investment in security is appropriate. > However, in the long run when the subsidy reduces to insignificance, we > basically lose this link. And even with this link, it's not very direct. > Fees retain only a little bit of this behavior, because presumably a more > valuable bitcoin is more valuable to spend, but the link to security is > very tenuous there. > > > There is also zero agreement on how much security would constitute such > an optimum. > > This is really step 1. We need to generate consensus on this long before > the block subsidy becomes too small. Probably in the next 10-15 years. I > wrote a paper > > that uses a framework for thinking about how much security bitcoin might > need. The concept is that we should figure out what bitcoin's bottlenecks > are, and figure out the minimum requirements we want to place on running a > node based on how many (public) nodes we think we need and what percentage > of machines out there are likely to run a node. The goals I chose to > explore in that paper are totally up for debate, and I think its an > important debate to have. But they are basically a first stab at setting up > what we would need to determine optimum security. I would very much > appreciate your review of that part of the paper, Corey. > > > Figuring out how much security is needed, or even better, figuring out a > way to have a market mechanism to answer that question, will be an > important project. > > My thoughts on this are that we will need to periodically make some > software change to adjust a *target amount of investment in security*, > because the components of bitcoin's blockchain security are not all > predictable. Many unpredictable things factor into bitcoin's security (eg > miner behavior, pools, how many people generally run public nodes on their > own, what features require running public nodes, value of bitcoin, etc. > > The primary mechanism we have to change how much security we have is to > change the block size, which changes how much fees miners can collect each > block. This isn't a linear thing. Its probably a parabola with a peak, > where at that peak, making the block either smaller and larger would both > reduce total fees paid. This is because when blocksize is higher, more > transactions (and thus more fees) can be collected, but at the same time > average fees will be lower. The pull of those two forces should define that > parabola. > > So my suggestion here would be that we should target a certain amount of > security and have programmatic adjustments to the block size in order to > stay near enough to the parabolic maximum so that we pay miners enough to > give us sufficient blockchain security. Conversely, it should also attempt > to minimize how much "extra" security we pay for. It would be wasteful to > pay 3 times as much for 3 times the security we actually need. Such a thing > is a very real form of devaluation that basically represents a tax on > bitcoin and users of bitcoin. And its very possible for the position of > this parabola to change over time. We could never say with certainty > whether we're on one side of the parabola's maximum or the other. This > would make it rather complex to track well. > > Additionally, there's no clear trustless way to determine the market value > of bitcoin at any given time, which makes it difficult to maintain this > target over time. As the market value of bitcoin changes, that target could > become quite inaccurate. This implies that we would need to do periodic > adjustments to the target, either through periodic forks or through some > other mechanism for changing the target. > > If there were a good trustless way to determine the market value of > bitcoin, we would have to "manually" change this target potentially much > less often. Transaction fees kind of have an association with market value. > Perhaps some kind of analysis can be done on that to make a reasonable > prediction of what market value is based on fees. Or maybe blocks can > commit to a market price similarly to how they commit to a timestamp (which > is also only verifiable to an approximation and can only be verified close > to when it was mined but not eg years later). > > > > > On Wed, Jul 6, 2022 at 4:13 AM vjudeu via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > > > If the only realistic (fair, efficient & proportionate) way to pay for > > Bitcoin's security was by having some inflation scheme that violated the > 21 > > million cap, then agreeing to break the limit would probably be what > makes > > sense, and in the economic interest of its users and holders. > > > > So, Paul Sztorc was right again, there are three options: Enormous Block > > Size Increases, Violate 21M Coin Limit, or >50% Miner Fee-Revenues Come > > From Merged Mining: https://www.truthcoin.info/images/sb-trilemma.png. > > And I think using Merged Mining is the best option. More about that: > > https://www.truthcoin.info/blog/security-budget-ii-mm/ > > > > > Another option, if we were to decide we are over-secured in the short > > term, would be to soft-fork in a reduction in the current and near-future > > mining rewards, by somehow locking the coins in a contract that deprived > > the miner of the full reward, and then using that contract to pay the > > rewards out far in the future, should at some point we feel the security > > budget was insufficient. > > > > Yes, that's also possible, RSK uses that. And making some kind of > > soft-fork for that is also possible, but I don't know if miners will > agree > > to send some coinbase reward to " > OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY > > OP_DROP OP_TRUE". > > > > On 2022-07-06 06:29:18 user Corey Haddad via bitcoin-dev < > > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > >Bitcoin's finite supply is the main argument for people investing in it, > > the whole narrative around bitcoin is based on its finite supply. While > it > > has its flaws and basically condemns bitcoin to be only used as a store > >of > > value (and not as a currency), I don't think it's worth questioning it at > > this point. > > > > > >Just my 2 sats. > > > > > >Giuseppe. > > > > > > A finite supply alone is not enough to give something value, as it must > > also be useful in some way. In the case of Bitcoin, various forms of > > cryptographic security must all work - and work together - to make > Bitcoin > > useful. If the only realistic (fair, efficient & proportionate) way to > pay > > for Bitcoin's security was by having some inflation scheme that violated > > the 21 million cap, then agreeing to break the limit would probably be > what > > makes sense, and in the economic interest of its users and holders. > > > > There will always be competitive pressures with respect to efficiency, > and > > both being over-secured and under-secured would be economically > inefficient > > for a crypto currency, and thereby laving room for a more > optimally-secured > > competitor to gain ground. Currently there is zero feedback in the > Bitcoin > > system between what we might think is the optimum amount of security and > > what actually exists. There is also zero agreement on how much security > > would constitute such an optimum. Figuring out how much security is > needed, > > or even better, figuring out a way to have a market mechanism to answer > > that question, will be an important project. > > > > Another option, if we were to decide we are over-secured in the short > > term, would be to soft-fork in a reduction in the current and near-future > > mining rewards, by somehow locking the coins in a contract that deprived > > the miner of the full reward, and then using that contract to pay the > > rewards out far in the future, should at some point we feel the security > > budget was insufficient. Anthony Towns presented a form of this concept > in > > greater detail at a Scaling Bitcoin conference some years ago. While this > > solution, if employed, would only work for some finite amount of time, it > > is possible that could give additional decades before the accumulated > > security budget was exhausted. > > > > > > Corey > > _______________________________________________ > > bitcoin-dev mailing list > > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > > -------------- next part -------------- > An HTML attachment was scrubbed... > URL: < > http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20220706/d5a48a69/attachment-0001.html > > > > ------------------------------ > > Subject: Digest Footer > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > > ------------------------------ > > End of bitcoin-dev Digest, Vol 86, Issue 7 > ****************************************** > -- -- John Carvalho CEO, Synonym.to Schedule: https://calendly.com/bitcoinerrorlog Chat: https://t.me/bitcoinerrorlog Social: https://twitter.com/bitcoinerrorlog --000000000000a1b84b05e33702f5 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Billy,

Proof of work and the difficulty adjustment function solve literally every= thing you are talking about already.

Bitcoin does not need active economic governanance by devs or = meddlers.

Please stop sp= amming this list with this nonsensical thread.

<= /div>
Love,=C2=A0

John


On Thu, Jul 7, 2022 at 1:00= PM <bi= tcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
Send bitcoin-dev mailing list submissions to
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org

To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 https://li= sts.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 bitcoin-dev-request@lists.linuxfoundati= on.org

You can reach the person managing the list at
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 bitcoin-dev-owner@lists.linuxfoundation.o= rg

When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of bitcoin-dev digest..."


Today's Topics:

=C2=A0 =C2=A01. Re: Bitcoin covenants are inevitable (Billy Tetrud)


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2022 17:46:15 -0700
From: Billy Tetrud <billy.tetrud@gmail.com>
To: vjudeu@gazeta.pl<= /a>,=C2=A0 Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org&g= t;
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Bitcoin covenants are inevitable
Message-ID:
=C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 =C2=A0 <CAGpPWDbKjSXKHaUcevzG1DtdP-WksO3Ak+1J2JWTeC= G2=3D3GgLQ@mail.g= mail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=3D"utf-8"

@Corey

>=C2=A0 Currently there is zero feedback in the Bitcoin system between w= hat we
might think is the optimum amount of security and what actually exists.

I basically agree with this. The pedantic part of my mind does want to
point out that the link between block subsidy and bitcoin's price does<= br> actually give somewhat of a feedback loop, in that the higher the price, the more valuable bitcoin is as a whole (at least as viewed by the active market), and therefore the more investment in security is appropriate.
However, in the long run when the subsidy reduces to insignificance, we
basically lose this link. And even with this link, it's not very direct= .
Fees retain only a little bit of this behavior, because presumably a more valuable bitcoin is more valuable to spend, but the link to security is
very tenuous there.

> There is also zero agreement on how much security would constitute suc= h
an optimum.

This is really step 1. We need to generate consensus on this long before the block subsidy becomes too small. Probably in the next 10-15 years. I wrote a paper
<https://github.com/fresh= eneesz/quantificationOfConsensusProtocolSecurity>
that uses a framework for thinking about how much security bitcoin might need. The concept is that we should figure out what bitcoin's bottlenec= ks
are, and figure out the minimum requirements we want to place on running a<= br> node based on how many (public) nodes we think we need and what percentage<= br> of machines out there are likely to run a node. The goals I chose to
explore in that paper are totally up for debate, and I think its an
important debate to have. But they are basically a first stab at setting up=
what we would need to determine optimum security. I would very much
appreciate your review of that part of the paper, Corey.

> Figuring out how much security is needed, or even better, figuring out= a
way to have a market mechanism to answer that question, will be an
important project.

My thoughts on this are that we will need to periodically make some
software change to adjust a *target amount of investment in security*,
because the components of bitcoin's blockchain security are not all
predictable. Many unpredictable things factor into bitcoin's security (= eg
miner behavior, pools, how many people generally run public nodes on their<= br> own, what features require running public nodes, value of bitcoin, etc.

The primary mechanism we have to change how much security we have is to
change the block size, which changes how much fees miners can collect each<= br> block. This isn't a linear thing. Its probably a parabola with a peak,<= br> where at that peak, making the block either smaller and larger would both reduce total fees paid. This is because when blocksize is higher, more
transactions (and thus more fees) can be collected, but at the same time average fees will be lower. The pull of those two forces should define that=
parabola.

So my suggestion here would be that we should target a certain amount of security and have programmatic adjustments to the block size in order to stay near enough to the parabolic maximum so that we pay miners enough to give us sufficient blockchain security. Conversely, it should also attempt<= br> to minimize how much "extra" security we pay for. It would be was= teful to
pay 3 times as much for 3 times the security we actually need. Such a thing=
is a very real form of devaluation that basically represents a tax on
bitcoin and users of bitcoin. And its very possible for the position of
this parabola to change over time. We could never say with certainty
whether we're on one side of the parabola's maximum or the other. T= his
would make it rather complex to track well.

Additionally, there's no clear trustless way to determine the market va= lue
of bitcoin at any given time, which makes it difficult to maintain this
target over time. As the market value of bitcoin changes, that target could=
become quite inaccurate. This implies that we would need to do periodic
adjustments to the target, either through periodic forks or through some other mechanism for changing the target.

If there were a good trustless way to determine the market value of
bitcoin, we would have to "manually" change this target potential= ly much
less often. Transaction fees kind of have an association with market value.=
Perhaps some kind of analysis can be done on that to make a reasonable
prediction of what market value is based on fees. Or maybe blocks can
commit to a market price similarly to how they commit to a timestamp (which=
is also only verifiable to an approximation and can only be verified close<= br> to when it was mined but not eg years later).




On Wed, Jul 6, 2022 at 4:13 AM vjudeu via bitcoin-dev <
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> > If the only realistic (fair, efficient & proportionate) way t= o pay for
> Bitcoin's security was by having some inflation scheme that violat= ed the 21
> million cap, then agreeing to break the limit would probably be what m= akes
> sense, and in the economic interest of its users and holders.
>
> So, Paul Sztorc was right again, there are three options: Enormous Blo= ck
> Size Increases, Violate 21M Coin Limit, or >50% Miner Fee-Revenues = Come
> From Merged Mining: https://www.truthcoin.info= /images/sb-trilemma.png.
> And I think using Merged Mining is the best option. More about that: > https://www.truthcoin.info/blog/security-= budget-ii-mm/
>
> > Another option, if we were to decide we are over-secured in the s= hort
> term, would be to soft-fork in a reduction in the current and near-fut= ure
> mining rewards, by somehow locking the coins in a contract that depriv= ed
> the miner of the full reward, and then using that contract to pay the<= br> > rewards out far in the future, should at some point we feel the securi= ty
> budget was insufficient.
>
> Yes, that's also possible, RSK uses that. And making some kind of<= br> > soft-fork for that is also possible, but I don't know if miners wi= ll agree
> to send some coinbase reward to "<futureBlockNumber> OP_CHE= CKLOCKTIMEVERIFY
> OP_DROP OP_TRUE".
>
> On 2022-07-06 06:29:18 user Corey Haddad via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >Bitcoin's finite supply is the main argument for people invest= ing in it,
> the whole narrative around bitcoin is based on its finite supply. Whil= e it
> has its flaws and basically condemns bitcoin to be only used as a stor= e >of
> value (and not as a currency), I don't think it's worth questi= oning it at
> this point.
> >
> >Just my 2 sats.
> >
> >Giuseppe.
>
>
> A finite supply alone is not enough to give something value, as it mus= t
> also be useful in some way. In the case of Bitcoin, various forms of > cryptographic security must all work - and work together - to make Bit= coin
> useful. If the only realistic (fair, efficient & proportionate) wa= y to pay
> for Bitcoin's security was by having some inflation scheme that vi= olated
> the 21 million cap, then agreeing to break the limit would probably be= what
> makes sense, and in the economic interest of its users and holders. >
> There will always be competitive pressures with respect to efficiency,= and
> both being over-secured and under-secured would be economically ineffi= cient
> for a crypto currency, and thereby laving room for a more optimally-se= cured
> competitor to gain ground. Currently there is zero feedback in the Bit= coin
> system between what we might think is the optimum amount of security a= nd
> what actually exists. There is also zero agreement on how much securit= y
> would constitute such an optimum. Figuring out how much security is ne= eded,
> or even better, figuring out a way to have a market mechanism to answe= r
> that question, will be an important project.
>
> Another option, if we were to decide we are over-secured in the short<= br> > term, would be to soft-fork in a reduction in the current and near-fut= ure
> mining rewards, by somehow locking the coins in a contract that depriv= ed
> the miner of the full reward, and then using that contract to pay the<= br> > rewards out far in the future, should at some point we feel the securi= ty
> budget was insufficient. Anthony Towns presented a form of this concep= t in
> greater detail at a Scaling Bitcoin conference some years ago. While t= his
> solution, if employed, would only work for some finite amount of time,= it
> is possible that could give additional decades before the accumulated<= br> > security budget was exhausted.
>
>
> Corey
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org= /mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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_______________________________________________
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= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


------------------------------

End of bitcoin-dev Digest, Vol 86, Issue 7
******************************************
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