From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org (smtp2.osuosl.org [140.211.166.133]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0857AC000B for ; Mon, 31 Jan 2022 22:54:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EAD91401E1 for ; Mon, 31 Jan 2022 22:54:24 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.099 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.099 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: smtp2.osuosl.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=chia.net Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp2.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id WNcM-E36YVgD for ; Mon, 31 Jan 2022 22:54:23 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 Received: from mail-lf1-x12d.google.com (mail-lf1-x12d.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::12d]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AE21A40189 for ; Mon, 31 Jan 2022 22:54:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-lf1-x12d.google.com with SMTP id u14so29968954lfo.11 for ; Mon, 31 Jan 2022 14:54:23 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chia.net; s=google; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=qgy8/XteBjEhyDsBlgst+qCujeSVEaVXJB30w1I6QJo=; b=W7+GIsHqncjy61OnDlHVcsc5rE1OKVSxNNF851LOLYZ4jv+Wwu0UQL0AUzBDo1znBr hJXfzrlU06OM+5XRkzyelI8upP7ydyy286FAPuGDnB+bpAsn4qgbJryPqN+xKjsgPg/B UglLsiAW/NeS48Dtd/ZgC6oUFf69N8Uy8WMJeRtBhKmSIYPNrlVockFrnt15P14zJjnl YlgygVoUaDa8U5iHx6gYe+hQ9MuTW472eQhNr9ct7cYVR3qx/ZfYfDQGsY8cgcGoha+G K/Tj6d4kFhEqKwwdqczQzDJbd+2ARbkvdA93XgPAaOt0ajb6ZwmvSIoi3cAs0UiZM4jv PCUg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to; bh=qgy8/XteBjEhyDsBlgst+qCujeSVEaVXJB30w1I6QJo=; b=2KliLd9hzJOwn/6JO62aP9VjLGR6l9E0mUafSyQ9Qtkl4QmNGLwAs1dbRGdztA3PkI yCc60uQXsacuG5UFR6kS8fWRw5Z2b/BQmai4/PZ+lf8jMkrD+tQs/6IBB8rkLgz2bmp8 nbRMs5dmxFW6dLMwPKrYCjkZ9GjFuRrzO4IW90+GBxtZt/ydit+dKBJBOdcFFz6QCOdh rOTpyrxnvw5jT4WUbKd7NHbYpIRG8mSR2r6EuI0FleCFyyT8gdYZPyMBBMbVWaXP/BAh Ipp9M5Ox8aGScHS5uniwnHvEZTMpwKqXURmW4NkfDNcV+VGW0OQbSv0FD4B1wXZodhqn H89Q== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM5305iEjafn3QSLlKKrRXb3OrR8wWo+8LTwJ/fTF3e28wkMFlyCvn DdOY67Fqdo+9DCpMaS+58wdz0VTGGC9LdBG73Q7umzXNHVE= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJyUtfhJM1EwW7rNxeHS3dXZhAPQ2kEG3Z/CSgxKePZJkT8ESihqfyvpfmlr2i8Q4GxI8aM2Adwm4AxF+1Dmfqo= X-Received: by 2002:a05:6512:11ef:: with SMTP id p15mr16386791lfs.471.1643669661296; Mon, 31 Jan 2022 14:54:21 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: Bram Cohen Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2022 14:54:10 -0800 Message-ID: To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000004a40a605d6e8aa4e" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Mon, 31 Jan 2022 23:15:32 +0000 Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Improving RBF policy X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2022 22:54:25 -0000 --0000000000004a40a605d6e8aa4e Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Gloria Zhao wrote: > > This post discusses limitations of current Bitcoin Core RBF policy and > attempts to start a conversation about how we can improve it, > summarizing some ideas that have been discussed. Please reply if you > have any new input on issues to be solved and ideas for improvement! > Is it still verboten to acknowledge that RBF is normal behavior and disallowing it is the feature, and that feature is mostly there to appease some people's delusions that zeroconf is a thing? It seems a bit overdue to disrespect the RBF flag in the direction of always assuming it's on. > - **Incentive Compatibility**: Ensure that our RBF policy would not > accept replacement transactions which would decrease fee profits > of a miner. In general, if our mempool policy deviates from what is > economically rational, it's likely that the transactions in our > mempool will not match the ones in miners' mempools, making our > fee estimation, compact block relay, and other mempool-dependent > functions unreliable. Incentive-incompatible policy may also > encourage transaction submission through routes other than the p2p > network, harming censorship-resistance and privacy of Bitcoin payments. > There are two different common regimes which result in different incentivized behavior. One of them is that there's more than a block's backlog in the mempool in which case between two conflicting transactions the one with the higher fee rate should win. In the other case where there isn't a whole block's worth of transactions the one with higher total value should win. It would be nice to have consolidated logic which handles both, it seems the issue has to do with the slope of the supply/demand curve which in the first case is gentle enough to keep the one transaction from hitting the rate but in the second one is basically infinite. --0000000000004a40a605d6e8aa4e Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Gloria Zhao wrote:

This post discusses limitations of current Bitcoin Core RBF policy and
attempts to start a conversation about how we can improve it,
summarizing some ideas that have been discussed. Please reply if you
have any new input on issues to be solved and ideas for improvement!

Is it still verboten to acknowledge that RBF = is normal behavior and disallowing it is the feature, and that feature is m= ostly there to appease some people's delusions that zeroconf is a thing= ? It seems a bit overdue to disrespect the RBF flag in the direction of alw= ays assuming it's on.
=C2=A0
- **Incentive Compatibility**: Ensure that our RBF p= olicy would not
=C2=A0 accept replacement transactions which would decrease fee profits
=C2=A0 of a miner. In general, if our mempool policy deviates from what is<= br> economically rational, it's likely that the transactions in our
mempool will not match the ones in miners' mempools, making our
fee estimation, compact block relay, and other mempool-dependent
functions unreliable. Incentive-incompatible policy may also
encourage transaction submission through routes other than the p2p
network, harming censorship-resistance and privacy of Bitcoin payments.
=

There are two different common regimes whi= ch result in different incentivized behavior. One of them is that there'= ;s more than a block's backlog in the mempool in which case between two= conflicting transactions the one with the higher fee rate should win. In t= he other case where there isn't a whole block's worth of transactio= ns the one with higher total value should win. It would be nice to have con= solidated logic which handles both, it seems the issue has to do with the s= lope of the supply/demand curve which in the first case is gentle enough to= keep the one transaction from hitting the rate but in the second one is ba= sically infinite.
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