Re: [bitcoin-dev] Trusted merkle tree depth for safe tx inclusion proofs without a soft fork

[Bram Cohen <bram@chia.net>]

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Are you proposing a soft fork to include the number of transactions in a
block in the block headers to compensate for the broken Merkle format? That
sounds like a good idea.

On Thu, Jun 7, 2018 at 10:13 AM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> It's well known that the Bitcoin merkle tree algorithm fails to distinguish
> between inner nodes and 64 byte transactions, as both txs and inner nodes
> are
> hashed the same way. This potentially poses a problem for tx inclusion
> proofs,
> as a miner could (with ~60 bits of brute forcing) create a transaction that
> committed to a transaction that was not in fact in the blockchain.
>
> Since odd-numbered inner/leaf nodes are concatenated with themselves and
> hashed
> twice, the depth of all leaves (txs) in the tree is fixed.
>
> It occured to me that if the depth of the merkle tree is known, this
> vulnerability can be trivially avoided by simply comparing the length of
> the
> merkle path to that known depth. For pruned nodes, if the depth is saved
> prior
> to pruning the block contents itself, this would allow for completely safe
> verification of tx inclusion proofs, without a soft-fork; storing this
> data in
> the block header database would be a simple thing to do.
>
> Lite client verification without a trusted source of known-valid headers is
> dangerous anyway, so this protection makes for a fairly simple addition to
> any
> lite client protocol.
>
>
> # Brute Force Cost Assuming a Valid Tx
>
> Consider the following 64 byte transaction:
>
>     tx = CTransaction([CTxIn(COutPoint(b'\xaa'*32,0xbbbbbbbb),
> nSequence=0xcccccccc)],[CTxOut(2**44-1,CScript([b'\
> xdd\xdd\xdd']))],nLockTime=2**31-1)
>
> If we serialize it, the last 32 bytes are:
>
>     aaaaaaaaaa bbbbbbbb 00 cccccccc 01 ffffffffff0f0000 04 03dddddd
> ffffff7f
>     ↳prevhash↲ ↳ n    ↲    ↳ seq  ↲    ↳ nValue       ↲    ↳ pubk ↲ ↳lockt
> ↲
>                         ↳ sig_len   ↳num_txouts         ↳scriptPubKey_len
>
> Of those fields, we have free choice of the following bits:
>
> prevhash:  40 - prev tx fully brute-forcable, as tx can be created to match
> prev_n:    16 - can create a tx with up to about 2^16 outputs
> seq:       32 - fully brute-forcable in nVersion=1 txs
> nValue:    44 - assuming attacker has access to 175,921 BTC, worth ~1.3
> billion right now
> pubk:      32 - fully brute-forcable if willing to lose BTC spent; all
> scriptPubKeys are valid
> nLockTime: 31 - valid time-based nLockTime
> Total: 195 bits free choice → 61 bits need to be brute-forced
>
> Additionally, this can be improved slightly by a few more bits by checking
> for
> valid scriptSig/scriptPubKey combinations other than a zero-length
> scriptSig;
> the attacker can also avoid creating an unspendable output this way, and
> recover their funds by spending it in the same block with a third
> transaction.
> An obvious implementation making use of this would be to check that the
> high
> bits of prevout.n are zero first, prior to doing more costly checks.
>
> Finally, if inflation is not controlled - and thus nValue can be set
> freely -
> note how the brute force is trivial. There may very well exist
> crypto-currencies
> for which this brute-force is much easier than it is on Bitcoin!
>
> --
> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
>
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>
>

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