From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 661B3E6D for ; Tue, 9 Feb 2016 13:59:43 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ig0-f199.google.com (mail-ig0-f199.google.com [209.85.213.199]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 885F3E1 for ; Tue, 9 Feb 2016 13:59:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-ig0-f199.google.com with SMTP id rs1so249799067igb.3 for ; Tue, 09 Feb 2016 05:59:41 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=coinapex.com; s=google; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-type; bh=CLVhH07/ni33JU2VdP3x8FcFqEvKcLDbw0hguU27dYc=; b=aZgMjpxhScNZOOn0P4ZeKwIwrN0hrXIkXSI5iPfvEs0Ufyu/jRbSQ8UGgz9ehRUSln CTVocZ8sFlX3tOmSMAw8BTX3L9eIs83oTs7FVbqDs5mHpK5pSNU1wyLLRgX//X8L+2K0 gH+pu4JGe0llhEeLpk9IU5ntBy0vz8GyBBQqM= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc:content-type; bh=CLVhH07/ni33JU2VdP3x8FcFqEvKcLDbw0hguU27dYc=; b=E9HeLc7E2fkmBqeyrr1XrVjtl5lLndVY+Wbp35gE4+j+IWq3mzyZlyqnSFmh7qSS+A QCeMHcEY5yRVzYGV56MeLFUQuIuNJuFopr9vNct0acYVXbkMDo722HvxvZ8TnbDRsR/M u9HbvWQBNrtSOJ4n7o3iC9OVD78aD3BgZxrCIIeZI6hJurREt9HZCtrZmifAui7PkYlY cqwKBJA2uunjfCr4MG1Fob2+XqZIyE7+5QsEcH9zNaI+MZTVFzP0Z1sf7btS9D913eeC TnFJ/xEJ5j/9wywSt0yI7MeNTYM85j6t4y37WxLW+TPAVPWYwoSd4kQpPtNOkpUE5aYr +kbg== X-Gm-Message-State: AG10YOQ6lnbc6in9nTid5B9GDTyB3LjJXyjIBoAdLsafT5R2ILeLnW8pos9/hZc4R9/9P7aIo7UVhi+99DCO1w== X-Received: by 10.60.117.137 with SMTP id ke9mr30792656oeb.16.1455026380922; Tue, 09 Feb 2016 05:59:40 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.202.209.22 with HTTP; Tue, 9 Feb 2016 05:59:01 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: <201602060012.26728.luke@dashjr.org> From: Yifu Guo Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2016 08:59:01 -0500 Message-ID: To: Gavin Andresen Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7b47202892fc55052b56bae7 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.1 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW,URIBL_SBL autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Wed, 10 Feb 2016 05:30:02 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP proposal: Increase block size limit to 2 megabytes X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 09 Feb 2016 13:59:43 -0000 --047d7b47202892fc55052b56bae7 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Happy Lunar New Year Everyone! Gavin, > I suspect there ARE a significant percentage of un-maintained full > nodes-- probably 30 to 40%. Losing those nodes will not be a problem, for > three reasons: The notion of large set ( 30% to 40% ) of un-maintained full nodes are not evident on the network. below is data based on a personal snap shot taken around Dec, 2015. with the following assumptions. 1) nodes running non standard version strings are considered a preference by the node operator and are not included. 2) nodes below 0.10 are counted as so called "un-maintained" even though they also can be a choice of the node operator. Satoshi:0.9.3, 105 Satoshi:0.8.6, 74 Satoshi:0.9.1, 49 Satoshi:0.9.2.1, 42 Satoshi:0.8.5, 39 Satoshi:0.8.1, 35 Satoshi:0.9.5, 14 Satoshi:0.8.3, 12 Satoshi:0.9.4, 10 Satoshi:0.9.99, 10 Satoshi:0.9.0, 5 Satoshi:0.9.2, 5 Satoshi:0.8.0, 4 Satoshi:0.8.99, 1 Satoshi:0.8.4, 1 There are 406 nodes total that falls under the un-maintained category, which is below 10% of the network. Luke also have some data here that shows similar results. http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/versions.txt > The network could shrink by 60% and it would still have plenty of open > connection slots I'm afraid we have to agree to disagree if you think dropping support for 60% of the nodes on the network when rolling out an upgrade is the sane default. > > > People are committing to spinning up thousands of supports-2mb-nodes > during the grace period. thousands of nodes?! where did you get this figure? who are these people? *Please* elaborate. > We could wait a year and pick up maybe 10 or 20% more. I don't understand this statement at all, please explicate. -- *Yifu Guo* *"Life is an everlasting self-improvement."* On Sat, Feb 6, 2016 at 10:37 AM, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Responding to "28 days is not long enough" : > > I keep seeing this claim made with no evidence to back it up. As I said, > I surveyed several of the biggest infrastructure providers and the btcd > lead developer and they all agree "28 days is plenty of time." > > For individuals... why would it take somebody longer than 28 days to > either download and restart their bitcoind, or to patch and then re-run > (the patch can be a one-line change MAX_BLOCK_SIZE from 1000000 to 2000000)? > > For the Bitcoin Core project: I'm well aware of how long it takes to roll > out new binaries, and 28 days is plenty of time. > > I suspect there ARE a significant percentage of un-maintained full nodes-- > probably 30 to 40%. Losing those nodes will not be a problem, for three > reasons: > 1) The network could shrink by 60% and it would still have plenty of open > connection slots > 2) People are committing to spinning up thousands of supports-2mb-nodes > during the grace period. > 3) We could wait a year and pick up maybe 10 or 20% more. > > I strongly disagree with the statement that there is no cost to a longer > grace period. There is broad agreement that a capacity increase is needed > NOW. > > To bring it back to bitcoin-dev territory: are there any TECHNICAL > arguments why an upgrade would take a business or individual longer than 28 > days? > > > Responding to Luke's message: > > On Sat, Feb 6, 2016 at 1:12 AM, Luke Dashjr via bitcoin-dev >> wrote: >> > On Friday, February 05, 2016 8:51:08 PM Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev >> wrote: >> >> Blog post on a couple of the constants chosen: >> >> http://gavinandresen.ninja/seventyfive-twentyeight >> > >> > Can you put this in the BIP's Rationale section (which appears to be >> mis-named >> > "Discussion" in the current draft)? >> > > I'll rename the section and expand it a little. I think standards > documents like BIPs should be concise, though (written for implementors), > so I'm not going to recreate the entire blog post there. > > >> > >> >> Signature operations in un-executed branches of a Script are not >> counted >> >> OP_CHECKMULTISIG evaluations are counted accurately; if the signature >> for a >> >> 1-of-20 OP_CHECKMULTISIG is satisified by the public key nearest the >> top >> >> of the execution stack, it is counted as one signature operation. If >> it is >> >> satisfied by the public key nearest the bottom of the execution stack, >> it >> >> is counted as twenty signature operations. Signature operations >> involving >> >> invalidly encoded signatures or public keys are not counted towards the >> >> limit >> > >> > These seem like they will break static analysis entirely. That was a >> noted >> > reason for creating BIP 16 to replace BIP 12. Is it no longer a >> concern? Would >> > it make sense to require scripts to commit to the total accurate-sigop >> count >> > to fix this? >> > > After implementing static counting and accurate counting... I was wrong. > Accurate/dynamic counting/limiting is quick and simple and can be > completely safe (the counting code can be told the limit and can > "early-out" validation). > > I think making scripts commit to a total accurate sigop count is a bad > idea-- it would make multisignature signing more complicated for zero > benefit. E.g. if you're circulating a partially signed transaction to that > must be signed by 2 of 5 people, you can end up with a transaction that > requires 2, 3, 4, or 5 signature operations to validate (depending on which > public keys are used to do the signing). The first signer might have no > idea who else would sign and wouldn't know the accurate sigop count. > > >> > >> >> The amount of data hashed to compute signature hashes is limited to >> >> 1,300,000,000 bytes per block. >> > >> > The rationale for this wasn't in your blog post. I assume it's based on >> the >> > current theoretical max at 1 MB blocks? Even a high-end PC would >> probably take >> > 40-80 seconds just for the hashing, however - maybe a lower limit would >> be >> > best? >> > > It is slightly more hashing than was required to validate block number > 364,422. > > There are a couple of advantages to a very high limit: > > 1) When the fork is over, special-case code for dealing with old blocks > can be eliminated, because all old blocks satisfy the new limit. > > 2) More importantly, if the limit is small enough it might get hit by > standard transactions, then block creation code (CreateNewBlock() / > getblocktemplate / or some external transaction-assembling software) will > have to solve an even more complicated bin-packing problem to optimize for > fees paid. > > In practice, the 20,000 sigop limit will always be reached before > MAX_BLOCK_SIGHASH. > > > >> > >> >> Miners express their support for this BIP by ... >> > >> > But miners don't get to decide hardforks. How does the economy express >> their >> > support for it? What happens if miners trigger it without consent from >> the >> > economy? >> > > "The economy" does support this. > > > >> > >> > If you are intent on using the version bits to trigger the hardfork, I >> suggest >> > rephrasing this such that miners should only enable the bit when they >> have >> > independently confirmed economic support (this means implementations >> need a >> > config option that defaults to off). >> > > Happy to add words about economic majority. > > Classic will not implement a command-line option (the act of running > Classic is "I opt in"), but happy to add one for a pull request to Core, > assuming Core would not see such a pull request as having any hostile > intent. > > > > >> >> SPV (simple payment validation) wallets are compatible with this >> change. >> > >> > Would prefer if this is corrected to "Light clients" or something. >> Actual SPV >> > wallets do not exist at this time, and would not be compatible with a >> > hardfork. >> > > Is there an explanation of SPV versus "Light Client" written somewhere > more permanent than a reddit comment or forum post that I can point to? > > >> > >> >> In the short term, an increase is needed to continue the current >> economic >> >> policies with regards to fees and block space, matching market >> expectations >> >> and preventing market disruption. >> > >> > IMO this sentence is the most controversial part of your draft, and it >> > wouldn't suffer a loss to remove it (or at least make it subjective). >> > > Happy to remove. > > >> > I would also prefer to see any hardfork: >> > >> > 1. Address at least the simple tasks on the hardfork wishlist (eg, >> enable some >> > disabled opcodes; fix P2SH for N-of->15 multisig; etc). >> > > Those would be separate BIPs. (according to BIP 1, smaller is better) > > After this 2MB bump, I agree we need to agree on a process for the next > hard fork to avoid all of the unnecessary drama. > > > 2. Be deployed as a soft-hardfork so as not to leave old nodes entirely >> > insecure. >> > > I haven't been paying attention to all of the > "soft-hardfork/hard-softfork/etc" terminology so have no idea what you > mean. Is THAT written up somewhere? > > -- > -- > Gavin Andresen > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > --047d7b47202892fc55052b56bae7 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Happy Lunar New Year Everyone!

Gavin,

> I suspect there ARE a significa= nt percentage of un-maintained full nodes-- probably 30 to 40%. Losing thos= e nodes will not be a problem, for three reasons:

The notion of large set ( 30% to 40% ) of un-maintained full nodes a= re not evident on the network. below is data based on a personal snap shot = taken around Dec, 2015. with the following assumptions.
1) nodes = running non standard version strings are considered a preference by the nod= e operator and are not included.
2) nodes below 0.10 are coun= ted as so called "un-maintained" even though they also can be a c= hoice of the node operator.

Satoshi:0.9.3, 10= 5
Satoshi:0.8.6, 74
Satoshi:0.9.1, 49
Satoshi= :0.9.2.1, 42
Satoshi:0.8.5, 39
Satoshi:0.8.1, 35
<= div>Satoshi:0.9.5, 14
Satoshi:0.8.3, 12
Satoshi:0.9.4, = 10
Satoshi:0.9.99, 10
Satoshi:0.9.0, 5
Satosh= i:0.9.2, 5
Satoshi:0.8.0, 4
Satoshi:0.8.99, 1
Satoshi:0.8.4, 1

There are 406 nodes total = that falls under the un-maintained category, which is below 10% of the netw= ork.
Luke also have some data here that shows similar results.=C2= =A0http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin/files/charts/versions.txt=

> The network could shrink by 60% = and it would still have plenty of open connection slots
I'm afraid we have to agree to disagree if you think dropp= ing support for 60% of the nodes on the network when rolling out an upgrade= is the sane default.

> People are committing = to spinning up thousands of supports-2mb-nodes during the grace period.

thousands of nodes?! where did you get this fi= gure? who are these people? Please elaborate.

<= /div>
> We could wait a year and pick up maybe 10 or 20%= more.

I don't understand this st= atement at all, please=C2=A0explicate.

--=C2=A0
Yifu Guo
"Life is an everlasting self= -improvement."

On Sat, Feb 6, 2016 at 10:37 AM= , Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.li= nuxfoundation.org> wrote:
Responding to "28 days is not long enough" :

I keep seeing this claim made with no evidence to back it up.=C2=A0 As I s= aid, I surveyed several of the biggest infrastructure providers and the btc= d lead developer and they all agree "28 days is plenty of time."<= /div>

For individuals... why would it take somebody long= er than 28 days to either download and restart their bitcoind, or to patch = and then re-run (the patch can be a one-line change MAX_BLOCK_SIZE from 100= 0000 to 2000000)?

For the Bitcoin Core project: = =C2=A0I'm well aware of how long it takes to roll out new binaries, and= 28 days is plenty of time.

I suspect there ARE a = significant percentage of un-maintained full nodes-- probably 30 to 40%. Lo= sing those nodes will not be a problem, for three reasons:
1) The= network could shrink by 60% and it would still have plenty of open connect= ion slots
2) People are committing to spinning up thousands of su= pports-2mb-nodes during the grace period.
3) We could wait a year= and pick up maybe 10 or 20% more.

I strongly disa= gree with the statement that there is no cost to a longer grace period. The= re is broad agreement that a capacity increase is needed NOW.
To bring it back to bitcoin-dev territory: =C2=A0are there any = TECHNICAL arguments why an upgrade would take a business or individual long= er than 28 days?


Responding to Luke= 's message:

On Sat, Feb = 6, 2016 at 1:12 AM, Luke Dashjr via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Friday, February 05, 2016 8:51:08 PM Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev= wrote:
>> Blog post on a couple of the constants chosen:
>>=C2=A0 =C2=A0http://gavinandresen.ninja/se= ventyfive-twentyeight
>
> Can you put this in the BIP's Rationale section (which appears to = be mis-named
> "Discussion" in the current draft)?

I'll rename the section and expand it a = little. I think standards documents like BIPs should be concise, though (wr= itten for implementors), so I'm not going to recreate the entire blog p= ost there.
=C2=A0
>
>> Signature operations in un-executed branches of a Script are not c= ounted
>> OP_CHECKMULTISIG evaluations are counted accurately; if the signat= ure for a
>> 1-of-20 OP_CHECKMULTISIG is satisified by the public key nearest t= he top
>> of the execution stack, it is counted as one signature operation. = If it is
>> satisfied by the public key nearest the bottom of the execution st= ack, it
>> is counted as twenty signature operations. Signature operations in= volving
>> invalidly encoded signatures or public keys are not counted toward= s the
>> limit
>
> These seem like they will break static analysis entirely. That was a n= oted
> reason for creating BIP 16 to replace BIP 12. Is it no longer a concer= n? Would
> it make sense to require scripts to commit to the total accurate-sigop= count
> to fix this?

Af= ter implementing static counting and accurate counting... I was wrong. Accu= rate/dynamic counting/limiting is quick and simple and can be completely sa= fe (the counting code can be told the limit and can "early-out" v= alidation).

I think making scripts commit to a tot= al accurate sigop count is a bad idea-- it would make multisignature signin= g more complicated for zero benefit.=C2=A0 E.g. if you're circulating a= partially signed transaction to that must be signed by 2 of 5 people, you = can end up with a transaction that requires 2, 3, 4, or 5 signature operati= ons to validate (depending on which public keys are used to do the signing)= .=C2=A0 The first signer might have no idea who else would sign and wouldn&= #39;t know the accurate sigop count.
=C2=A0
>
>> The amount of data hashed to compute signature hashes is limited t= o
>> 1,300,000,000 bytes per block.
>
> The rationale for this wasn't in your blog post. I assume it's= based on the
> current theoretical max at 1 MB blocks? Even a high-end PC would proba= bly take
> 40-80 seconds just for the hashing, however - maybe a lower limit woul= d be
> best?

It is sli= ghtly more hashing than was required to validate block number 364,422.

There are a couple of advantages to a very high limit:=

1) When the fork is over, special-case code for d= ealing with old blocks can be eliminated, because all old blocks satisfy th= e new limit.

2) More importantly, if the limit is = small enough it might get hit by standard transactions, then block creation= code (CreateNewBlock() / getblocktemplate / or some external transaction-a= ssembling software) will have to solve an even more complicated bin-packing= problem to optimize for fees paid.

In practice, t= he 20,000 sigop limit will always be reached before MAX_BLOCK_SIGHASH.

=C2=A0
>
>> Miners express their support for this BIP by ...
>
> But miners don't get to decide hardforks. How does the economy exp= ress their
> support for it? What happens if miners trigger it without consent from= the
> economy?

"= The economy" does support this.

<= div>=C2=A0
>
> If you are intent on using the version bits to trigger the hardfork, I= suggest
> rephrasing this such that miners should only enable the bit when they = have
> independently confirmed economic support (this means implementations n= eed a
> config option that defaults to off).
=
Happy to add words about economic majority.

Classic will not implement a command-line option (the act o= f running Classic is "I opt in"), but happy to add one for a pull= request to Core, assuming Core would not see such a pull request as having= any hostile intent.


>
>> SPV (simple payment validation) wallets are compatible with this c= hange.
>
> Would prefer if this is corrected to "Light clients" or some= thing. Actual SPV
> wallets do not exist at this time, and would not be compatible with a<= br> > hardfork.

Is th= ere an explanation of SPV versus "Light Client" written somewhere= more permanent than a reddit comment or forum post that I can point to?
=C2=A0
>
>> In the short term, an increase is needed to continue the current e= conomic
>> policies with regards to fees and block space, matching market exp= ectations
>> and preventing market disruption.
>
> IMO this sentence is the most controversial part of your draft, and it=
> wouldn't suffer a loss to remove it (or at least make it subjectiv= e).

Happy to remove.=
=C2=A0
> I would also prefer to see any hardfork:
>
> 1. Address at least the simple tasks on the hardfork wishlist (eg, ena= ble some
>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 disabled opcodes; fix P2SH for N-of->15 multisig; etc)= .

Those would be sep= arate BIPs. (according to BIP 1, smaller is better)

After this 2MB bump, I agree we need to agree on a process for the next h= ard fork to avoid all of the unnecessary drama.
=
> 2. Be deployed as a soft-hardfork so as not to leave old nodes entirel= y
>=C2=A0 =C2=A0 insecure.

I haven't been paying attention to all of th= e "soft-hardfork/hard-softfork/etc" terminology so have no idea w= hat you mean. Is THAT written up somewhere?

--
--
Gavin Andresen

<= /div>
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
--047d7b47202892fc55052b56bae7--