From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org (smtp2.osuosl.org [IPv6:2605:bc80:3010::133]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 557ADC000E for ; Tue, 27 Jul 2021 11:18:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 37183400D2 for ; Tue, 27 Jul 2021 11:18:24 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.098 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.098 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: smtp2.osuosl.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp2.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id eeWkNaFvJUvb for ; Tue, 27 Jul 2021 11:18:23 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 Received: from mail-il1-x136.google.com (mail-il1-x136.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::136]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0A445400DB for ; Tue, 27 Jul 2021 11:18:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-il1-x136.google.com with SMTP id k3so11732785ilu.2 for ; Tue, 27 Jul 2021 04:18:22 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=b5LYiHbD+LFfq2o7IxTdSxY1w8kq6Mdaszxz7A1Hh38=; b=pK80qHZ/dbzNpafugTGfgOY1Rd5fXrLIspUgbxe3L15Ca98UbMPkfMDKBDJXaceeVx tu8brmI9g8mEaUyAAUnBGKFvkUPiuigi41jA++jrtLvrSVbO0NQXdVvXzv0QKHR4Q3ep LpDFUJe0cYfaE+0pVwlcHPaj4qyt5O8NmNYVgqI2clW+nxWM9Mum+IwOXUgXBGppVgi+ EqJraVRDC0DqPl4Tic98l5iw+xkHapxHI1ai/3fzIB0RWyuuvO7QgHaphUHSqaygXXTJ BWTHJuci8Ov0U2nJQ15YBOeF79YSiJ4DLBi9PZ3d6EjUp9/dUb6+5SonETaWvTbprgc1 Ffbg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to; bh=b5LYiHbD+LFfq2o7IxTdSxY1w8kq6Mdaszxz7A1Hh38=; b=X7rSFNK8D4wv/AvwahvadctbjCoH1jh6KF4y3v4uF1NKHYlRM7NytAWdFhIkuaJ7Vg nebrhOyoDYDA/998YXLi5fIQDeO1jKHTVYTpeFfbkiBpoZUgK8KOoyxEOmDg5gL1ZHxH Qutcf6t9sNyEG4pJutwbM5s+T5ogt8Ddm2ItRn3bwtHKJ1dV1AzNQyQlcS36BiGmmURk K8oQUtFwhSfdYfgDG4q+h5p2bV0x5wVuYaLl+2/8gJa4gX96SverYrTShczzP6/QUC17 FPvhi8btHSqcQCJKDDiippvMHydIBWUzArYs80xPIZnt4IHFXOmw09AVknlxjwMjh6rB 8dOg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM532R0XN+2tFWjyGAfOE6AW7yoNIL9uSvE4bOTiMVj45hk82TUqUD DT/Dn0dCJ51cae/hrletZg2cpcJPTbPIEk1kZCk= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJwRC5t/eIfuTf08wLFBtBEFyU51SzuipnS2mXRGXivg0niSmu6sUZfUAtZ2yo6dxIXjtjwuX+QM9tbrJCp/B3E= X-Received: by 2002:a92:7d08:: with SMTP id y8mr16287182ilc.111.1627384702106; Tue, 27 Jul 2021 04:18:22 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20210725053803.fnmd6etv3f7x3u3p@ganymede> In-Reply-To: From: Zac Greenwood Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2021 13:18:11 +0200 Message-ID: To: Billy Tetrud , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000001501c605c8190772" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Tue, 27 Jul 2021 12:25:12 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Covenant opcode proposal OP_CONSTRAINDESTINATION (an alternative to OP_CTV) X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2021 11:18:24 -0000 --0000000000001501c605c8190772 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Hi Billy, On the topic of wallet vaults, are there any plans to implement a way to limit the maximum amount to be sent from an address? An example of such limit might be: the maximum amount allowed to send is max(s, p) where s is a number of satoshi and p a percentage of the total available (sendable) amount. A minimum value may be imposed on the percentage to ensure that the address can be emptied within a reasonable number of transactions. The second parameter s allows a minimum permitted amount. (This is necessary because with only the percentage parameter the minimum permitted amount converges to zero, making it impossible to empty the address). There may be other ways too. In my view, such kind of restriction would be extremely effective in thwarting the most damaging type of theft being the one where all funds are swept in a single transaction. Zac On Tue, 27 Jul 2021 at 03:26, Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Hey James, > > In the examples you mentioned, what I was exploring was a mechanism of > attack by which the attacker could steal user A's key and use that key to > send a transaction with the maximum possible fee. User B would still > receive some funds (probably), but if the fee could be large, the attacker > would either do a lot of damage to user B (griefing) or could make an > agreement with a miner to give back some of the large fee (theft). > > But as for use cases, the proposal mentions a number of use cases > and > most overlap with the use cases of op_ctv (Jeremy > Rubin's website for op_ctv has a lot of good details, most of which are > also relevant to op_cd). The use case I'm most interested in is wallet > vaults. This opcode can be used to create a wallet vault where the user > only needs to use, for example, 1 key to spend funds, but the attacker must > steal 2 or more keys to spend funds. The benefits of a 2 key wallet vault > like this vs a normal 2-of-2 multisig wallet are that not only does an > attacker have to steal both keys (same level of security), but also the > user can lose one key and still recover their funds (better redundancy) and > also that generally the user doesn't need to access their second key - so > that can remain in a much more secure location (which would also probably > make that key harder to steal). The only time the second key only comes > into play if one key is stolen and the attacker attempts to send a > transaction. At that point, the user would go find and use his second key > (along with the first) to send a revoke transaction to prevent the attacker > from stealing their funds. This is somewhat akin to a lightning watchtower > scenario, where your wallet would watch the chain and alert you about an > unexpected transaction, at which point you'd manually do a revoke (vs a > watchtower's automated response). You might be interested in taking a look > at this wallet vault design > > that uses OP_CD or even my full vision > of the > wallet vault I want to be able to create. > > With a covenant opcode like this, its possible to create very usable and > accessible but highly secure wallets that can allow normal people to hold > self custody of their keys without fear of loss or theft and without the > hassle of a lot of safe deposit boxes (or other secure seed storage > locations). > > Cheers, > BT > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 26, 2021 at 2:08 PM James MacWhyte wrote: > >> Hi Billy! >> >> See above, but to break down that situation a bit further, these are the >>> two situations I can think of: >>> >>> 1. The opcode limits user/group A to send the output to user/group B >>> 2. The opcode limits user A to send from one address they own to >>> another address they own. >>> >>> I'm trying to think of a good use case for this type of opcode. In these >> examples, an attacker who compromises the key for user A can't steal the >> money because it can only be sent to user B. So if the attacker wants to >> steal the funds, they would need to compromise the keys of both user A and >> user B. >> >> But how is that any better than a 2-of-2 multisig? Isn't the end result >> exactly the same? >> >> James >> > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > --0000000000001501c605c8190772 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi Billy,

On the topic of wallet vaults, are there any plans to implement a way t= o limit the maximum amount to be sent from an address?

An example of such limit might be: the maxim= um amount allowed to send is max(s, p) where s is a number of satoshi and p= a percentage of the total available (sendable) amount.

A minimum value may be imposed on the perce= ntage to ensure that the address can be emptied within a reasonable number = of transactions. The second parameter s allows a minimum permitted amount. = (This is necessary because with only the percentage parameter the minimum p= ermitted amount converges to zero, making it impossible to empty the addres= s).=C2=A0

There may be o= ther ways too. In my view, such kind of restriction would be extremely effe= ctive in thwarting the most damaging type of theft being the one where all = funds are swept in a single transaction.

<= div dir=3D"auto">Zac


On Tue, 27 Jul 2021 = at 03:26, Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrot= e:
Hey James,

In the examples you mentioned, what I was exploring was a mechanism of att= ack by which the attacker could steal user A's key and use that key to = send a transaction with the maximum possible fee. User B would still receiv= e some funds (probably), but if the fee could be large, the attacker would = either do a lot of damage to user B (griefing) or could make an agreement w= ith a miner to give back some of the large fee (theft).=C2=A0
But as for use cases, the proposal mentions a number of use cases= =C2=A0and most overlap with the use cases of op_ctv=C2=A0(Jeremy Rubin's website for op= _ctv has a lot of good details, most of which are also relevant to op_cd). = The use case I'm most interested=C2=A0in is wallet vaults. This opcode = can be used to create a wallet vault where the user only needs to use, for = example, 1 key to spend funds, but the attacker must steal 2 or more keys t= o spend funds. The benefits of a 2 key wallet vault like this vs a normal 2= -of-2 multisig wallet are that not only does an attacker have to steal both= keys (same level of security), but also the user can lose one key and stil= l recover their funds (better redundancy) and also that generally the user = doesn't need to access their second key - so that can remain in a much = more secure location (which would also probably make that key harder to ste= al). The only time the second key only comes into play if one key is stolen= and the attacker attempts to send a transaction. At that point, the user w= ould go find and use his second key (along with the first) to send a revoke= transaction to prevent the attacker from stealing their funds. This is som= ewhat akin to a lightning watchtower scenario, where your wallet would watc= h the chain and alert you about an unexpected transaction, at which point y= ou'd manually do a revoke (vs a watchtower's automated response). Y= ou might be interested in taking a look at this wallet vault design that uses OP_CD or even my full vision of the wallet vault I want to be able to cre= ate.

With a covenant opcode like this, its possibl= e to create very usable and accessible but highly secure wallets that can a= llow normal people to hold self custody of their keys without fear of loss = or theft and without the hassle of a lot of safe deposit boxes (or other se= cure seed storage locations).=C2=A0

Cheers,
<= div>BT





On = Mon, Jul 26, 2021 at 2:08 PM James MacWhyte <macwhyte@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi Billy!

See above, but to break down that situation a bit further, thes= e are the two situations I can think of:
  1. The opcode limits user/group A to send th= e output to user/group B
  2. The opco= de limits user A to send from one address they own to another address they = own.=C2=A0
I'm tryin= g to think of a good use case for this type of opcode. In these examples, a= n attacker who compromises the key for user A can't steal the money bec= ause it can only be sent to user B. So if the attacker wants to steal the f= unds, they would need to compromise the keys of both user A and user B.

But how is that any better = than a 2-of-2 multisig? Isn't the end result exactly=C2=A0the same?

James
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
--0000000000001501c605c8190772--