[Bitcoin-development] BIP 38 NFC normalisation issue

[Bitcoin-development] BIP 38 NFC normalisation issue

[Mike Hearn]

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[+cc aaron]

We recently added an implementation of BIP 38 (password protected private
keys) to bitcoinj. It came to my attention that the third test vector may
be broken. It gives a hex version of what the NFC normalised version of the
input string should be, but this does not match the results of the Java
unicode normaliser, and in fact I can't even get Python to print the names
of the characters past the embedded null. I'm curious where this normalised
version came from.

Given that "pile of poo" is not a character I think any sane user would put
into a passphrase, I question the value of this test vector. NFC form is
intended to collapse things like umlaut control characters onto their prior
code point, but here we're feeding the algorithm what is basically garbage
so I'm not totally surprised that different implementations appear to
disagree on the outcome.

Proposed action: we remove this test vector as it does not represent any
real world usage of the spec, or if we desperately need to verify NFC
normalisation I suggest using a different, more realistic test string, like
Zürich, or something written in Thai.



Test 3:

   - Passphrase ϓ␀𐐀💩 (\u03D2\u0301\u0000\U00010400\U0001F4A9; GREEK
   UPSILON WITH HOOK <http://codepoints.net/U+03D2>, COMBINING ACUTE ACCENT
   <http://codepoints.net/U+0301>, NULL <http://codepoints.net/U+0000>, DESERET
   CAPITAL LETTER LONG I <http://codepoints.net/U+10400>, PILE OF POO
   <http://codepoints.net/U+1F4A9>)
   - Encrypted key:
   6PRW5o9FLp4gJDDVqJQKJFTpMvdsSGJxMYHtHaQBF3ooa8mwD69bapcDQn
   - Bitcoin Address: 16ktGzmfrurhbhi6JGqsMWf7TyqK9HNAeF
   - Unencrypted private key (WIF):
   5Jajm8eQ22H3pGWLEVCXyvND8dQZhiQhoLJNKjYXk9roUFTMSZ4
   - *Note:* The non-standard UTF-8 characters in this passphrase should be
   NFC normalized to result in a passphrase of0xcf9300f0909080f09f92a9 before
   further processing

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Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP 38 NFC normalisation issue

[Eric Winer]

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I don't know for sure if the test vector is correct NFC form.  But for what
it's worth, the Pile of Poo character is pretty easily accessible on the
iPhone and Android keyboards, and in this string it's already in NFC form
(f09f92a9 in the test result).  I've certainly seen it in usernames around
the internet, and wouldn't be surprised to see it in passphrases entered on
smartphones, especially if the author of a BIP38-compatible app includes a
(possibly ill-advised) suggestion to have your passphrase "include special
characters".

I haven't seen the NULL character on any smartphone keyboards, though - I
assume the iOS and Android developers had the foresight to know how much
havoc that would wreak on systems assuming null-terminated strings.  It
seems unlikely that NULL would be in a real-world passphrase entered by a
sane user.


On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 8:03 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> wrote:

> [+cc aaron]
>
> We recently added an implementation of BIP 38 (password protected private
> keys) to bitcoinj. It came to my attention that the third test vector may
> be broken. It gives a hex version of what the NFC normalised version of the
> input string should be, but this does not match the results of the Java
> unicode normaliser, and in fact I can't even get Python to print the names
> of the characters past the embedded null. I'm curious where this normalised
> version came from.
>
> Given that "pile of poo" is not a character I think any sane user would
> put into a passphrase, I question the value of this test vector. NFC form
> is intended to collapse things like umlaut control characters onto their
> prior code point, but here we're feeding the algorithm what is basically
> garbage so I'm not totally surprised that different implementations appear
> to disagree on the outcome.
>
> Proposed action: we remove this test vector as it does not represent any
> real world usage of the spec, or if we desperately need to verify NFC
> normalisation I suggest using a different, more realistic test string, like
> Zürich, or something written in Thai.
>
>
>
> Test 3:
>
>    - Passphrase ϓ␀𐐀💩 (\u03D2\u0301\u0000\U00010400\U0001F4A9; GREEK
>    UPSILON WITH HOOK <http://codepoints.net/U+03D2>, COMBINING ACUTE
>    ACCENT <http://codepoints.net/U+0301>, NULL
>    <http://codepoints.net/U+0000>, DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG I
>    <http://codepoints.net/U+10400>, PILE OF POO
>    <http://codepoints.net/U+1F4A9>)
>    - Encrypted key:
>    6PRW5o9FLp4gJDDVqJQKJFTpMvdsSGJxMYHtHaQBF3ooa8mwD69bapcDQn
>    - Bitcoin Address: 16ktGzmfrurhbhi6JGqsMWf7TyqK9HNAeF
>    - Unencrypted private key (WIF):
>    5Jajm8eQ22H3pGWLEVCXyvND8dQZhiQhoLJNKjYXk9roUFTMSZ4
>    - *Note:* The non-standard UTF-8 characters in this passphrase should
>    be NFC normalized to result in a passphrase of0xcf9300f0909080f09f92a9 before
>    further processing
>
>
>
>
>
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP 38 NFC normalisation issue

[Andreas Schildbach]

I think generally control-characters (such as \u0000) should be
disallowed in passphrases. (Even the use of whitespaces is very
questionable.)

I'm ok with allowing pile-of-poo's. On mobile phones there is keyboards
just containing emoticons -- why not allow those? Assuming NFC works of
course.


On 07/15/2014 03:07 PM, Eric Winer wrote:
> I don't know for sure if the test vector is correct NFC form.  But for
> what it's worth, the Pile of Poo character is pretty easily accessible
> on the iPhone and Android keyboards, and in this string it's already in
> NFC form (f09f92a9 in the test result).  I've certainly seen it in
> usernames around the internet, and wouldn't be surprised to see it in
> passphrases entered on smartphones, especially if the author of a
> BIP38-compatible app includes a (possibly ill-advised) suggestion to
> have your passphrase "include special characters".
> 
> I haven't seen the NULL character on any smartphone keyboards, though -
> I assume the iOS and Android developers had the foresight to know how
> much havoc that would wreak on systems assuming null-terminated strings.
>  It seems unlikely that NULL would be in a real-world passphrase entered
> by a sane user.
> 
> 
> On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 8:03 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net
> <mailto:mike@plan99.net>> wrote:
> 
>     [+cc aaron]
> 
>     We recently added an implementation of BIP 38 (password protected
>     private keys) to bitcoinj. It came to my attention that the third
>     test vector may be broken. It gives a hex version of what the NFC
>     normalised version of the input string should be, but this does not
>     match the results of the Java unicode normaliser, and in fact I
>     can't even get Python to print the names of the characters past the
>     embedded null. I'm curious where this normalised version came from.
> 
>     Given that "pile of poo" is not a character I think any sane user
>     would put into a passphrase, I question the value of this test
>     vector. NFC form is intended to collapse things like umlaut control
>     characters onto their prior code point, but here we're feeding the
>     algorithm what is basically garbage so I'm not totally surprised
>     that different implementations appear to disagree on the outcome.
> 
>     Proposed action: we remove this test vector as it does not represent
>     any real world usage of the spec, or if we desperately need to
>     verify NFC normalisation I suggest using a different, more realistic
>     test string, like Zürich, or something written in Thai.
> 
> 
> 
>     Test 3:
> 
>       * Passphrase ϓ␀𐐀💩 (\u03D2\u0301\u0000\U00010400\U0001F4A9; GREEK
>         UPSILON WITH HOOK <http://codepoints.net/U+03D2>, COMBINING
>         ACUTE ACCENT <http://codepoints.net/U+0301>, NULL
>         <http://codepoints.net/U+0000>, DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG I
>         <http://codepoints.net/U+10400>, PILE OF POO
>         <http://codepoints.net/U+1F4A9>)
>       * Encrypted key:
>         6PRW5o9FLp4gJDDVqJQKJFTpMvdsSGJxMYHtHaQBF3ooa8mwD69bapcDQn
>       * Bitcoin Address: 16ktGzmfrurhbhi6JGqsMWf7TyqK9HNAeF
>       * Unencrypted private key (WIF):
>         5Jajm8eQ22H3pGWLEVCXyvND8dQZhiQhoLJNKjYXk9roUFTMSZ4
>       * /Note:/ The non-standard UTF-8 characters in this passphrase
>         should be NFC normalized to result in a passphrase
>         of0xcf9300f0909080f09f92a9 before further processing
> 
> 
> 
> 
>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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> 
> 
> 
> 
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP 38 NFC normalisation issue

[Michael Wozniak]

I have a python implementation that seems to pass this test vector:

https://github.com/wozz/electrum/blob/bip38_import/lib/bip38.py#L299



On Jul 15, 2014, at 9:19 AM, Andreas Schildbach <andreas@schildbach.de> wrote:

> I think generally control-characters (such as \u0000) should be
> disallowed in passphrases. (Even the use of whitespaces is very
> questionable.)
> 
> I'm ok with allowing pile-of-poo's. On mobile phones there is keyboards
> just containing emoticons -- why not allow those? Assuming NFC works of
> course.
> 
> 
> On 07/15/2014 03:07 PM, Eric Winer wrote:
>> I don't know for sure if the test vector is correct NFC form.  But for
>> what it's worth, the Pile of Poo character is pretty easily accessible
>> on the iPhone and Android keyboards, and in this string it's already in
>> NFC form (f09f92a9 in the test result).  I've certainly seen it in
>> usernames around the internet, and wouldn't be surprised to see it in
>> passphrases entered on smartphones, especially if the author of a
>> BIP38-compatible app includes a (possibly ill-advised) suggestion to
>> have your passphrase "include special characters".
>> 
>> I haven't seen the NULL character on any smartphone keyboards, though -
>> I assume the iOS and Android developers had the foresight to know how
>> much havoc that would wreak on systems assuming null-terminated strings.
>> It seems unlikely that NULL would be in a real-world passphrase entered
>> by a sane user.
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 8:03 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net
>> <mailto:mike@plan99.net>> wrote:
>> 
>>    [+cc aaron]
>> 
>>    We recently added an implementation of BIP 38 (password protected
>>    private keys) to bitcoinj. It came to my attention that the third
>>    test vector may be broken. It gives a hex version of what the NFC
>>    normalised version of the input string should be, but this does not
>>    match the results of the Java unicode normaliser, and in fact I
>>    can't even get Python to print the names of the characters past the
>>    embedded null. I'm curious where this normalised version came from.
>> 
>>    Given that "pile of poo" is not a character I think any sane user
>>    would put into a passphrase, I question the value of this test
>>    vector. NFC form is intended to collapse things like umlaut control
>>    characters onto their prior code point, but here we're feeding the
>>    algorithm what is basically garbage so I'm not totally surprised
>>    that different implementations appear to disagree on the outcome.
>> 
>>    Proposed action: we remove this test vector as it does not represent
>>    any real world usage of the spec, or if we desperately need to
>>    verify NFC normalisation I suggest using a different, more realistic
>>    test string, like Zürich, or something written in Thai.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>    Test 3:
>> 
>>      * Passphrase ϓ␀𐐀💩 (\u03D2\u0301\u0000\U00010400\U0001F4A9; GREEK
>>        UPSILON WITH HOOK <http://codepoints.net/U+03D2>, COMBINING
>>        ACUTE ACCENT <http://codepoints.net/U+0301>, NULL
>>        <http://codepoints.net/U+0000>, DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG I
>>        <http://codepoints.net/U+10400>, PILE OF POO
>>        <http://codepoints.net/U+1F4A9>)
>>      * Encrypted key:
>>        6PRW5o9FLp4gJDDVqJQKJFTpMvdsSGJxMYHtHaQBF3ooa8mwD69bapcDQn
>>      * Bitcoin Address: 16ktGzmfrurhbhi6JGqsMWf7TyqK9HNAeF
>>      * Unencrypted private key (WIF):
>>        5Jajm8eQ22H3pGWLEVCXyvND8dQZhiQhoLJNKjYXk9roUFTMSZ4
>>      * /Note:/ The non-standard UTF-8 characters in this passphrase
>>        should be NFC normalized to result in a passphrase
>>        of0xcf9300f0909080f09f92a9 before further processing
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>    Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
>>    search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>>    Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>>    search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>>    http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>    _______________________________________________
>>    Bitcoin-development mailing list
>>    Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>>    <mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
>>    https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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>> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> _______________________________________________
>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
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Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP 38 NFC normalisation issue

[Brooks Boyd]

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I was part of adding in that test vector, and I think it's a good test
vector since it is an extreme edge-case of the current definition: If the
BIP38 proposal allows any password that can be in UTF-8, NFC normalized
form, those characters cover the various edge cases (combining characters,
null character, astral range) that if your implementation doesn't handle,
then it can't really be said to be "BIP38-compatible/compliant", right?

The "passphrase" in the test vector is NOT in NFC form; that's the point.
Whatever implementation gets designed has to assume the input is not
already NFC-normalized and needs to handle/sanitize that input before
further processing. To test your implementation for compliance, you should
not be inputting the NFC-normalized bytestring as the password input, you
should be entering the original passphrase as the test. My original pull
request for this change (https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/29) shows a
Python and a NodeJS way to input that test vector password as intended.

Some input devices may already handle the input as NFC, which is great, but
per the BIP38 proposal, that shouldn't be assumed, so various
implementations are cross-compatible. If one implementation assumes the
input is already NFC, they may encode/decode the password incorrectly, and
lock a user out of their wallet. Android allows different user keyboards to
be used, so I'm guessing there's one somewhere that allows manual entry of
unicode codepoints that could be used to enter a null character, and with
the next version of iOS, Apple devices will also get custom keyboard
options, too, so even if the default Apple keyboard does NFC-form properly,
other developers' keyboards may not. So while it is an extreme edge case,
that is not very likely to be used as a "real password" by any user, that's
what test vectors are for: to test for the edge case that you might not
have expected and handled in your implementation.

Brooks


On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 8:07 AM, Eric Winer <enwiner@gmail.com> wrote:

> I don't know for sure if the test vector is correct NFC form.  But for
> what it's worth, the Pile of Poo character is pretty easily accessible on
> the iPhone and Android keyboards, and in this string it's already in NFC
> form (f09f92a9 in the test result).  I've certainly seen it in usernames
> around the internet, and wouldn't be surprised to see it in passphrases
> entered on smartphones, especially if the author of a BIP38-compatible app
> includes a (possibly ill-advised) suggestion to have your passphrase
> "include special characters".
>
> I haven't seen the NULL character on any smartphone keyboards, though - I
> assume the iOS and Android developers had the foresight to know how much
> havoc that would wreak on systems assuming null-terminated strings.  It
> seems unlikely that NULL would be in a real-world passphrase entered by a
> sane user.
>
>
> On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 8:03 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> wrote:
>
>> [+cc aaron]
>>
>> We recently added an implementation of BIP 38 (password protected private
>> keys) to bitcoinj. It came to my attention that the third test vector may
>> be broken. It gives a hex version of what the NFC normalised version of the
>> input string should be, but this does not match the results of the Java
>> unicode normaliser, and in fact I can't even get Python to print the names
>> of the characters past the embedded null. I'm curious where this normalised
>> version came from.
>>
>> Given that "pile of poo" is not a character I think any sane user would
>> put into a passphrase, I question the value of this test vector. NFC form
>> is intended to collapse things like umlaut control characters onto their
>> prior code point, but here we're feeding the algorithm what is basically
>> garbage so I'm not totally surprised that different implementations appear
>> to disagree on the outcome.
>>
>> Proposed action: we remove this test vector as it does not represent any
>> real world usage of the spec, or if we desperately need to verify NFC
>> normalisation I suggest using a different, more realistic test string, like
>> Zürich, or something written in Thai.
>>
>>
>>
>> Test 3:
>>
>>    - Passphrase ϓ␀𐐀💩 (\u03D2\u0301\u0000\U00010400\U0001F4A9; GREEK
>>    UPSILON WITH HOOK <http://codepoints.net/U+03D2>, COMBINING ACUTE
>>    ACCENT <http://codepoints.net/U+0301>, NULL
>>    <http://codepoints.net/U+0000>, DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG I
>>    <http://codepoints.net/U+10400>, PILE OF POO
>>    <http://codepoints.net/U+1F4A9>)
>>    - Encrypted key:
>>    6PRW5o9FLp4gJDDVqJQKJFTpMvdsSGJxMYHtHaQBF3ooa8mwD69bapcDQn
>>    - Bitcoin Address: 16ktGzmfrurhbhi6JGqsMWf7TyqK9HNAeF
>>    - Unencrypted private key (WIF):
>>    5Jajm8eQ22H3pGWLEVCXyvND8dQZhiQhoLJNKjYXk9roUFTMSZ4
>>    - *Note:* The non-standard UTF-8 characters in this passphrase should
>>    be NFC normalized to result in a passphrase of0xcf9300f0909080f09f92a9 before
>>    further processing
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
>> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>> _______________________________________________
>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>
>>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
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> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
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[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 9551 bytes --]

Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP 38 NFC normalisation issue

[Jeff Garzik]

Unicode guarantees that null-terminated strings still work.  U+0000
terminates a unicode (or C) string.  strlen() gets the string byte
count.  mbstowcs() gets the character count.

Whitespace can be problematic, but should be allowed.  Control
characters should be filtered.  Emoticons probably cannot be filtered
without substandard approaches such as character blacklists, a road
you do not want to travel.

(all this is simply standard practice)


On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 9:07 AM, Eric Winer <enwiner@gmail.com> wrote:
> I don't know for sure if the test vector is correct NFC form.  But for what
> it's worth, the Pile of Poo character is pretty easily accessible on the
> iPhone and Android keyboards, and in this string it's already in NFC form
> (f09f92a9 in the test result).  I've certainly seen it in usernames around
> the internet, and wouldn't be surprised to see it in passphrases entered on
> smartphones, especially if the author of a BIP38-compatible app includes a
> (possibly ill-advised) suggestion to have your passphrase "include special
> characters".
>
> I haven't seen the NULL character on any smartphone keyboards, though - I
> assume the iOS and Android developers had the foresight to know how much
> havoc that would wreak on systems assuming null-terminated strings.  It
> seems unlikely that NULL would be in a real-world passphrase entered by a
> sane user.
>
>
> On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 8:03 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> wrote:
>>
>> [+cc aaron]
>>
>> We recently added an implementation of BIP 38 (password protected private
>> keys) to bitcoinj. It came to my attention that the third test vector may be
>> broken. It gives a hex version of what the NFC normalised version of the
>> input string should be, but this does not match the results of the Java
>> unicode normaliser, and in fact I can't even get Python to print the names
>> of the characters past the embedded null. I'm curious where this normalised
>> version came from.
>>
>> Given that "pile of poo" is not a character I think any sane user would
>> put into a passphrase, I question the value of this test vector. NFC form is
>> intended to collapse things like umlaut control characters onto their prior
>> code point, but here we're feeding the algorithm what is basically garbage
>> so I'm not totally surprised that different implementations appear to
>> disagree on the outcome.
>>
>> Proposed action: we remove this test vector as it does not represent any
>> real world usage of the spec, or if we desperately need to verify NFC
>> normalisation I suggest using a different, more realistic test string, like
>> Zürich, or something written in Thai.
>>
>>
>>
>> Test 3:
>>
>> Passphrase ϓ␀𐐀💩 (\u03D2\u0301\u0000\U00010400\U0001F4A9; GREEK UPSILON
>> WITH HOOK, COMBINING ACUTE ACCENT, NULL, DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG I, PILE
>> OF POO)
>> Encrypted key: 6PRW5o9FLp4gJDDVqJQKJFTpMvdsSGJxMYHtHaQBF3ooa8mwD69bapcDQn
>> Bitcoin Address: 16ktGzmfrurhbhi6JGqsMWf7TyqK9HNAeF
>> Unencrypted private key (WIF):
>> 5Jajm8eQ22H3pGWLEVCXyvND8dQZhiQhoLJNKjYXk9roUFTMSZ4
>> Note: The non-standard UTF-8 characters in this passphrase should be NFC
>> normalized to result in a passphrase of0xcf9300f0909080f09f92a9 before
>> further processing
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
>> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>> _______________________________________________
>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>



-- 
Jeff Garzik
Bitcoin core developer and open source evangelist
BitPay, Inc.      https://bitpay.com/

Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP 38 NFC normalisation issue

[Mike Hearn]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 318 bytes --]

>
> Unicode guarantees that null-terminated strings still work.


UTF-8 guarantees that. Other encodings do not, you can have null bytes in
UTF-16 strings for example. Indeed most languages that use pascal-style
encodings internally allow null characters in strings, it's just not a good
idea to exploit that fact ...

[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 545 bytes --]

Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP 38 NFC normalisation issue

[Andreas Schildbach]

Can you provide the rationale for standard practice? For example, why
should whitespace be allowed? I regularly use trim() on any passphrase
(or other input ftm).

So what's the action point? Should we amend the spec to filter control
characters? That would get rid of the \u0000 problem.


On 07/15/2014 05:17 PM, Jeff Garzik wrote:
> Unicode guarantees that null-terminated strings still work.  U+0000
> terminates a unicode (or C) string.  strlen() gets the string byte
> count.  mbstowcs() gets the character count.
> 
> Whitespace can be problematic, but should be allowed.  Control
> characters should be filtered.  Emoticons probably cannot be filtered
> without substandard approaches such as character blacklists, a road
> you do not want to travel.
> 
> (all this is simply standard practice)
> 
> 
> On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 9:07 AM, Eric Winer <enwiner@gmail.com> wrote:
>> I don't know for sure if the test vector is correct NFC form.  But for what
>> it's worth, the Pile of Poo character is pretty easily accessible on the
>> iPhone and Android keyboards, and in this string it's already in NFC form
>> (f09f92a9 in the test result).  I've certainly seen it in usernames around
>> the internet, and wouldn't be surprised to see it in passphrases entered on
>> smartphones, especially if the author of a BIP38-compatible app includes a
>> (possibly ill-advised) suggestion to have your passphrase "include special
>> characters".
>>
>> I haven't seen the NULL character on any smartphone keyboards, though - I
>> assume the iOS and Android developers had the foresight to know how much
>> havoc that would wreak on systems assuming null-terminated strings.  It
>> seems unlikely that NULL would be in a real-world passphrase entered by a
>> sane user.
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 8:03 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> wrote:
>>>
>>> [+cc aaron]
>>>
>>> We recently added an implementation of BIP 38 (password protected private
>>> keys) to bitcoinj. It came to my attention that the third test vector may be
>>> broken. It gives a hex version of what the NFC normalised version of the
>>> input string should be, but this does not match the results of the Java
>>> unicode normaliser, and in fact I can't even get Python to print the names
>>> of the characters past the embedded null. I'm curious where this normalised
>>> version came from.
>>>
>>> Given that "pile of poo" is not a character I think any sane user would
>>> put into a passphrase, I question the value of this test vector. NFC form is
>>> intended to collapse things like umlaut control characters onto their prior
>>> code point, but here we're feeding the algorithm what is basically garbage
>>> so I'm not totally surprised that different implementations appear to
>>> disagree on the outcome.
>>>
>>> Proposed action: we remove this test vector as it does not represent any
>>> real world usage of the spec, or if we desperately need to verify NFC
>>> normalisation I suggest using a different, more realistic test string, like
>>> Zürich, or something written in Thai.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Test 3:
>>>
>>> Passphrase ϓ␀𐐀💩 (\u03D2\u0301\u0000\U00010400\U0001F4A9; GREEK UPSILON
>>> WITH HOOK, COMBINING ACUTE ACCENT, NULL, DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG I, PILE
>>> OF POO)
>>> Encrypted key: 6PRW5o9FLp4gJDDVqJQKJFTpMvdsSGJxMYHtHaQBF3ooa8mwD69bapcDQn
>>> Bitcoin Address: 16ktGzmfrurhbhi6JGqsMWf7TyqK9HNAeF
>>> Unencrypted private key (WIF):
>>> 5Jajm8eQ22H3pGWLEVCXyvND8dQZhiQhoLJNKjYXk9roUFTMSZ4
>>> Note: The non-standard UTF-8 characters in this passphrase should be NFC
>>> normalized to result in a passphrase of0xcf9300f0909080f09f92a9 before
>>> further processing
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
>>> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>>> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>>> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>>
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
>> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>> _______________________________________________
>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>
> 
> 
> 

Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP 38 NFC normalisation issue

[Jeff Garzik]

On whitespace:  Security UX testing I've seen shows it is mentally
easier for some users to memorize and use longer passphrases, if they
are permitted spaces.  I've not seen anything written on use of
tabs/NLs/FFs in passphrases.

I can see the logic of some systems, that convert \s+ into ' ' for
purposes of password hashing, even though that might frustrate a
security nerd or two.
http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/32691/why-not-allow-spaces-in-a-password

I do think control characters should be filtered.

On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 11:32 AM, Andreas Schildbach
<andreas@schildbach.de> wrote:
> Can you provide the rationale for standard practice? For example, why
> should whitespace be allowed? I regularly use trim() on any passphrase
> (or other input ftm).
>
> So what's the action point? Should we amend the spec to filter control
> characters? That would get rid of the \u0000 problem.
>
>
> On 07/15/2014 05:17 PM, Jeff Garzik wrote:
>> Unicode guarantees that null-terminated strings still work.  U+0000
>> terminates a unicode (or C) string.  strlen() gets the string byte
>> count.  mbstowcs() gets the character count.
>>
>> Whitespace can be problematic, but should be allowed.  Control
>> characters should be filtered.  Emoticons probably cannot be filtered
>> without substandard approaches such as character blacklists, a road
>> you do not want to travel.
>>
>> (all this is simply standard practice)
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 9:07 AM, Eric Winer <enwiner@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> I don't know for sure if the test vector is correct NFC form.  But for what
>>> it's worth, the Pile of Poo character is pretty easily accessible on the
>>> iPhone and Android keyboards, and in this string it's already in NFC form
>>> (f09f92a9 in the test result).  I've certainly seen it in usernames around
>>> the internet, and wouldn't be surprised to see it in passphrases entered on
>>> smartphones, especially if the author of a BIP38-compatible app includes a
>>> (possibly ill-advised) suggestion to have your passphrase "include special
>>> characters".
>>>
>>> I haven't seen the NULL character on any smartphone keyboards, though - I
>>> assume the iOS and Android developers had the foresight to know how much
>>> havoc that would wreak on systems assuming null-terminated strings.  It
>>> seems unlikely that NULL would be in a real-world passphrase entered by a
>>> sane user.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 8:03 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> [+cc aaron]
>>>>
>>>> We recently added an implementation of BIP 38 (password protected private
>>>> keys) to bitcoinj. It came to my attention that the third test vector may be
>>>> broken. It gives a hex version of what the NFC normalised version of the
>>>> input string should be, but this does not match the results of the Java
>>>> unicode normaliser, and in fact I can't even get Python to print the names
>>>> of the characters past the embedded null. I'm curious where this normalised
>>>> version came from.
>>>>
>>>> Given that "pile of poo" is not a character I think any sane user would
>>>> put into a passphrase, I question the value of this test vector. NFC form is
>>>> intended to collapse things like umlaut control characters onto their prior
>>>> code point, but here we're feeding the algorithm what is basically garbage
>>>> so I'm not totally surprised that different implementations appear to
>>>> disagree on the outcome.
>>>>
>>>> Proposed action: we remove this test vector as it does not represent any
>>>> real world usage of the spec, or if we desperately need to verify NFC
>>>> normalisation I suggest using a different, more realistic test string, like
>>>> Zürich, or something written in Thai.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Test 3:
>>>>
>>>> Passphrase ϓ␀𐐀💩 (\u03D2\u0301\u0000\U00010400\U0001F4A9; GREEK UPSILON
>>>> WITH HOOK, COMBINING ACUTE ACCENT, NULL, DESERET CAPITAL LETTER LONG I, PILE
>>>> OF POO)
>>>> Encrypted key: 6PRW5o9FLp4gJDDVqJQKJFTpMvdsSGJxMYHtHaQBF3ooa8mwD69bapcDQn
>>>> Bitcoin Address: 16ktGzmfrurhbhi6JGqsMWf7TyqK9HNAeF
>>>> Unencrypted private key (WIF):
>>>> 5Jajm8eQ22H3pGWLEVCXyvND8dQZhiQhoLJNKjYXk9roUFTMSZ4
>>>> Note: The non-standard UTF-8 characters in this passphrase should be NFC
>>>> normalized to result in a passphrase of0xcf9300f0909080f09f92a9 before
>>>> further processing
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
>>>> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>>>> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>>>> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>>>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>>>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>>>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
>>> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>>> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>>> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development



-- 
Jeff Garzik
Bitcoin core developer and open source evangelist
BitPay, Inc.      https://bitpay.com/

Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP 38 NFC normalisation issue

[Mike Hearn]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 741 bytes --]

Yes, we know, Andreas' code is indeed doing normalisation.

However it appears the output bytes end up being different. What I get back
is:

cf9300*01*303430300166346139

vs

cf9300*f0*909080f09f92a9

from the spec.

I'm not sure why. It appears this is due to the character from the astral
planes. Java is old and uses 16 bit characters internally - it wouldn't
surprise me if there's some weirdness that means it doesn't/won't support
this kind of thing.

I recommend instead that any implementation that wishes to be compatible
with JVM based wallets (I suspect Android is the same) just refuse any
passphrase that includes characters outside the BMP. At least unless
someone can find a fix. I somehow doubt this will really hurt anyone.

[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 1308 bytes --]

Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP 38 NFC normalisation issue

[Aaron Voisine]

If the user creates a password on an iOS device with an astral
character and then can't enter that password on a JVM wallet, that
sucks. If JVMs really can't support unicode NFC then that's a strong
case to limit the spec to the subset of unicode that all popular
platforms can support, but it sounds like it might just be a JVM
string library bug that could hopefully be reported and fixed. I get
the same result as in the test case using apple's
CFStringNormalize(passphrase, kCFStringNormalizationFormC);

Aaron Voisine
breadwallet.com


On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 11:20 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> wrote:
> Yes, we know, Andreas' code is indeed doing normalisation.
>
> However it appears the output bytes end up being different. What I get back
> is:
>
> cf930001303430300166346139
>
> vs
>
> cf9300f0909080f09f92a9
>
> from the spec.
>
> I'm not sure why. It appears this is due to the character from the astral
> planes. Java is old and uses 16 bit characters internally - it wouldn't
> surprise me if there's some weirdness that means it doesn't/won't support
> this kind of thing.
>
> I recommend instead that any implementation that wishes to be compatible
> with JVM based wallets (I suspect Android is the same) just refuse any
> passphrase that includes characters outside the BMP. At least unless someone
> can find a fix. I somehow doubt this will really hurt anyone.
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>

Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP 38 NFC normalisation issue

[Mike Hearn]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2818 bytes --]

I'm all for fixing bugs, but I know from bitter experience that outside the
BMP dragons lurk. Browsers don't even expose Unicode APIs at all. You end
up needing to ship an entire pure-js implementation, which can be too large
for some use cases (too much time sunk on that issue in my last job).

I'm hoping BIP 38 doesn't get widely used anyway, to be frank. People
moving private keys around by hand has caused quite a few problems in the
past, sometimes people lost money. It's better to work at the level of a
wallet and ideally ask people to move money using regular transactions. Way
less potential for errors.

Regardless, I'll file a JVM bug and see what the outcome is.


On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 12:23 AM, Aaron Voisine <voisine@gmail.com> wrote:

> If the user creates a password on an iOS device with an astral
> character and then can't enter that password on a JVM wallet, that
> sucks. If JVMs really can't support unicode NFC then that's a strong
> case to limit the spec to the subset of unicode that all popular
> platforms can support, but it sounds like it might just be a JVM
> string library bug that could hopefully be reported and fixed. I get
> the same result as in the test case using apple's
> CFStringNormalize(passphrase, kCFStringNormalizationFormC);
>
> Aaron Voisine
> breadwallet.com
>
>
> On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 11:20 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> wrote:
> > Yes, we know, Andreas' code is indeed doing normalisation.
> >
> > However it appears the output bytes end up being different. What I get
> back
> > is:
> >
> > cf930001303430300166346139
> >
> > vs
> >
> > cf9300f0909080f09f92a9
> >
> > from the spec.
> >
> > I'm not sure why. It appears this is due to the character from the astral
> > planes. Java is old and uses 16 bit characters internally - it wouldn't
> > surprise me if there's some weirdness that means it doesn't/won't support
> > this kind of thing.
> >
> > I recommend instead that any implementation that wishes to be compatible
> > with JVM based wallets (I suspect Android is the same) just refuse any
> > passphrase that includes characters outside the BMP. At least unless
> someone
> > can find a fix. I somehow doubt this will really hurt anyone.
> >
> >
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
> > search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
> > Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
> > search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
> > http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
> > _______________________________________________
> > Bitcoin-development mailing list
> > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
> >
>

[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 3880 bytes --]

Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP 38 NFC normalisation issue

[Andreas Schildbach]

Guys, you are always talking about the Unicode astral plane, but in fact
its a plain old (ASCII) control character where this problem starts and
likely ends: \u0000.

Let's ban/filter ISO control characters and be done with it. Most
control characters will never be enterable by any keyboard into a
password field. Of course I assume that Character.isISOControl() works
consistently across platforms.

http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/lang/Character.html#isISOControl%28char%29


On 07/16/2014 12:23 AM, Aaron Voisine wrote:
> If the user creates a password on an iOS device with an astral
> character and then can't enter that password on a JVM wallet, that
> sucks. If JVMs really can't support unicode NFC then that's a strong
> case to limit the spec to the subset of unicode that all popular
> platforms can support, but it sounds like it might just be a JVM
> string library bug that could hopefully be reported and fixed. I get
> the same result as in the test case using apple's
> CFStringNormalize(passphrase, kCFStringNormalizationFormC);
> 
> Aaron Voisine
> breadwallet.com
> 
> 
> On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 11:20 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> wrote:
>> Yes, we know, Andreas' code is indeed doing normalisation.
>>
>> However it appears the output bytes end up being different. What I get back
>> is:
>>
>> cf930001303430300166346139
>>
>> vs
>>
>> cf9300f0909080f09f92a9
>>
>> from the spec.
>>
>> I'm not sure why. It appears this is due to the character from the astral
>> planes. Java is old and uses 16 bit characters internally - it wouldn't
>> surprise me if there's some weirdness that means it doesn't/won't support
>> this kind of thing.
>>
>> I recommend instead that any implementation that wishes to be compatible
>> with JVM based wallets (I suspect Android is the same) just refuse any
>> passphrase that includes characters outside the BMP. At least unless someone
>> can find a fix. I somehow doubt this will really hurt anyone.
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
>> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>> _______________________________________________
>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
> 

Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP 38 NFC normalisation issue

[Mike Hearn]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3905 bytes --]

Yes sorry, you're right, the issue starts with the null code point. Python
seems to have problems starting there too. It might work if we took that
out.


On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Andreas Schildbach <andreas@schildbach.de>
wrote:

> Guys, you are always talking about the Unicode astral plane, but in fact
> its a plain old (ASCII) control character where this problem starts and
> likely ends: \u0000.
>
> Let's ban/filter ISO control characters and be done with it. Most
> control characters will never be enterable by any keyboard into a
> password field. Of course I assume that Character.isISOControl() works
> consistently across platforms.
>
>
> http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/lang/Character.html#isISOControl%28char%29
>
>
> On 07/16/2014 12:23 AM, Aaron Voisine wrote:
> > If the user creates a password on an iOS device with an astral
> > character and then can't enter that password on a JVM wallet, that
> > sucks. If JVMs really can't support unicode NFC then that's a strong
> > case to limit the spec to the subset of unicode that all popular
> > platforms can support, but it sounds like it might just be a JVM
> > string library bug that could hopefully be reported and fixed. I get
> > the same result as in the test case using apple's
> > CFStringNormalize(passphrase, kCFStringNormalizationFormC);
> >
> > Aaron Voisine
> > breadwallet.com
> >
> >
> > On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 11:20 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> wrote:
> >> Yes, we know, Andreas' code is indeed doing normalisation.
> >>
> >> However it appears the output bytes end up being different. What I get
> back
> >> is:
> >>
> >> cf930001303430300166346139
> >>
> >> vs
> >>
> >> cf9300f0909080f09f92a9
> >>
> >> from the spec.
> >>
> >> I'm not sure why. It appears this is due to the character from the
> astral
> >> planes. Java is old and uses 16 bit characters internally - it wouldn't
> >> surprise me if there's some weirdness that means it doesn't/won't
> support
> >> this kind of thing.
> >>
> >> I recommend instead that any implementation that wishes to be compatible
> >> with JVM based wallets (I suspect Android is the same) just refuse any
> >> passphrase that includes characters outside the BMP. At least unless
> someone
> >> can find a fix. I somehow doubt this will really hurt anyone.
> >>
> >>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
> >> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
> >> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
> >> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
> >> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
> >>
> >
> >
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
> > search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
> > Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
> > search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
> > http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
> >
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>

[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 5514 bytes --]

Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP 38 NFC normalisation issue

[Andreas Schildbach]

I will change the bitcoinj implementation and propose a new test vector.



On 07/16/2014 11:29 AM, Mike Hearn wrote:
> Yes sorry, you're right, the issue starts with the null code point.
> Python seems to have problems starting there too. It might work if we
> took that out.
> 
> 
> On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Andreas Schildbach
> <andreas@schildbach.de <mailto:andreas@schildbach.de>> wrote:
> 
>     Guys, you are always talking about the Unicode astral plane, but in fact
>     its a plain old (ASCII) control character where this problem starts and
>     likely ends: \u0000.
> 
>     Let's ban/filter ISO control characters and be done with it. Most
>     control characters will never be enterable by any keyboard into a
>     password field. Of course I assume that Character.isISOControl() works
>     consistently across platforms.
> 
>     http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/lang/Character.html#isISOControl%28char%29
> 
> 
>     On 07/16/2014 12:23 AM, Aaron Voisine wrote:
>     > If the user creates a password on an iOS device with an astral
>     > character and then can't enter that password on a JVM wallet, that
>     > sucks. If JVMs really can't support unicode NFC then that's a strong
>     > case to limit the spec to the subset of unicode that all popular
>     > platforms can support, but it sounds like it might just be a JVM
>     > string library bug that could hopefully be reported and fixed. I get
>     > the same result as in the test case using apple's
>     > CFStringNormalize(passphrase, kCFStringNormalizationFormC);
>     >
>     > Aaron Voisine
>     > breadwallet.com <http://breadwallet.com>
>     >
>     >
>     > On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 11:20 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net
>     <mailto:mike@plan99.net>> wrote:
>     >> Yes, we know, Andreas' code is indeed doing normalisation.
>     >>
>     >> However it appears the output bytes end up being different. What
>     I get back
>     >> is:
>     >>
>     >> cf930001303430300166346139
>     >>
>     >> vs
>     >>
>     >> cf9300f0909080f09f92a9
>     >>
>     >> from the spec.
>     >>
>     >> I'm not sure why. It appears this is due to the character from
>     the astral
>     >> planes. Java is old and uses 16 bit characters internally - it
>     wouldn't
>     >> surprise me if there's some weirdness that means it doesn't/won't
>     support
>     >> this kind of thing.
>     >>
>     >> I recommend instead that any implementation that wishes to be
>     compatible
>     >> with JVM based wallets (I suspect Android is the same) just
>     refuse any
>     >> passphrase that includes characters outside the BMP. At least
>     unless someone
>     >> can find a fix. I somehow doubt this will really hurt anyone.
>     >>
>     >>
>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>     >> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise?
>     Index and
>     >> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>     >> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>     >> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>     >> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>     >> _______________________________________________
>     >> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>     >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>     <mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
>     >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>     >>
>     >
>     >
>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>     > Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise?
>     Index and
>     > search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>     > Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>     > search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>     > http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>     >
> 
> 
> 
>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>     Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
>     search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>     Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>     search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>     http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>     _______________________________________________
>     Bitcoin-development mailing list
>     Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>     <mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
>     https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
> 

Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP 38 NFC normalisation issue

[Andreas Schildbach]

Damn, I just realized that I implement only the decoding side of BIP38.
So I cannot propose a complete test vector. Here is what I have:


Passphrase: ϓ␀𐐀💩 (\u03D2\u0301\u0000\U00010400\U0001F4A9; GREEK
UPSILON WITH HOOK, COMBINING ACUTE ACCENT, NULL, DESERET CAPITAL LETTER
LONG I, PILE OF POO)

Passphrase bytes after removing ISO control characters and NFC
normalization: 0xcf933034303066346139

Bitcoin Address: 16ktGzmfrurhbhi6JGqsMWf7TyqK9HNAeF

Unencrypted private key (WIF):
5Jajm8eQ22H3pGWLEVCXyvND8dQZhiQhoLJNKjYXk9roUFTMSZ4


Can someone calculate the encrypted key from it (using whatever
implementation) and I will verify it decodes properly in bitcoinj?



On 07/16/2014 12:46 PM, Andreas Schildbach wrote:
> I will change the bitcoinj implementation and propose a new test vector.
> 
> 
> 
> On 07/16/2014 11:29 AM, Mike Hearn wrote:
>> Yes sorry, you're right, the issue starts with the null code point.
>> Python seems to have problems starting there too. It might work if we
>> took that out.
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Andreas Schildbach
>> <andreas@schildbach.de <mailto:andreas@schildbach.de>> wrote:
>>
>>     Guys, you are always talking about the Unicode astral plane, but in fact
>>     its a plain old (ASCII) control character where this problem starts and
>>     likely ends: \u0000.
>>
>>     Let's ban/filter ISO control characters and be done with it. Most
>>     control characters will never be enterable by any keyboard into a
>>     password field. Of course I assume that Character.isISOControl() works
>>     consistently across platforms.
>>
>>     http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/lang/Character.html#isISOControl%28char%29
>>
>>
>>     On 07/16/2014 12:23 AM, Aaron Voisine wrote:
>>     > If the user creates a password on an iOS device with an astral
>>     > character and then can't enter that password on a JVM wallet, that
>>     > sucks. If JVMs really can't support unicode NFC then that's a strong
>>     > case to limit the spec to the subset of unicode that all popular
>>     > platforms can support, but it sounds like it might just be a JVM
>>     > string library bug that could hopefully be reported and fixed. I get
>>     > the same result as in the test case using apple's
>>     > CFStringNormalize(passphrase, kCFStringNormalizationFormC);
>>     >
>>     > Aaron Voisine
>>     > breadwallet.com <http://breadwallet.com>
>>     >
>>     >
>>     > On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 11:20 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net
>>     <mailto:mike@plan99.net>> wrote:
>>     >> Yes, we know, Andreas' code is indeed doing normalisation.
>>     >>
>>     >> However it appears the output bytes end up being different. What
>>     I get back
>>     >> is:
>>     >>
>>     >> cf930001303430300166346139
>>     >>
>>     >> vs
>>     >>
>>     >> cf9300f0909080f09f92a9
>>     >>
>>     >> from the spec.
>>     >>
>>     >> I'm not sure why. It appears this is due to the character from
>>     the astral
>>     >> planes. Java is old and uses 16 bit characters internally - it
>>     wouldn't
>>     >> surprise me if there's some weirdness that means it doesn't/won't
>>     support
>>     >> this kind of thing.
>>     >>
>>     >> I recommend instead that any implementation that wishes to be
>>     compatible
>>     >> with JVM based wallets (I suspect Android is the same) just
>>     refuse any
>>     >> passphrase that includes characters outside the BMP. At least
>>     unless someone
>>     >> can find a fix. I somehow doubt this will really hurt anyone.
>>     >>
>>     >>
>>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>     >> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise?
>>     Index and
>>     >> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>>     >> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>>     >> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>>     >> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>     >> _______________________________________________
>>     >> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>>     >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>>     <mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
>>     >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>     >>
>>     >
>>     >
>>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>     > Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise?
>>     Index and
>>     > search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>>     > Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>>     > search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>>     > http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>     >
>>
>>
>>
>>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>     Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
>>     search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>>     Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>>     search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>>     http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>     _______________________________________________
>>     Bitcoin-development mailing list
>>     Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>>     <mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
>>     https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
>> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
> 

Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP 38 NFC normalisation issue

[Wladimir]

On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 11:29 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> wrote:
> Yes sorry, you're right, the issue starts with the null code point. Python
> seems to have problems starting there too. It might work if we took that
> out.

Forbidding control characters, at least anything < 32 makes a lot of
sense to me. Carriage returns, linefeeds, formfeeds, null characters,
I see no valid reason to allow them and lots of reasons they could
cause havoc.

PILE OF POO or GRINNING CAT FACE WITH SMILING EYES should be allowed
in this day and age though.

Wladimir

Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP 38 NFC normalisation issue

[Aaron Voisine]

If I first remove \u0000, so the non-normalized passphrase is
"\u03D2\u0301\U00010400\U0001F4A9", and then NFC normalize it, it
becomes "\u03D3\U00010400\U0001F4A9"

UTF-8 encoded this is: 0xcf93f0909080f09f92a9 (not the same as what
you got, Andreas!)

Encoding private key: 5Jajm8eQ22H3pGWLEVCXyvND8dQZhiQhoLJNKjYXk9roUFTMSZ4
with this passphrase, I get a BIP38 key of:
6PRW5o9FMb4hAYRQPmgcvVDTyDtr6R17VMXGLmvKjKVpGkYhBJ4uYuR9wZ

I recommend rather than simply removing control characters from the
password that instead the spec require that passwords containing
control characters are invalid. We don't want people trying to be
clever and putting them in thinking they are adding to the password
entropy.

Also for UI compatibility across many platforms, I'm also in favor
disallowing any character below U+0020 (space)

I can submit a PR once we figure out why Andreas's passphrase was
different than what I got.

Aaron Voisine
breadwallet.com


On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 4:04 AM, Andreas Schildbach
<andreas@schildbach.de> wrote:
> Damn, I just realized that I implement only the decoding side of BIP38.
> So I cannot propose a complete test vector. Here is what I have:
>
>
> Passphrase: ϓ␀𐐀💩 (\u03D2\u0301\u0000\U00010400\U0001F4A9; GREEK
> UPSILON WITH HOOK, COMBINING ACUTE ACCENT, NULL, DESERET CAPITAL LETTER
> LONG I, PILE OF POO)
>
> Passphrase bytes after removing ISO control characters and NFC
> normalization: 0xcf933034303066346139
>
> Bitcoin Address: 16ktGzmfrurhbhi6JGqsMWf7TyqK9HNAeF
>
> Unencrypted private key (WIF):
> 5Jajm8eQ22H3pGWLEVCXyvND8dQZhiQhoLJNKjYXk9roUFTMSZ4
>
>
> Can someone calculate the encrypted key from it (using whatever
> implementation) and I will verify it decodes properly in bitcoinj?
>
>
>
> On 07/16/2014 12:46 PM, Andreas Schildbach wrote:
>> I will change the bitcoinj implementation and propose a new test vector.
>>
>>
>>
>> On 07/16/2014 11:29 AM, Mike Hearn wrote:
>>> Yes sorry, you're right, the issue starts with the null code point.
>>> Python seems to have problems starting there too. It might work if we
>>> took that out.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Andreas Schildbach
>>> <andreas@schildbach.de <mailto:andreas@schildbach.de>> wrote:
>>>
>>>     Guys, you are always talking about the Unicode astral plane, but in fact
>>>     its a plain old (ASCII) control character where this problem starts and
>>>     likely ends: \u0000.
>>>
>>>     Let's ban/filter ISO control characters and be done with it. Most
>>>     control characters will never be enterable by any keyboard into a
>>>     password field. Of course I assume that Character.isISOControl() works
>>>     consistently across platforms.
>>>
>>>     http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/lang/Character.html#isISOControl%28char%29
>>>
>>>
>>>     On 07/16/2014 12:23 AM, Aaron Voisine wrote:
>>>     > If the user creates a password on an iOS device with an astral
>>>     > character and then can't enter that password on a JVM wallet, that
>>>     > sucks. If JVMs really can't support unicode NFC then that's a strong
>>>     > case to limit the spec to the subset of unicode that all popular
>>>     > platforms can support, but it sounds like it might just be a JVM
>>>     > string library bug that could hopefully be reported and fixed. I get
>>>     > the same result as in the test case using apple's
>>>     > CFStringNormalize(passphrase, kCFStringNormalizationFormC);
>>>     >
>>>     > Aaron Voisine
>>>     > breadwallet.com <http://breadwallet.com>
>>>     >
>>>     >
>>>     > On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 11:20 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net
>>>     <mailto:mike@plan99.net>> wrote:
>>>     >> Yes, we know, Andreas' code is indeed doing normalisation.
>>>     >>
>>>     >> However it appears the output bytes end up being different. What
>>>     I get back
>>>     >> is:
>>>     >>
>>>     >> cf930001303430300166346139
>>>     >>
>>>     >> vs
>>>     >>
>>>     >> cf9300f0909080f09f92a9
>>>     >>
>>>     >> from the spec.
>>>     >>
>>>     >> I'm not sure why. It appears this is due to the character from
>>>     the astral
>>>     >> planes. Java is old and uses 16 bit characters internally - it
>>>     wouldn't
>>>     >> surprise me if there's some weirdness that means it doesn't/won't
>>>     support
>>>     >> this kind of thing.
>>>     >>
>>>     >> I recommend instead that any implementation that wishes to be
>>>     compatible
>>>     >> with JVM based wallets (I suspect Android is the same) just
>>>     refuse any
>>>     >> passphrase that includes characters outside the BMP. At least
>>>     unless someone
>>>     >> can find a fix. I somehow doubt this will really hurt anyone.
>>>     >>
>>>     >>
>>>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>     >> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise?
>>>     Index and
>>>     >> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>>>     >> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>>>     >> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>>>     >> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>>     >> _______________________________________________
>>>     >> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>>>     >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>>>     <mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
>>>     >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>>     >>
>>>     >
>>>     >
>>>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>     > Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise?
>>>     Index and
>>>     > search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>>>     > Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>>>     > search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>>>     > http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>>     >
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>     Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
>>>     search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>>>     Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>>>     search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>>>     http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>>     _______________________________________________
>>>     Bitcoin-development mailing list
>>>     Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>>>     <mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
>>>     https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
>>> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>>> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>>> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
>> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development

Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP 38 NFC normalisation issue

[Andreas Schildbach]

Please excuse me. I had a more thorough look at the original problem and
found that the only problem with the original test case was that you
cannot specify codepoints from the SMP using \u in Java. I always tried
\u010400 but that doesn't work.

Here is a fix for bitcoinj. The test now passes.

https://github.com/bitcoinj/bitcoinj/pull/143

We can (and probably should) still need to filter control chars, I'll
have a look at that now again.


On 07/16/2014 11:06 PM, Aaron Voisine wrote:
> If I first remove \u0000, so the non-normalized passphrase is
> "\u03D2\u0301\U00010400\U0001F4A9", and then NFC normalize it, it
> becomes "\u03D3\U00010400\U0001F4A9"
> 
> UTF-8 encoded this is: 0xcf93f0909080f09f92a9 (not the same as what
> you got, Andreas!)
> 
> Encoding private key: 5Jajm8eQ22H3pGWLEVCXyvND8dQZhiQhoLJNKjYXk9roUFTMSZ4
> with this passphrase, I get a BIP38 key of:
> 6PRW5o9FMb4hAYRQPmgcvVDTyDtr6R17VMXGLmvKjKVpGkYhBJ4uYuR9wZ
> 
> I recommend rather than simply removing control characters from the
> password that instead the spec require that passwords containing
> control characters are invalid. We don't want people trying to be
> clever and putting them in thinking they are adding to the password
> entropy.
> 
> Also for UI compatibility across many platforms, I'm also in favor
> disallowing any character below U+0020 (space)
> 
> I can submit a PR once we figure out why Andreas's passphrase was
> different than what I got.
> 
> Aaron Voisine
> breadwallet.com
> 
> 
> On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 4:04 AM, Andreas Schildbach
> <andreas@schildbach.de> wrote:
>> Damn, I just realized that I implement only the decoding side of BIP38.
>> So I cannot propose a complete test vector. Here is what I have:
>>
>>
>> Passphrase: ϓ␀𐐀💩 (\u03D2\u0301\u0000\U00010400\U0001F4A9; GREEK
>> UPSILON WITH HOOK, COMBINING ACUTE ACCENT, NULL, DESERET CAPITAL LETTER
>> LONG I, PILE OF POO)
>>
>> Passphrase bytes after removing ISO control characters and NFC
>> normalization: 0xcf933034303066346139
>>
>> Bitcoin Address: 16ktGzmfrurhbhi6JGqsMWf7TyqK9HNAeF
>>
>> Unencrypted private key (WIF):
>> 5Jajm8eQ22H3pGWLEVCXyvND8dQZhiQhoLJNKjYXk9roUFTMSZ4
>>
>>
>> Can someone calculate the encrypted key from it (using whatever
>> implementation) and I will verify it decodes properly in bitcoinj?
>>
>>
>>
>> On 07/16/2014 12:46 PM, Andreas Schildbach wrote:
>>> I will change the bitcoinj implementation and propose a new test vector.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 07/16/2014 11:29 AM, Mike Hearn wrote:
>>>> Yes sorry, you're right, the issue starts with the null code point.
>>>> Python seems to have problems starting there too. It might work if we
>>>> took that out.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Andreas Schildbach
>>>> <andreas@schildbach.de <mailto:andreas@schildbach.de>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>     Guys, you are always talking about the Unicode astral plane, but in fact
>>>>     its a plain old (ASCII) control character where this problem starts and
>>>>     likely ends: \u0000.
>>>>
>>>>     Let's ban/filter ISO control characters and be done with it. Most
>>>>     control characters will never be enterable by any keyboard into a
>>>>     password field. Of course I assume that Character.isISOControl() works
>>>>     consistently across platforms.
>>>>
>>>>     http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/lang/Character.html#isISOControl%28char%29
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>     On 07/16/2014 12:23 AM, Aaron Voisine wrote:
>>>>     > If the user creates a password on an iOS device with an astral
>>>>     > character and then can't enter that password on a JVM wallet, that
>>>>     > sucks. If JVMs really can't support unicode NFC then that's a strong
>>>>     > case to limit the spec to the subset of unicode that all popular
>>>>     > platforms can support, but it sounds like it might just be a JVM
>>>>     > string library bug that could hopefully be reported and fixed. I get
>>>>     > the same result as in the test case using apple's
>>>>     > CFStringNormalize(passphrase, kCFStringNormalizationFormC);
>>>>     >
>>>>     > Aaron Voisine
>>>>     > breadwallet.com <http://breadwallet.com>
>>>>     >
>>>>     >
>>>>     > On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 11:20 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net
>>>>     <mailto:mike@plan99.net>> wrote:
>>>>     >> Yes, we know, Andreas' code is indeed doing normalisation.
>>>>     >>
>>>>     >> However it appears the output bytes end up being different. What
>>>>     I get back
>>>>     >> is:
>>>>     >>
>>>>     >> cf930001303430300166346139
>>>>     >>
>>>>     >> vs
>>>>     >>
>>>>     >> cf9300f0909080f09f92a9
>>>>     >>
>>>>     >> from the spec.
>>>>     >>
>>>>     >> I'm not sure why. It appears this is due to the character from
>>>>     the astral
>>>>     >> planes. Java is old and uses 16 bit characters internally - it
>>>>     wouldn't
>>>>     >> surprise me if there's some weirdness that means it doesn't/won't
>>>>     support
>>>>     >> this kind of thing.
>>>>     >>
>>>>     >> I recommend instead that any implementation that wishes to be
>>>>     compatible
>>>>     >> with JVM based wallets (I suspect Android is the same) just
>>>>     refuse any
>>>>     >> passphrase that includes characters outside the BMP. At least
>>>>     unless someone
>>>>     >> can find a fix. I somehow doubt this will really hurt anyone.
>>>>     >>
>>>>     >>
>>>>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>     >> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise?
>>>>     Index and
>>>>     >> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>>>>     >> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>>>>     >> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>>>>     >> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>>>     >> _______________________________________________
>>>>     >> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>>>>     >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>>>>     <mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
>>>>     >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>>>     >>
>>>>     >
>>>>     >
>>>>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>     > Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise?
>>>>     Index and
>>>>     > search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>>>>     > Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>>>>     > search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>>>>     > http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>>>     >
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>     Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
>>>>     search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>>>>     Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>>>>     search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>>>>     http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>>>     _______________________________________________
>>>>     Bitcoin-development mailing list
>>>>     Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>>>>     <mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
>>>>     https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
>>>> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>>>> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>>>> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>>>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>>>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>>>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
>>> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>>> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>>> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
>> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>> _______________________________________________
>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
> 

Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP 38 NFC normalisation issue

[Andreas Schildbach]

Ok, I just fixed the String filtering so that it can handle SMP chars
and my implementation behaves exactly like in your modified testcase
quoted below.

Bitcoinj code available on this branch, in case we decide to change the
spec:

https://github.com/schildbach/bitcoinj/commits/bip38-normalize-control-characters



On 07/17/2014 12:02 AM, Andreas Schildbach wrote:
> Please excuse me. I had a more thorough look at the original problem and
> found that the only problem with the original test case was that you
> cannot specify codepoints from the SMP using \u in Java. I always tried
> \u010400 but that doesn't work.
> 
> Here is a fix for bitcoinj. The test now passes.
> 
> https://github.com/bitcoinj/bitcoinj/pull/143
> 
> We can (and probably should) still need to filter control chars, I'll
> have a look at that now again.
> 
> 
> On 07/16/2014 11:06 PM, Aaron Voisine wrote:
>> If I first remove \u0000, so the non-normalized passphrase is
>> "\u03D2\u0301\U00010400\U0001F4A9", and then NFC normalize it, it
>> becomes "\u03D3\U00010400\U0001F4A9"
>>
>> UTF-8 encoded this is: 0xcf93f0909080f09f92a9 (not the same as what
>> you got, Andreas!)
>>
>> Encoding private key: 5Jajm8eQ22H3pGWLEVCXyvND8dQZhiQhoLJNKjYXk9roUFTMSZ4
>> with this passphrase, I get a BIP38 key of:
>> 6PRW5o9FMb4hAYRQPmgcvVDTyDtr6R17VMXGLmvKjKVpGkYhBJ4uYuR9wZ
>>
>> I recommend rather than simply removing control characters from the
>> password that instead the spec require that passwords containing
>> control characters are invalid. We don't want people trying to be
>> clever and putting them in thinking they are adding to the password
>> entropy.
>>
>> Also for UI compatibility across many platforms, I'm also in favor
>> disallowing any character below U+0020 (space)
>>
>> I can submit a PR once we figure out why Andreas's passphrase was
>> different than what I got.
>>
>> Aaron Voisine
>> breadwallet.com
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 4:04 AM, Andreas Schildbach
>> <andreas@schildbach.de> wrote:
>>> Damn, I just realized that I implement only the decoding side of BIP38.
>>> So I cannot propose a complete test vector. Here is what I have:
>>>
>>>
>>> Passphrase: ϓ␀𐐀💩 (\u03D2\u0301\u0000\U00010400\U0001F4A9; GREEK
>>> UPSILON WITH HOOK, COMBINING ACUTE ACCENT, NULL, DESERET CAPITAL LETTER
>>> LONG I, PILE OF POO)
>>>
>>> Passphrase bytes after removing ISO control characters and NFC
>>> normalization: 0xcf933034303066346139
>>>
>>> Bitcoin Address: 16ktGzmfrurhbhi6JGqsMWf7TyqK9HNAeF
>>>
>>> Unencrypted private key (WIF):
>>> 5Jajm8eQ22H3pGWLEVCXyvND8dQZhiQhoLJNKjYXk9roUFTMSZ4
>>>
>>>
>>> Can someone calculate the encrypted key from it (using whatever
>>> implementation) and I will verify it decodes properly in bitcoinj?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 07/16/2014 12:46 PM, Andreas Schildbach wrote:
>>>> I will change the bitcoinj implementation and propose a new test vector.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 07/16/2014 11:29 AM, Mike Hearn wrote:
>>>>> Yes sorry, you're right, the issue starts with the null code point.
>>>>> Python seems to have problems starting there too. It might work if we
>>>>> took that out.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Andreas Schildbach
>>>>> <andreas@schildbach.de <mailto:andreas@schildbach.de>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>     Guys, you are always talking about the Unicode astral plane, but in fact
>>>>>     its a plain old (ASCII) control character where this problem starts and
>>>>>     likely ends: \u0000.
>>>>>
>>>>>     Let's ban/filter ISO control characters and be done with it. Most
>>>>>     control characters will never be enterable by any keyboard into a
>>>>>     password field. Of course I assume that Character.isISOControl() works
>>>>>     consistently across platforms.
>>>>>
>>>>>     http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/lang/Character.html#isISOControl%28char%29
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>     On 07/16/2014 12:23 AM, Aaron Voisine wrote:
>>>>>     > If the user creates a password on an iOS device with an astral
>>>>>     > character and then can't enter that password on a JVM wallet, that
>>>>>     > sucks. If JVMs really can't support unicode NFC then that's a strong
>>>>>     > case to limit the spec to the subset of unicode that all popular
>>>>>     > platforms can support, but it sounds like it might just be a JVM
>>>>>     > string library bug that could hopefully be reported and fixed. I get
>>>>>     > the same result as in the test case using apple's
>>>>>     > CFStringNormalize(passphrase, kCFStringNormalizationFormC);
>>>>>     >
>>>>>     > Aaron Voisine
>>>>>     > breadwallet.com <http://breadwallet.com>
>>>>>     >
>>>>>     >
>>>>>     > On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 11:20 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net
>>>>>     <mailto:mike@plan99.net>> wrote:
>>>>>     >> Yes, we know, Andreas' code is indeed doing normalisation.
>>>>>     >>
>>>>>     >> However it appears the output bytes end up being different. What
>>>>>     I get back
>>>>>     >> is:
>>>>>     >>
>>>>>     >> cf930001303430300166346139
>>>>>     >>
>>>>>     >> vs
>>>>>     >>
>>>>>     >> cf9300f0909080f09f92a9
>>>>>     >>
>>>>>     >> from the spec.
>>>>>     >>
>>>>>     >> I'm not sure why. It appears this is due to the character from
>>>>>     the astral
>>>>>     >> planes. Java is old and uses 16 bit characters internally - it
>>>>>     wouldn't
>>>>>     >> surprise me if there's some weirdness that means it doesn't/won't
>>>>>     support
>>>>>     >> this kind of thing.
>>>>>     >>
>>>>>     >> I recommend instead that any implementation that wishes to be
>>>>>     compatible
>>>>>     >> with JVM based wallets (I suspect Android is the same) just
>>>>>     refuse any
>>>>>     >> passphrase that includes characters outside the BMP. At least
>>>>>     unless someone
>>>>>     >> can find a fix. I somehow doubt this will really hurt anyone.
>>>>>     >>
>>>>>     >>
>>>>>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>     >> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise?
>>>>>     Index and
>>>>>     >> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>>>>>     >> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>>>>>     >> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>>>>>     >> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>>>>     >> _______________________________________________
>>>>>     >> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>>>>>     >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>>>>>     <mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
>>>>>     >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>>>>     >>
>>>>>     >
>>>>>     >
>>>>>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>     > Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise?
>>>>>     Index and
>>>>>     > search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>>>>>     > Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>>>>>     > search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>>>>>     > http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>>>>     >
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>     Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
>>>>>     search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>>>>>     Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>>>>>     search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>>>>>     http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>>>>     _______________________________________________
>>>>>     Bitcoin-development mailing list
>>>>>     Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>>>>>     <mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
>>>>>     https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
>>>>> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>>>>> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>>>>> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>>>>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>>>>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>>>>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
>>>> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>>>> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>>>> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>>>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
>>> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>>> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>>> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
>> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
>> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
>> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
>> _______________________________________________
>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>>
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
> 

Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP 38 NFC normalisation issue

[Mike Hearn]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 11221 bytes --]

Glad we got to the bottom of that. That's quite a nasty compiler/language
bug I must say. Not even a warning. Still, python crashes when trying to
print the name of a null character. It wouldn't surprise me if there are
other weird issues lurking. Would definitely sleep better with a more
restricted character set.
On 17 Jul 2014 00:04, "Andreas Schildbach" <andreas@schildbach.de> wrote:

> Please excuse me. I had a more thorough look at the original problem and
> found that the only problem with the original test case was that you
> cannot specify codepoints from the SMP using \u in Java. I always tried
> \u010400 but that doesn't work.
>
> Here is a fix for bitcoinj. The test now passes.
>
> https://github.com/bitcoinj/bitcoinj/pull/143
>
> We can (and probably should) still need to filter control chars, I'll
> have a look at that now again.
>
>
> On 07/16/2014 11:06 PM, Aaron Voisine wrote:
> > If I first remove \u0000, so the non-normalized passphrase is
> > "\u03D2\u0301\U00010400\U0001F4A9", and then NFC normalize it, it
> > becomes "\u03D3\U00010400\U0001F4A9"
> >
> > UTF-8 encoded this is: 0xcf93f0909080f09f92a9 (not the same as what
> > you got, Andreas!)
> >
> > Encoding private key: 5Jajm8eQ22H3pGWLEVCXyvND8dQZhiQhoLJNKjYXk9roUFTMSZ4
> > with this passphrase, I get a BIP38 key of:
> > 6PRW5o9FMb4hAYRQPmgcvVDTyDtr6R17VMXGLmvKjKVpGkYhBJ4uYuR9wZ
> >
> > I recommend rather than simply removing control characters from the
> > password that instead the spec require that passwords containing
> > control characters are invalid. We don't want people trying to be
> > clever and putting them in thinking they are adding to the password
> > entropy.
> >
> > Also for UI compatibility across many platforms, I'm also in favor
> > disallowing any character below U+0020 (space)
> >
> > I can submit a PR once we figure out why Andreas's passphrase was
> > different than what I got.
> >
> > Aaron Voisine
> > breadwallet.com
> >
> >
> > On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 4:04 AM, Andreas Schildbach
> > <andreas@schildbach.de> wrote:
> >> Damn, I just realized that I implement only the decoding side of BIP38.
> >> So I cannot propose a complete test vector. Here is what I have:
> >>
> >>
> >> Passphrase: ϓ␀𐐀💩 (\u03D2\u0301\u0000\U00010400\U0001F4A9; GREEK
> >> UPSILON WITH HOOK, COMBINING ACUTE ACCENT, NULL, DESERET CAPITAL LETTER
> >> LONG I, PILE OF POO)
> >>
> >> Passphrase bytes after removing ISO control characters and NFC
> >> normalization: 0xcf933034303066346139
> >>
> >> Bitcoin Address: 16ktGzmfrurhbhi6JGqsMWf7TyqK9HNAeF
> >>
> >> Unencrypted private key (WIF):
> >> 5Jajm8eQ22H3pGWLEVCXyvND8dQZhiQhoLJNKjYXk9roUFTMSZ4
> >>
> >>
> >> Can someone calculate the encrypted key from it (using whatever
> >> implementation) and I will verify it decodes properly in bitcoinj?
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 07/16/2014 12:46 PM, Andreas Schildbach wrote:
> >>> I will change the bitcoinj implementation and propose a new test
> vector.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On 07/16/2014 11:29 AM, Mike Hearn wrote:
> >>>> Yes sorry, you're right, the issue starts with the null code point.
> >>>> Python seems to have problems starting there too. It might work if we
> >>>> took that out.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Andreas Schildbach
> >>>> <andreas@schildbach.de <mailto:andreas@schildbach.de>> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>     Guys, you are always talking about the Unicode astral plane, but
> in fact
> >>>>     its a plain old (ASCII) control character where this problem
> starts and
> >>>>     likely ends: \u0000.
> >>>>
> >>>>     Let's ban/filter ISO control characters and be done with it. Most
> >>>>     control characters will never be enterable by any keyboard into a
> >>>>     password field. Of course I assume that Character.isISOControl()
> works
> >>>>     consistently across platforms.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/lang/Character.html#isISOControl%28char%29
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>     On 07/16/2014 12:23 AM, Aaron Voisine wrote:
> >>>>     > If the user creates a password on an iOS device with an astral
> >>>>     > character and then can't enter that password on a JVM wallet,
> that
> >>>>     > sucks. If JVMs really can't support unicode NFC then that's a
> strong
> >>>>     > case to limit the spec to the subset of unicode that all popular
> >>>>     > platforms can support, but it sounds like it might just be a JVM
> >>>>     > string library bug that could hopefully be reported and fixed.
> I get
> >>>>     > the same result as in the test case using apple's
> >>>>     > CFStringNormalize(passphrase, kCFStringNormalizationFormC);
> >>>>     >
> >>>>     > Aaron Voisine
> >>>>     > breadwallet.com <http://breadwallet.com>
> >>>>     >
> >>>>     >
> >>>>     > On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 11:20 AM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net
> >>>>     <mailto:mike@plan99.net>> wrote:
> >>>>     >> Yes, we know, Andreas' code is indeed doing normalisation.
> >>>>     >>
> >>>>     >> However it appears the output bytes end up being different.
> What
> >>>>     I get back
> >>>>     >> is:
> >>>>     >>
> >>>>     >> cf930001303430300166346139
> >>>>     >>
> >>>>     >> vs
> >>>>     >>
> >>>>     >> cf9300f0909080f09f92a9
> >>>>     >>
> >>>>     >> from the spec.
> >>>>     >>
> >>>>     >> I'm not sure why. It appears this is due to the character from
> >>>>     the astral
> >>>>     >> planes. Java is old and uses 16 bit characters internally - it
> >>>>     wouldn't
> >>>>     >> surprise me if there's some weirdness that means it
> doesn't/won't
> >>>>     support
> >>>>     >> this kind of thing.
> >>>>     >>
> >>>>     >> I recommend instead that any implementation that wishes to be
> >>>>     compatible
> >>>>     >> with JVM based wallets (I suspect Android is the same) just
> >>>>     refuse any
> >>>>     >> passphrase that includes characters outside the BMP. At least
> >>>>     unless someone
> >>>>     >> can find a fix. I somehow doubt this will really hurt anyone.
> >>>>     >>
> >>>>     >>
> >>>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>>     >> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise?
> >>>>     Index and
> >>>>     >> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black
> Duck
> >>>>     >> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest
> code
> >>>>     >> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
> >>>>     >> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
> >>>>     >> _______________________________________________
> >>>>     >> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> >>>>     >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> >>>>     <mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
> >>>>     >>
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
> >>>>     >>
> >>>>     >
> >>>>     >
> >>>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>>     > Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise?
> >>>>     Index and
> >>>>     > search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black
> Duck
> >>>>     > Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest
> code
> >>>>     > search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
> >>>>     > http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
> >>>>     >
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>>     Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise?
> Index and
> >>>>     search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
> >>>>     Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest
> code
> >>>>     search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
> >>>>     http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
> >>>>     _______________________________________________
> >>>>     Bitcoin-development mailing list
> >>>>     Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> >>>>     <mailto:Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
> >>>>     https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index
> and
> >>>> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
> >>>> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
> >>>> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
> >>>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> >>>> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> >>>> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
> >>> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
> >>> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
> >>> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
> >>> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
> >> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
> >> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
> >> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
> >> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> >> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> >> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
> >
> >
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
> > search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
> > Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
> > search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
> > http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
> > _______________________________________________
> > Bitcoin-development mailing list
> > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
> >
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Want fast and easy access to all the code in your enterprise? Index and
> search up to 200,000 lines of code with a free copy of Black Duck
> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
> search on Ohloh, the Black Duck Open Hub! Try it now.
> http://p.sf.net/sfu/bds
> _______________________________________________
> Bitcoin-development mailing list
> Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net
> https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>

[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 16516 bytes --]

Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP 38 NFC normalisation issue

[Andreas Schildbach]

Here is a good article that helped me with what's going wrong:

http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/articles/javase/supplementary-142654.html

Basically, Java is stuck at 16 bits per char due to legacy reasons. They
admit that for a new language, they would probably use 32 (or 24?) bits
per char.

\u literals express UTF-16 encoding, so you have to use 16 bits. I
learned that for codepoint 0x010400, I could write "\uD801\uDC00", which
is the UTF-16 encoding of that codepoint.

Other languages have literals for codepoints. E.g. Python can use
u"\U00010400" or HTML has 𐐀  Unfortunately, Java is missing such
a construct (at least in Java6).


On 07/17/2014 12:59 PM, Mike Hearn wrote:
> Glad we got to the bottom of that. That's quite a nasty
> compiler/language bug I must say. Not even a warning. Still, python
> crashes when trying to print the name of a null character. It wouldn't
> surprise me if there are other weird issues lurking. Would definitely
> sleep better with a more restricted character set.
> 
> On 17 Jul 2014 00:04, "Andreas Schildbach" <andreas@schildbach.de
> <mailto:andreas@schildbach.de>> wrote:
> 
>     Please excuse me. I had a more thorough look at the original problem and
>     found that the only problem with the original test case was that you
>     cannot specify codepoints from the SMP using \u in Java. I always tried
>     \u010400 but that doesn't work.
> 
>     Here is a fix for bitcoinj. The test now passes.
> 
>     https://github.com/bitcoinj/bitcoinj/pull/143
> 
>     We can (and probably should) still need to filter control chars, I'll
>     have a look at that now again.
> 
> 
>     On 07/16/2014 11:06 PM, Aaron Voisine wrote:
>     > If I first remove \u0000, so the non-normalized passphrase is
>     > "\u03D2\u0301\U00010400\U0001F4A9", and then NFC normalize it, it
>     > becomes "\u03D3\U00010400\U0001F4A9"
>     >
>     > UTF-8 encoded this is: 0xcf93f0909080f09f92a9 (not the same as what
>     > you got, Andreas!)
>     >
>     > Encoding private key:
>     5Jajm8eQ22H3pGWLEVCXyvND8dQZhiQhoLJNKjYXk9roUFTMSZ4
>     > with this passphrase, I get a BIP38 key of:
>     > 6PRW5o9FMb4hAYRQPmgcvVDTyDtr6R17VMXGLmvKjKVpGkYhBJ4uYuR9wZ
>     >
>     > I recommend rather than simply removing control characters from the
>     > password that instead the spec require that passwords containing
>     > control characters are invalid. We don't want people trying to be
>     > clever and putting them in thinking they are adding to the password
>     > entropy.
>     >
>     > Also for UI compatibility across many platforms, I'm also in favor
>     > disallowing any character below U+0020 (space)
>     >
>     > I can submit a PR once we figure out why Andreas's passphrase was
>     > different than what I got.
>     >
>     > Aaron Voisine
>     > breadwallet.com <http://breadwallet.com>
>     >
>     >
>     > On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 4:04 AM, Andreas Schildbach
>     > <andreas@schildbach.de <mailto:andreas@schildbach.de>> wrote:
>     >> Damn, I just realized that I implement only the decoding side of
>     BIP38.
>     >> So I cannot propose a complete test vector. Here is what I have:
>     >>
>     >>
>     >> Passphrase: ϓ␀𐐀💩 (\u03D2\u0301\u0000\U00010400\U0001F4A9; GREEK
>     >> UPSILON WITH HOOK, COMBINING ACUTE ACCENT, NULL, DESERET CAPITAL
>     LETTER
>     >> LONG I, PILE OF POO)
>     >>
>     >> Passphrase bytes after removing ISO control characters and NFC
>     >> normalization: 0xcf933034303066346139
>     >>
>     >> Bitcoin Address: 16ktGzmfrurhbhi6JGqsMWf7TyqK9HNAeF
>     >>
>     >> Unencrypted private key (WIF):
>     >> 5Jajm8eQ22H3pGWLEVCXyvND8dQZhiQhoLJNKjYXk9roUFTMSZ4
>     >>
>     >>
>     >> Can someone calculate the encrypted key from it (using whatever
>     >> implementation) and I will verify it decodes properly in bitcoinj?
>     >>
>     >>
>     >>
>     >> On 07/16/2014 12:46 PM, Andreas Schildbach wrote:
>     >>> I will change the bitcoinj implementation and propose a new test
>     vector.
>     >>>
>     >>>
>     >>>
>     >>> On 07/16/2014 11:29 AM, Mike Hearn wrote:
>     >>>> Yes sorry, you're right, the issue starts with the null code point.
>     >>>> Python seems to have problems starting there too. It might work
>     if we
>     >>>> took that out.
>     >>>>
>     >>>>
>     >>>> On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Andreas Schildbach
>     >>>> <andreas@schildbach.de <mailto:andreas@schildbach.de>
>     <mailto:andreas@schildbach.de <mailto:andreas@schildbach.de>>> wrote:
>     >>>>
>     >>>>     Guys, you are always talking about the Unicode astral
>     plane, but in fact
>     >>>>     its a plain old (ASCII) control character where this
>     problem starts and
>     >>>>     likely ends: \u0000.
>     >>>>
>     >>>>     Let's ban/filter ISO control characters and be done with
>     it. Most
>     >>>>     control characters will never be enterable by any keyboard
>     into a
>     >>>>     password field. Of course I assume that
>     Character.isISOControl() works
>     >>>>     consistently across platforms.
>     >>>>
>     >>>>    
>     http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/lang/Character.html#isISOControl%28char%29
>     >>>>
>     >>>>
>     >>>>     On 07/16/2014 12:23 AM, Aaron Voisine wrote:
>     >>>>     > If the user creates a password on an iOS device with an
>     astral
>     >>>>     > character and then can't enter that password on a JVM
>     wallet, that
>     >>>>     > sucks. If JVMs really can't support unicode NFC then
>     that's a strong
>     >>>>     > case to limit the spec to the subset of unicode that all
>     popular
>     >>>>     > platforms can support, but it sounds like it might just
>     be a JVM
>     >>>>     > string library bug that could hopefully be reported and
>     fixed. I get
>     >>>>     > the same result as in the test case using apple's
>     >>>>     > CFStringNormalize(passphrase, kCFStringNormalizationFormC);
>     >>>>     >
>     >>>>     > Aaron Voisine
>     >>>>     > breadwallet.com <http://breadwallet.com>
>     <http://breadwallet.com>
>     >>>>     >
>     >>>>     >
>     >>>>     > On Tue, Jul 15, 2014 at 11:20 AM, Mike Hearn
>     <mike@plan99.net <mailto:mike@plan99.net>
>     >>>>     <mailto:mike@plan99.net <mailto:mike@plan99.net>>> wrote:
>     >>>>     >> Yes, we know, Andreas' code is indeed doing normalisation.
>     >>>>     >>
>     >>>>     >> However it appears the output bytes end up being
>     different. What
>     >>>>     I get back
>     >>>>     >> is:
>     >>>>     >>
>     >>>>     >> cf930001303430300166346139
>     >>>>     >>
>     >>>>     >> vs
>     >>>>     >>
>     >>>>     >> cf9300f0909080f09f92a9
>     >>>>     >>
>     >>>>     >> from the spec.
>     >>>>     >>
>     >>>>     >> I'm not sure why. It appears this is due to the
>     character from
>     >>>>     the astral
>     >>>>     >> planes. Java is old and uses 16 bit characters
>     internally - it
>     >>>>     wouldn't
>     >>>>     >> surprise me if there's some weirdness that means it
>     doesn't/won't
>     >>>>     support
>     >>>>     >> this kind of thing.
>     >>>>     >>
>     >>>>     >> I recommend instead that any implementation that wishes
>     to be
>     >>>>     compatible
>     >>>>     >> with JVM based wallets (I suspect Android is the same) just
>     >>>>     refuse any
>     >>>>     >> passphrase that includes characters outside the BMP. At
>     least
>     >>>>     unless someone
>     >>>>     >> can find a fix. I somehow doubt this will really hurt
>     anyone.
>     >>>>     >>
>     >>>>     >>
>     >>>>    
>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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>     >>>>     >> _______________________________________________
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>     >>>>     >>
>     https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
>     >>>>     >>
>     >>>>     >
>     >>>>     >
>     >>>>    
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>     >>>>
>     >>>>
>     >>>>
>     >>>>    
>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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>     >>>>     _______________________________________________
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>     >>>>
>     >>>>
>     >>>>
>     >>>>
>     >>>>
>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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>     >>>>
>     >>>>
>     >>>>
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>     >>>>
>     >>>
>     >>>
>     >>>
>     >>>
>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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>     >>>
>     >>
>     >>
>     >>
>     >>
>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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> 
> 
> 
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> 
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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> Code Sight - the same software that powers the world's largest code
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