From: Danny Thorpe <danny.thorpe@gmail.com>
To: Upal Chakraborty <bitcoin@upalc.com>
Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Dynamically Controlled Bitcoin Block Size Max Cap
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2015 13:58:50 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAJN5wHU59N68H7U-reANK9u=dF+906y-fyOj2cYRSFXZyLAT0g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAED3CWgTOMFgaM6bBfU0Dn-R0NrdrhGAQo34wHEneYkTtB4Opg@mail.gmail.com>
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I like the simplicity of this approach. Demand driven response.
Is there really a need to reduce the max block size at all? It is just a
maximum limit, not a required size for every block. If a seasonal
transaction surge bumps the max block size limit up a notch, what harm is
there in leaving the max block size limit at the "high water mark"
indefinitely, even though periods of decreased transaction volume?
I'd argue to remove the reduction step, making the max block size
calculation a monotonic increasing function. Cut the complexity in half.
-Danny
On Tue, Aug 18, 2015 at 5:13 AM, Upal Chakraborty via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Regarding:
> http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-August/010295.html
>
>
> I am arguing with the following statement here...
>
> *I see problems to this approach. The biggest one I see is that a miner
>> with 11% of hash power could sabotage block size increases by only ever
>> mining empty blocks.*
>
>
>
> First, I would like to argue from economics' point of view. If someone
> wants to hold back the block size increase with 11% hash power by mining
> empty blocks, he has to sacrifice Tx fees, which is not economical. 11%
> hash power will most likely be a pool and pool miners will find out soon
> that they are losing Tx fees because of pool owner's intention. Hence,
> they'll switch pool and pool owner will lose out. This is the same reason
> why 51% attack will never happen, even if a pool gets more than 51% hash
> power.
>
>
> Next, I would like to propose a slightly modified technical solution to
> this problem in algorithmic format...
>
> If more than 50% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last
> difficulty period, is more than 90% MaxBlockSize
> Double MaxBlockSize
> Else if more than 90% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last
> difficulty period, is less than 50% MaxBlockSize
> Half MaxBlockSize
> Else
> Keep the same MaxBlockSize
>
> This is how, those who want to stop increase, need to have more than 50%
> hash power. Those who want to stop decrease, need to have more than 10%
> hash power, but must mine more than 50% of MaxBlockSize in all blocks. In
> this approach, not only miners, but also the end user have their say.
> Because, end users will fill up the mempool, from where miners will take Tx
> to fill up the blocks. Please note that, taking first 2000 of the last 2016
> blocks is important to avoid data discrepancy among different nodes due to
> orphan blocks. It is assumed that a chain can not be orphaned after having
> 16 confirmation.
>
> Looking for comments.
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-08-18 20:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-08-18 12:13 [bitcoin-dev] Dynamically Controlled Bitcoin Block Size Max Cap Upal Chakraborty
2015-08-18 17:26 ` Chris Wardell
2015-08-20 7:31 ` Jorge Timón
2015-08-20 10:23 ` Milly Bitcoin
2015-08-21 0:25 ` Tom Harding
2015-08-21 0:37 ` Peter Todd
2015-08-21 16:52 ` Tom Harding
2015-08-21 22:21 ` Peter Todd
2015-08-21 23:16 ` Tom Harding
2015-08-22 0:01 ` Peter Todd
2015-08-22 3:21 ` Jorge Timón
2015-08-22 6:26 ` Peter Todd
2015-08-23 23:41 ` Tom Harding
2015-08-24 2:27 ` Jorge Timón
2015-08-21 0:45 ` Milly Bitcoin
2015-08-21 0:58 ` Peter Todd
2015-08-21 1:30 ` Milly Bitcoin
2015-08-21 20:28 ` Jorge Timón
2015-08-21 12:13 ` Sriram Karra
2015-08-21 20:09 ` Jorge Timón
2015-08-18 19:44 ` cedric perronnet
2015-08-18 20:58 ` Danny Thorpe [this message]
2015-08-18 21:17 ` Chris Wardell
2015-08-19 17:21 ` Upal Chakraborty
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2015-08-21 21:45 Upal Chakraborty
2015-08-20 15:02 Upal Chakraborty
2015-08-17 11:57 Rodney Morris
2015-08-17 12:38 ` Angel Leon
2015-08-17 12:43 ` Tier Nolan
2015-08-17 9:44 Upal Chakraborty
2015-08-17 9:54 ` Levin Keller
2015-08-17 9:59 ` Patrick Strateman
2015-08-17 10:51 ` Btc Drak
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