From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org (smtp2.osuosl.org [IPv6:2605:bc80:3010::133]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 80883C0001 for ; Thu, 4 Mar 2021 17:54:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6346843282 for ; Thu, 4 Mar 2021 17:54:33 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 0.877 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.877 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[DATE_IN_PAST_03_06=1.076, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: smtp2.osuosl.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp2.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id e7GT1eQtAx9c for ; Thu, 4 Mar 2021 17:54:32 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: delayed 03:03:12 by SQLgrey-1.8.0 Received: from mail-ed1-x52b.google.com (mail-ed1-x52b.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::52b]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 158AF4326E for ; Thu, 4 Mar 2021 17:54:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-ed1-x52b.google.com with SMTP id h10so35988796edl.6 for ; Thu, 04 Mar 2021 09:54:31 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=zukLdD4KJ89ix0owHGjlti1Z7OdewzKWe9zBu/fa7wQ=; b=jvbSdK3itfNwDyAXlorKv4lPNkxmN37abCCcDstK7de0Df/AqjZjsSXX6Np2QQfbgm o6Z4l4JZUhKj6T1I24m58lofFovGocL6WrkmWsmdtj5cF8cIdKDlLFGYicr3JEKNKc6T fuCFR2rXfpruhYiZDcBcm+MYSO2dgEYQdPiKKOM39vttyOyxgoCFLvUo0UT6xFgOp6Vf VehDjrV33OwmbxJqkiEI901d0P4xdkARxwnsJh0o8WJ6uGWZ1U3T4HP9w7vfIwG8r89S A6hXCpfheWmSDmXCfqQD93sXQ/jJTHgNlGTeLX7Tm8jLK2eo1wQhFhH8w5Fy42Vn6G6s c8aw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=zukLdD4KJ89ix0owHGjlti1Z7OdewzKWe9zBu/fa7wQ=; b=GDIqCYcV8OevecLIJaLWdtdROYZ3VJjuBSJysc86u7UFCeZmjsVlrkz565Cwuhd/6t XxGTPObJl/5Dj72YYLahnldwiL0iGVfW0Ctqr9rA2Gxq54gzMrR9Aj+dUu8kZveZ28sm PDPZoanT2xXb0yX0+Fp6L1/eBtyofHeFexWmCuhhnv9U2XqNTM9Pmro1rl5+tD9jQrGk vSLtsxnhrQoAwNWdLUEL76TUB4y9tI2Ba0VZMJWyeyqzVKkfqqeGa9A28CO/pgIgQeXg laV35WaIwZ7BccFlmj9fOjj/uRBJd3zZ5qhhn1EiaAJFp8+DS4wuN19vMrSE4dmMQBi8 8l2A== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM531+3Vk4KGanDyEhVmxT/dkdHkaqUOjFTmGacfIWzy0fmmxMj0no RzKwNiXEh/8aUTfme3YN7USlMnjJJk0WUqpCQx1w8vJAcFw3Uw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzV7aelSbHh6ZU3uwgNh+gzEhNBGJ6N7qD0BtpUgmiIwJSpb2YVMJhcbax7l9YP4WMwtCsyZTT0TdA+fzqD6Kk= X-Received: by 2002:a2e:b043:: with SMTP id d3mr2472753ljl.280.1614867953450; Thu, 04 Mar 2021 06:25:53 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 From: John Rand Date: Thu, 4 Mar 2021 14:25:41 +0000 Message-ID: To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000b9809905bcb6be51" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Thu, 04 Mar 2021 18:15:21 +0000 Subject: [bitcoin-dev] MASF=true + LOT=informational X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 04 Mar 2021 17:54:33 -0000 --000000000000b9809905bcb6be51 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" With reference to considerations https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-March/018555.html and motivation to find consensus on incrementally improving Bitcoin soft-fork activation mechanisms. (TL;DR Consensus is important for the activation mechanism as there are more soft-forks that Bitcoin will need. We need to incrementally improve activation mechanisms. It could become critical that Bitcoin prevails in achieving a future upgrade even against powerful interests.) These activation configurations have been discussed with rationales. 1) MASF=true + LOT=false https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-February/018380.html Try LOT=false first, with a potential to change to LOT=true if pools and miners were to unreasonably delay MASF activation. (By later deploying a revised activation mechanism with LOT=true or other.) Arguments against have included a major concern about perpetuating the risk demonstrated by the BIP 141 / BIP 9 with potential for misuse and misunderstanding of a normative mechanism as a political veto. Such veto can be overridden by the market, but the forced need to do so increases drama and risk. Arguments in favor include being defensive to avoid misinterpretation about developer control, and being considered and incremental in starting with a safe conservative approach https://old.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/lcjhl6/taproot_activation_pools_will_be_able_to_veto/gm2l02w/ Though it should be acknowledged and taken into account that disagreement and potential for partly incompatible clients with different activation configuration, changes the risk calculation for LOT=false. So that LOT=false may not be safer in practice, and does not wash reference client developers hands of contributing to the combined risk. 2) MASF=true + LOT=true https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-March/018545.html Arguments in favor, inverse of above. But if LOT=true is a hidden flag in bitcoin reference code, or released by another project, then misinterpretation of developer control is avoided. Would there be consensus for the reference implementation doing nothing, and signal intent to follow the market if a non-contentious LOT=true gains traction? With explicit communication of this intent and reason for initial non-inclusion. There were also concerns about offending miners. This concern seems dubious to many, given pools indicated ~90% support https://taprootactivation.com/ and are less detail oriented. But also BIP 148/ BIP 91 sequence events was enormously dangerous and worth minor social cohesion to avoid as a category of risk. Against the realism of developer control, if there were a market need to reject a soft-fork, that can also be done with a UASF. But UASF is dramatic and the signaling direction against should be reserved for the low probability outcome. 3) MASF=false + LOT=informational https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2021-February/018495.html No miner activation. This is interesting in using the non-standardness part of schnorr to activate at a flag height without normative signaling in version bits. But the combined removal in this proposal of (normative signaled) MASF is problematic for the needless delay it creates. It seems probable that the delay itself would motivate users to switch to clients with MASF+UASF (LOT=true) in protest. It is true that schnorr requires wallet work, but that overlooks the philosophical nature of the rejection of unneeded delay and empirical evidence shows rather conclusively that ecosystem players are predominantly selectively lazy and only work on Bitcoin infrastructure upgrades after the fact. Subsequent posts on the thread with this proposal discuss that informational signaling be substituted so that users and the market can benefit from the information about miner intent. As it is non-normative it seems hard to argue against: more information is better. 4) MASF=true + LOT=informational >From the above it would be interesting to see discussion of a combination of MASF=true (same mechanism as 1 or 2) with LOT=informational (mechanism from 3). Where, again, informational means signaling is provided but in an optional and informational sense, that is not normative for consensus code, but to inform the ecosystem about a hashrate verified opt-in assertion of readiness from pools. In some way that could be more reliable in signaling a willing readiness rather than a UASF under duress mandatory signal. Consider also with 2 or 4) alike (or 1 after switching to 2), in the event that activation were unreasonably delayed, forced miner signaling from 2) could be argued to be less reliable as the mechanism for signaling on pools has no automated link to fullnode software version. In the MASF delay eventuality, where the flag height is relied upon, users and services would be well advised to ensure they are running schnorr validating fullnodes, and for SPV users to verify their wallet relies on schnorr upgraded fullnodes. John R --000000000000b9809905bcb6be51 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable




Try LOT=3Dfalse first, with a potential t= o change to LOT=3Dtrue if pools and miners were to unreasonably delay MASF = activation.=C2=A0 (By later deploying a revised activation mechanism with L= OT=3Dtrue or other.)

Arguments against have includ= ed a major concern about perpetuating the risk demonstrated by the BIP 141 = / BIP 9 with potential for misuse and misunderstanding of a normative mecha= nism as a political veto.=C2=A0 Such veto can be overridden by the market, = but the forced need to do so increases drama and risk.

=
Arguments in favor include being defensive to avoid misinterpretation = about developer control, and being considered and incremental in starting w= ith a safe conservative approach=C2=A0https://old.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comment= s/lcjhl6/taproot_activation_pools_will_be_able_to_veto/gm2l02w/=C2=A0= =C2=A0

Though it should be acknowledged and taken = into account that disagreement and potential for partly incompatible client= s with different activation configuration, changes the risk calculation for= LOT=3Dfalse.=C2=A0 So that LOT=3Dfalse may not be safer in practice, and d= oes not wash reference client developers hands of contributing to the combi= ned risk.

2) MASF=3Dtrue=C2=A0+ LOT=3Dtrue


Argu= ments in favor, inverse of above.=C2=A0 But if LOT=3Dtrue is a hidden flag = in bitcoin reference code, or released by another project, then misinterpre= tation of developer control is avoided.

Would ther= e be consensus for the reference implementation doing nothing, and signal i= ntent to follow the market if a non-contentious LOT=3Dtrue gains traction?= =C2=A0 With explicit communication of this intent and reason for initial no= n-inclusion.

There were also concerns about offend= ing miners.=C2=A0 This concern seems dubious to many, given pools indicated= ~90% support https://taprootact= ivation.com/ and are less detail oriented.=C2=A0 But also BIP 148/ BIP = 91 sequence events was enormously dangerous and worth minor social cohesion= to avoid as a category of risk.

Against the reali= sm of developer control, if there were a market need to reject a soft-fork,= that can also be done with a UASF.=C2=A0 But UASF is dramatic and the sign= aling direction against should be reserved for the low probability outcome.=

3) MASF=3Dfalse + LOT=3Dinformational
<= br>

No= miner activation.=C2=A0 This is interesting in using the non-standardness = part of schnorr to activate at a flag height without normative signaling in= version bits.=C2=A0 But the combined removal in this proposal of (normativ= e signaled) MASF is problematic for the needless delay it creates.=C2=A0=C2= =A0

It seems probable that the delay itself would = motivate users to switch to clients with MASF+UASF (LOT=3Dtrue) in protest.= =C2=A0 It is true that schnorr requires wallet work, but that overlooks the= philosophical nature of the rejection of unneeded delay and empirical evid= ence shows rather conclusively that ecosystem players are predominantly sel= ectively lazy and only work on Bitcoin infrastructure upgrades after the fa= ct.

Subsequent posts on the thread with this propo= sal discuss that informational signaling be substituted so that users and t= he market can benefit from the information about miner intent.=C2=A0 As it = is non-normative it seems hard to argue against: more information is better= .

4) MASF=3Dtrue=C2=A0+ LOT=3Dinformational
From the above it would be interesting to see discussion of a c= ombination of MASF=3Dtrue (same mechanism as 1 or 2) with LOT=3Dinformation= al (mechanism from 3).=C2=A0 Where, again, informational means signaling is= provided but in an optional and informational sense, that is not normative= for consensus code, but to inform the ecosystem about a hashrate verified = opt-in assertion of readiness from pools.=C2=A0 In some way that could be m= ore reliable in signaling a willing readiness rather than a UASF under dure= ss mandatory signal.

Consider also with 2 or 4) al= ike (or 1 after switching to 2), in the event that activation were unreason= ably delayed, forced miner signaling from 2) could be argued to be less rel= iable as the mechanism for signaling on pools has no automated link to full= node software version.=C2=A0 In the MASF delay eventuality, where the flag = height is relied upon, users and services would be well advised to ensure t= hey are running schnorr validating fullnodes, and for SPV users to verify t= heir wallet relies on schnorr upgraded fullnodes.

<= div>John R
--000000000000b9809905bcb6be51--