From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from whitealder.osuosl.org (smtp1.osuosl.org [140.211.166.138]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E19A7C0881 for ; Sun, 8 Dec 2019 10:50:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by whitealder.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C3B7B86DDC for ; Sun, 8 Dec 2019 10:50:53 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org Received: from whitealder.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id uyHu7jX4goA6 for ; Sun, 8 Dec 2019 10:50:52 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: delayed 00:06:49 by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ot1-f45.google.com (mail-ot1-f45.google.com [209.85.210.45]) by whitealder.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 55B7586DCE for ; Sun, 8 Dec 2019 10:50:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-ot1-f45.google.com with SMTP id 59so9707384otp.12 for ; Sun, 08 Dec 2019 02:50:47 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=alephium-org.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=GkCVQzMqKnbqz5oj1j3yJ4v7/VHe+Z48/9y4zTWjREI=; b=O1vKnLY1qqVInq6ge1XLZ6hIbjJ6VocrGRsm/u2qw+SAfHjbP3yfNHrA2v5sV2aDTC 4XoWDzN79MxV/U5R67WBxVr9KYsLrXbzBZlQc6SMl2rVXfUB4qgIdWmLdFACKIrit9X/ DfWmQZIAOGaaGtK/IyDTYA/W1+/MTOPZz0wyhxCnIIhU2LwcBvQF/H8T5TZmSkAhTvui dryU6OnOhacxzUTKY+5bS09fAL6wKrYbsDZx0sauxgPGFaSEooyqhnqIerp4tvXajlpv aChGfpfQKUzpWsM+g3JVkm6ISCgi7TZcFZfedskHnvPkqs1Cdp9g9gPa/6imJPwSMELD heXA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=GkCVQzMqKnbqz5oj1j3yJ4v7/VHe+Z48/9y4zTWjREI=; b=BZIRupHeFk4E5mU1Y0i0c5DQ2isRFuaOUjU+XWL/iN+ml6xKXCblSsplMTPXy+guBr T+KFRxgu/3Oc5vf6nxfcm0KVDIOrS0hmJMNa2pY61Yo5/tis7BHp8dacFWGQWqkhbjyY KotwXpj7TnJn3z27f1lzXmDxNGp1GqFSdgUadw6M9j7caQp3gmwn5K23Pf88p6n5nNIL rFiMKIfd7lfnJuxSzXIvCexSqqp8wWpbpbFQic9qETAPnVX5GjfJQQ8o5Sj3yjLIksFP +oFAvpOMnBoo0vJnsSt9X2p1Q3wmBLbIwoypzqEx+pTWv4rQZR/BKRroYMsNZXqYWeGh HsKA== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAVIpu/RnHcF4O2SZET67YfsY4RnKZxOju8dTvGk+yhv37rZGMip jubqPYHRkxyrt7Q1lWk2vf34eWyh9LNJvucHgk1wXAJbTbAOYA== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqyq8Lwrm5EGoxEFFZcxkRks17DavTJUWXMhpiSH7/bab/k8o5o9uyGB0vyRw3KMJgbyx2cnihDWoC9E0CzDE/s= X-Received: by 2002:a9d:6654:: with SMTP id q20mr17267205otm.284.1575801840555; Sun, 08 Dec 2019 02:44:00 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Cheng Wang Date: Sun, 8 Dec 2019 11:43:49 +0100 Message-ID: To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000f16dfb05992ef4b7" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Sun, 08 Dec 2019 17:22:55 +0000 Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Reducing energy consumption and increasing security at the same time X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 08 Dec 2019 10:50:54 -0000 --000000000000f16dfb05992ef4b7 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Hi Everyone, I would like to share my serious work on reducing the energy consumption of PoW without sacrificing security. My new type of algorithm is called PoLW. For a practical system where mining is profitable, PoLW could actually improve the security of the system. The idea is to shift part of the external cost of mining in the physical world (mainly energy consumption) to the internal cost of the network. In PoLW, the miners are able to give up part of the coinbase reward so as to get weight (> 1) for the block hash they produce. The total cost of generating a new block would still be equal to maximal coinbase reward in equilibrium. I analyzed two algorithms in the paper: linear PoLW and exponential PoLW. Linear PoLW could reduce energy consumption by a factor close to 1/2 in equilibrium, while exponential PoLW could reduce energy consumption by an arbitrary factor in equilibrium. In a practical system, mining is usually (if not always) profitable. If we transition from PoW to PoLW, the external costs of mining would decrease and the internal costs will increase. However, the decrease in external costs would be less than the increase in internal costs since mining is profitable. The total cost of block generation would get higher, therefore, the security will increase. Of course, we could not decrease the external costs of any existing system by a factor close to zero immediately. There is a section in my paper discussing this particularly. The principle of applying PoLW is that keeping the absolute external cost increasing all the time, but the percentage of external cost in the total cost gets lower eventually. This work is based on solid math calculation, and I am looking forward to feedback and discussions. My paper is available at: https://github.com/alephium/research/raw/master/polw.pdf It's inspired by the recent great paper of Itay, Alexander, and Ittay: https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.04124 Best, Cheng Wang --000000000000f16dfb05992ef4b7 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi Everyone,

I would like to= share my serious work on=C2=A0reducing the energy consumption of PoW witho= ut sacrificing security. My new type of algorithm is called PoLW. For a pra= ctical system where mining is profitable, PoLW could actually improve the s= ecurity of the system.

The idea is to shift part o= f the external cost of mining in the physical world (mainly energy consumpt= ion) to the internal cost of the network. In PoLW,=C2=A0the miners are able= to give up part of the coinbase reward so as to get weight (> 1) for th= e block hash they produce. The total cost of generating a new block would s= till be equal to maximal coinbase reward in equilibrium.

I analyzed two algorithms in the paper: linear PoLW and=C2=A0exponen= tial PoLW. Linear PoLW could reduce energy consumption by a factor close to= 1/2 in equilibrium, while exponential PoLW could reduce energy consumption= by an arbitrary factor in equilibrium.

In a pract= ical system, mining is usually (if not always) profitable. If we transition= from PoW to PoLW, the external costs of mining would decrease and the inte= rnal costs will increase. However, the decrease in external costs would be = less than the increase in internal costs since mining is profitable. The to= tal cost of block generation would get higher, therefore, the security will= increase.

Of course, we could not decrease the ex= ternal costs of any existing system by a factor close to zero immediately. = There is a section in my paper discussing this particularly. The principle = of applying PoLW is that keeping the absolute external cost increasing all = the time, but the percentage of external cost in the total cost gets lower = eventually.

This work is based on solid math calcu= lation, and I am looking forward to feedback and discussions. My paper is a= vailable at:

It's inspired by the recent great p= aper of=C2=A0Itay, Alexander, and Ittay:
Best,
Cheng Wang
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