From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1RcSI6-0000oz-FY for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Mon, 19 Dec 2011 01:45:22 +0000 X-ACL-Warn: Received: from mail-ey0-f175.google.com ([209.85.215.175]) by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1RcSI5-00075D-2L for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Mon, 19 Dec 2011 01:45:22 +0000 Received: by eaal1 with SMTP id l1so6331791eaa.34 for ; Sun, 18 Dec 2011 17:45:14 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.204.154.136 with SMTP id o8mr4570487bkw.112.1324259114504; Sun, 18 Dec 2011 17:45:14 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: marek@palatinus.cz Received: by 10.204.168.15 with HTTP; Sun, 18 Dec 2011 17:44:42 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: <20111219011417.GA16815@ulyssis.org> References: <1323728469.78044.YahooMailNeo@web121012.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> <201112181644.44134.luke@dashjr.org> <20111219011417.GA16815@ulyssis.org> From: slush Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2011 02:44:42 +0100 X-Google-Sender-Auth: qrrVqiAIfrhoXAsI9ZIW0r0ASj4 Message-ID: To: Pieter Wuille Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=00151761ca761c512304b4681a06 X-Spam-Score: 1.3 (+) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (slush[at]centrum.cz) 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message 0.0 LOTS_OF_MONEY Huge... sums of money 0.3 AWL AWL: From: address is in the auto white-list X-Headers-End: 1RcSI5-00075D-2L Cc: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] [BIP 15] Aliases X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2011 01:45:22 -0000 --00151761ca761c512304b4681a06 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Pieter, it was more rhetorical question than asking for explanation, but thanks anyway. As an Internet application developer, I of course understand security issues while using HTTPS and CA. I have a gut feeling that there simply does not exist any single solution which is both easy to use and secure enough. At least nobody mentioned it yet. And if I need to choose between easy solution or secure solution for aliases, I'll pick that easy one. I mean - we need some solution which will be easy enough for daily use; it is something what we currently don't have. But if I want to be really really sure I'm using correct destination for paying $1mil for a house, I can every time ask for real bitcoin addresses, this is that secure way which we currently have. slush On Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at 2:14 AM, Pieter Wuille wrote: > On Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at 12:58:37AM +0100, slush wrote: > > Maybe I'm retarded, but where's the point in providing alliases > containing > > yet another hash in URL? > > Any DNS-based alias system is vulnerable to spoofing. If I can make > people's > DNS server believe that mining.cz points to my IP, I'll receive payments > to > you... > > If no trusted CA is used to authenticate the communication, there is no way > to be sure the one you are asking how to pay, is the person you want to > pay. > Therefore, one solution is to put a bitcoin address in the identification > string itself, and requiring SSL communication authenticated using the > respective key. > > This makes the identification strings obviously less useful as aliases, > but pure aliases in the sense of human-typable strings have imho > limited usefulness anyway - in most cases these identification strings > will be communicated through other electronic means anyway. > > Furthermore, the embedded bitcoin address could be hidden from the user: > retrieved when first connecting, and stored together with the URI in > an address book. Like ssh, it could warn the user if the key changes > (which wil be ignored by most users anyway, but what do you do about > that?) > > -- > Pieter > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Learn Windows Azure Live! Tuesday, Dec 13, 2011 > Microsoft is holding a special Learn Windows Azure training event for > developers. It will provide a great way to learn Windows Azure and what it > provides. You can attend the event by watching it streamed LIVE online. > Learn more at http://p.sf.net/sfu/ms-windowsazure > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > --00151761ca761c512304b4681a06 Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Pieter, it was more rhetorical question than asking for explanation, but th= anks anyway. As an Internet application developer, I of course understand s= ecurity issues while using HTTPS and CA.

I have a gut fe= eling that there simply does not exist any single solution which is both ea= sy to use and secure enough. At least nobody mentioned it yet. And if I nee= d to choose between easy solution or secure solution for aliases, I'll = pick that easy one. I mean - we need some solution which will be easy enoug= h for daily use; it is something what we currently don't have. But if I= want to be really really sure I'm using correct destination for paying= $1mil for a house, I can every time ask for real bitcoin addresses, this i= s that secure way which we currently have.=A0

slush

On Mon, Dec 19,= 2011 at 2:14 AM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com> wrote:
On Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at 12:58:37AM +0100, slush wrote: > Maybe I'm retarded, but where's the point in providing alliase= s containing
> yet another hash in URL?

Any DNS-based alias system is vulnerable to spoofing. If I can make p= eople's
DNS server believe that mini= ng.cz points to my IP, I'll receive payments to
you...

If no trusted CA is used to authenticate the communication, there is no way=
to be sure the one you are asking how to pay, is the person you want to pay= .
Therefore, one solution is to put a bitcoin address in the identification string itself, and requiring SSL communication authenticated using the
respective key.

This makes the identification strings obviously less useful as aliases,
but pure aliases in the sense of human-typable strings have imho
limited usefulness anyway - in most cases these identification strings
will be communicated through other electronic means anyway.

Furthermore, the embedded bitcoin address could be hidden from the user: retrieved when first connecting, and stored together with the URI in
an address book. Like ssh, it could warn the user if the key changes
(which wil be ignored by most users anyway, but what do you do about
that?)

--
Pieter

---------------------------------------------------------------------------= ---
Learn Windows Azure Live! =A0Tuesday, Dec 13, 2011
Microsoft is holding a special Learn Windows Azure training event for
developers. It will provide a great way to learn Windows Azure and what it<= br> provides. You can attend the event by watching it streamed LIVE online.
Learn more at http://p.sf.net/sfu/ms-windowsazure
_______________________________________________
Bitcoin-development mailing list
Bitcoin-develo= pment@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-de= velopment

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