A 0-conf double spend caused by FSS-RBF would be harmless since the original output (address and amounts) remain in the double spending trx.
So all a merchant would need to do is monitor block inclusion for the relevant output. Addition of some wallet logic would resolve it easily.
Technically the only difference is that a FSS-RBF requires an additional input trx to be included in the second trx.
Not clear to me, why the limitation of adding an additional input hinders the added value of FullRBF and how significant that hinderance is.
Why wasn't this solution put in place back then? Are there problems with the design?
While I still think there are unhealthy side-effects of Full-RBF (like more doublespending at unknowing merchants, after years of FSS protection) I think discussion of this FSS-RBF feature is worth considering.
Thank you for bringing that to my attention, apologies for not being aware of it.
This would seem like a good way forward.
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