From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from silver.osuosl.org (smtp3.osuosl.org [140.211.166.136]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8CB79C07FF for ; Thu, 2 Apr 2020 22:56:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by silver.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7600026754 for ; Thu, 2 Apr 2020 22:56:32 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org Received: from silver.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id YHz6svvLrPHt for ; Thu, 2 Apr 2020 22:56:31 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ed1-f47.google.com (mail-ed1-f47.google.com [209.85.208.47]) by silver.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B1A7520354 for ; Thu, 2 Apr 2020 22:56:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-ed1-f47.google.com with SMTP id cw6so6662393edb.9 for ; Thu, 02 Apr 2020 15:56:30 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=commerceblock-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=keQMhfOCcXT5UvLSkbZGTS2KLWNDKlPxTWF35U1TUfk=; b=Din0QbTNvpmernYyhy+P7PvcOkrI78QIxpJ4HlAhDqPB+PwNJD2qA+z+6XQDsxF7MK f/3JNj5ZmYmHm6vwWpmcxK42H8ow6jjbJJDBC725xOdxRNw3Ua8WRgiccynVMkrka30Z R3De+ZndyDG5yYCvQvM+r4pRcusAv06TGBjk1S+V4Rli8ZxiMB3qGavV9O0/2U9U90r0 nA3kMaOttoor2qaTml55rKl5tPerbPuaTD3r9w9rBs6SwOU4LvCqtmBhe4LRgduRYIaA 2cIAlzJi/e1+LflzZzhJV+taxREhm0isn0NXBLN2DWMIVHS0MpfP8/N9ttT1voUg26f+ yaFg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to; bh=keQMhfOCcXT5UvLSkbZGTS2KLWNDKlPxTWF35U1TUfk=; b=VLKMji18ucAoUrAVjpVwuvGcpxaIyRb1P4Axmjddfws4o7OH8/rhnPn1tNXoeqBgM2 2iQnLE2v9Gb/nq9XjZVrGvCt4KqZ8zga7SN8sOcmOdrC4RUnMA/L2w/h23p3eeeYyjNZ G24X6pe4/0puTsW2lXMztF9X6U7dhCKcYUGa872nSDdERc95nLTj+VOmekenjzn/DTpG CXI9S1qOH7yyeHiC6aIoh5/AXFS/iRFIrKKG4aTbSlBialmaTKDxvFGn2m89riAvZKLq Ogyh3qesmxF53Z0HIOmOTNuayOJIxG4M6t3h+Gq6WfUZrwpTT7cpQscVIIBKthjFOlzT +cgQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AGi0PuZ7CiNFoC0GEypzGlILasvZK0r7PRYOWYmo9qNm9cLaCV8gCf4N 2ydDmNafN+WY7cTnttqkq0E44ex8FYmSm5o8GR+vnG2zLw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APiQypJen0o7sOA3W1lPpDhqnMjvD4QnHGtHcb5WRPZlChOGzTfxWZ0pb0DmFbMw3XiZXFKlxUgGzZgiOouQ9yUp38U= X-Received: by 2002:a50:d61c:: with SMTP id x28mr5110755edi.344.1585868188753; Thu, 02 Apr 2020 15:56:28 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20200331103508.asvxujkhtifj6n7i@ganymede> In-Reply-To: From: Tom Trevethan Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2020 23:56:17 +0100 Message-ID: To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000000d302b05a256b6ef" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Fri, 03 Apr 2020 00:22:24 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Statechain implementations X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 02 Apr 2020 22:56:32 -0000 --0000000000000d302b05a256b6ef Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Thanks for all of the input and comments - I do now think that the decrementing nSequence relative locktime backup system with kick-off transaction is the way to go, including a fee penalty via CPFP to disincentivise DoS, as suggested. I have started a more detailed document specifying the proposed protocol in more detail: https://github.com/commerceblock/mercury/blob/master/statechains.md which includes improvements to the transfer mechanism (and an explanation of how this can be used to transfer/novate positions in DLCs). Always happy to get more feedback or PRs. Tom On Tue, Mar 31, 2020 at 12:41 PM Tom Trevethan wrote: > Hi David, > > Just for clarity, I left nChain over 2 years ago (having worked there > since 2016). While there, I (along with other researchers) were given free > rein to work on any ideas we wanted to. I had been interested in the > scaling of Bitcoin off-chain, and this was one of several things I spent > time on (including things like sidechains, pegs and threshold signatures). > This patent application came out of an idea I had to transfer ownership of > UTXOs off-chain that has some similarities to the statechains proposal, > which has shown there is interest and demand for this type of system. > > Although I think the existence of this application is something to be > mindful of, there are several important things to note: > > 1. Although there are similarities, the current ideas are significantly > different to those in the application. > 2. The key transfer protocol as described in the application is not secure > (for several reasons, including as discussed above, by Albert and Bob etc.) > - and a different mechanism is required. > 3. Decrementing timelocks (as suggested in the application) are prior art > (Decker-Wattenhofer 2015), and in any case any implementation will most > likely use an 'invalidation tree' relative locktime backup mechanism for > open-ended UTXOs. > 4. The patent application has not been granted (it was made in May 2017) > and the international search report rejected it on the grounds of prior > art. > > Tom > > On Tue, Mar 31, 2020 at 11:36 AM David A. Harding wrote: > >> On Wed, Mar 25, 2020 at 01:52:10PM +0000, Tom Trevethan via bitcoin-dev >> wrote: >> > Hi all, >> > >> > We are starting to work on an implementation of the statechains concept >> ( >> > >> https://medium.com/@RubenSomsen/statechains-non-custodial-off-chain-bitcoin-transfer-1ae4845a4a39 >> ), >> > >> > [...] >> > There are two main modifications we are looking at: >> > [...] >> > >> > 2. Replacing the 2-of-2 multisig output (paying to statechain entity SE >> key >> > and transitory key) with a single P2(W)PKH output where the public key >> > shared between the SE and the current owner. The SE and the current >> owner >> > can then sign with a 2-of-2 ECDSA MPC. >> >> Dr. Trevethan, >> >> Would you be able to explain how your proposal to use statechains with >> 2P-ECDSA relates to your patent assigned to nChain Holdings for "Secure >> off-chain blockchain transactions"?[1] >> >> [1] https://patents.google.com/patent/US20200074464A1 >> >> Here are some excerpts from the application that caught my attention in >> the context of statechains in general and your proposal to this list in >> particular: >> >> > an exchange platform that is trusted to implement and operate the >> > transaction protocol, without requiring an on-chain transaction. The >> > off-chain transactions enable one computer system to generate multiple >> > transactions that are recordable to a blockchain in different >> > circumstances >> > >> > [...] >> > >> > at least some of the off-chain transactions are valid for recording on >> > the blockchain even in the event of a catastrophic failure of the >> > exchange (e.g., exchange going permanently off-line or loosing key >> > shares). >> > >> > [...] >> > >> > there may be provided a computer readable storage medium including a >> > two-party elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (two-party ECDSA) >> > script comprising computer executable instructions which, when >> > executed, configure a processor to perform functions of a two-party >> > elliptic curve digital signature algorithm described herein. >> > >> > [...] >> > >> > In this instance the malicious actor would then also have to collude >> > with a previous owner of the funds to recreate the full key. Because >> > an attack requires either the simultaneous theft of both exchange and >> > depositor keys or collusion with previous legitimate owners of funds, >> > the opportunities for a malicious attacker to compromise the exchange >> > platform are limited. >> >> Thank you, >> >> -Dave >> > --0000000000000d302b05a256b6ef Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Thanks for all of the input and comments - I do now think = that the decrementing nSequence relative locktime backup system with kick-o= ff transaction is the way to go, including a fee penalty via CPFP to disinc= entivise=C2=A0DoS, as suggested.=C2=A0
I have started a more detailed d= ocument specifying the proposed protocol in more detail:=C2=A0https://= github.com/commerceblock/mercury/blob/master/statechains.md=C2=A0which = includes improvements to the transfer=C2=A0mechanism (and an explanation of= how this can be used to transfer/novate positions in DLCs). Always happy t= o get more feedback or PRs.=C2=A0

Tom
<= br>
On Tue,= Mar 31, 2020 at 12:41 PM Tom Trevethan <tom@commerceblock.com> wrote:
Hi David,

<= div>Just for clarity, I left nChain over 2 years ago (having worked there s= ince 2016). While there, I (along with other researchers) were given free r= ein to work on any ideas we wanted to. I had been interested in the scaling= of Bitcoin off-chain, and this was one of several things I spent time on (= including things like sidechains,=C2=A0pegs and threshold signatures). This= patent application came out of an idea I had to transfer ownership of UTXO= s off-chain that has some similarities to the statechains proposal, which h= as shown there is interest and demand for this type of system.=C2=A0
<= div>
Although I think the existence of this application is so= mething to be mindful of, there are several important things to note:
=

1. Although there are similarities, the current ideas a= re significantly different to those in the application.=C2=A0
2. = The key transfer protocol as described in the application is not secure (fo= r several reasons, including as discussed above, by Albert and Bob etc.) - = and a different mechanism is required.=C2=A0
3. Decrementing time= locks (as suggested in the application) are prior art (Decker-Wattenhofer 2= 015), and in any case any implementation will most likely use an 'inval= idation tree' relative locktime backup mechanism for open-ended UTXOs.= =C2=A0
4. The patent application has not been granted (it was mad= e in May 2017) and the international search report rejected it on the groun= ds of prior art.=C2=A0

Tom

On Tue, Mar 31, 20= 20 at 11:36 AM David A. Harding <dave@dtrt.org> wrote:
On Wed, Mar 25, 2020 at 01:52:10PM +0000, Tom Trev= ethan via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> We are starting to work on an implementation of the statechains concep= t (
> https://medium.com/@RubenSomsen/statechains-non-custodial-off-chain-bitco= in-transfer-1ae4845a4a39),
>
> [...]
> There are two main modifications we are looking at:
> [...]
>
> 2. Replacing the 2-of-2 multisig output (paying to statechain entity S= E key
> and transitory key) with a single P2(W)PKH output where the public key=
> shared between the SE and the current owner. The SE and the current ow= ner
> can then sign with a 2-of-2 ECDSA MPC.

Dr. Trevethan,

Would you be able to explain how your proposal to use statechains with
2P-ECDSA relates to your patent assigned to nChain Holdings for "Secur= e
off-chain blockchain transactions"?[1]=C2=A0

=C2=A0 =C2=A0 [1] https://patents.google.com/patent= /US20200074464A1

Here are some excerpts from the application that caught my attention in
the context of statechains in general and your proposal to this list in
particular:

> an exchange platform that is trusted to implement and operate the
> transaction protocol, without requiring an on-chain transaction. The > off-chain transactions enable one computer system to generate multiple=
> transactions that are recordable to a blockchain in different
> circumstances
>
> [...]
>
> at least some of the off-chain transactions are valid for recording on=
> the blockchain even in the event of a catastrophic failure of the
> exchange (e.g., exchange going permanently off-line or loosing key
> shares).
>
> [...]
>
> there may be provided a computer readable storage medium including a > two-party elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (two-party ECDSA)=
> script comprising computer executable instructions which, when
> executed, configure a processor to perform functions of a two-party > elliptic curve digital signature algorithm described herein.
>
> [...]
>
> In this instance the malicious actor would then also have to collude > with a previous owner of the funds to recreate the full key. Because > an attack requires either the simultaneous theft of both exchange and<= br> > depositor keys or collusion with previous legitimate owners of funds,<= br> > the opportunities for a malicious attacker to compromise the exchange<= br> > platform are limited.

Thank you,

-Dave
--0000000000000d302b05a256b6ef--