From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.osuosl.org (smtp1.osuosl.org [IPv6:2605:bc80:3010::138]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D9317C0032 for ; Thu, 27 Jul 2023 13:25:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp1.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id ACC0F83993 for ; Thu, 27 Jul 2023 13:25:48 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp1.osuosl.org ACC0F83993 Authentication-Results: smtp1.osuosl.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=commerceblock-com.20221208.gappssmtp.com header.i=@commerceblock-com.20221208.gappssmtp.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20221208 header.b=q/dLpHaB X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -1.897 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.897 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp1.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp1.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id DTMT0ip_cAE4 for ; Thu, 27 Jul 2023 13:25:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail-lf1-x136.google.com (mail-lf1-x136.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::136]) by smtp1.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9A6D08309A for ; Thu, 27 Jul 2023 13:25:47 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp1.osuosl.org 9A6D08309A Received: by mail-lf1-x136.google.com with SMTP id 2adb3069b0e04-4fdd31bf179so1697952e87.2 for ; Thu, 27 Jul 2023 06:25:47 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=commerceblock-com.20221208.gappssmtp.com; s=20221208; t=1690464345; x=1691069145; h=to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references:mime-version :from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=NSuVLb1L3ev5Ubl/03IPWgCaSBRJcqs31RdwDYYM5pU=; b=q/dLpHaB91v3QdB9G5MuwpfE6C7SFYnA1o8Ufb8VkuXTosqJZ8ooqGfVTrcNGI3TNS 8LEpM4V9WUNHo0X1g4TMyaSB7+iI46jbCcp/fPoqPugeGt/+DAAndmFJr/3j9ak3eV3z ssQlUx4Rqpz00b6/ZXfVqxW9egQk4mZqwV3qvHCm7atoBHYaZI8NotWe08YYvbf54tK8 LyZrNVM91cEXwTi6A5yYtsmFFCjnH2uVm7/zphG31JA87J1jxfZiy5vHKi7qHrZlKohA 1HjCOA+O+OXQvzkxrKHIIzI5zr9rKiXr8El9U0Ic9CQB7G7Vkt7+u5pZNiskho/SVc4N yNZA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20221208; t=1690464345; x=1691069145; h=to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references:mime-version :x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=NSuVLb1L3ev5Ubl/03IPWgCaSBRJcqs31RdwDYYM5pU=; b=cXVLZA3xZuTD/aNFZJq+i7Tofths4LPS06/U2Sfx2QdU1iDcE/WZt82L8cYGwneOu6 W40T8odQRDrpbdcvmr++FeMc167AFwVN4gQYgh5TWAVWdin8J53MaTm9AlEc8ig2KvGr vuhF6ksEK9B6U1Tj7rIxRRhbGkb4j39kRqZTaq0LoXL50CvD1y+ygKzk/MkCNAuT4PBs X31qt+eOXO1IPjfFArpUwLYq3YLkIMOn1tQXArn+4kpZoABKkPP/Qz++OzwMLqKmdB+5 /QS49WaAEgPx1yJKu36OIf3NgjLEfrBY70a+YL1/TzkMJahaj0oEazRpERdIM/Js+xan siUg== X-Gm-Message-State: ABy/qLbNnSEL0/W+22FwDHlBjP2f29D2tcKnEqsGIp5jtTzZd2G++v8A 6V6RFo/DQaK/QidE96Uw1WzbxFNqaViJV7ui6MgcHnh/VGj6vqk= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APBJJlEDEv5WCsxqp+1PofLeBG+AreNkCxMqrnJ7Rnrvln/HFaGck+CrFkGsgNW/7uePdB4MxIoPdRxr05ECnoTTs24= X-Received: by 2002:a19:710f:0:b0:4fe:ef9:c8d0 with SMTP id m15-20020a19710f000000b004fe0ef9c8d0mr1640407lfc.35.1690464344708; Thu, 27 Jul 2023 06:25:44 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <7eae57c9-be42-ae07-9296-ae9e8e03c1b8@gmail.com> In-Reply-To: From: Tom Trevethan Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2023 14:25:33 +0100 Message-ID: To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000c5b71a060177e63a" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Fri, 28 Jul 2023 00:40:18 +0000 Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Fwd: Blinded 2-party Musig2 X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2023 13:25:49 -0000 --000000000000c5b71a060177e63a Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable @Jonas OK, thanks, I get the logic now. I believe this attack can be mitigated (at least in the case of using this scheme for statechains) by the receiver of a coin verifying the construction of all previous challenges. So in this case, the sender of a coin would record R2[K-1] in addition to m (and any c blinding nonce used) for the signature it generates with the server. It would then send this (and all previous R2 values i =3D 0, ..., K-2) to the receiver. The receiver would then query the server for the full set (i =3D 0, ..., K-= 1) of R1[i] values it has generated, and the corresponding (blinded) c[i] values used for each co-signing it has performed on this key. The receiver would then verify that each previous c[i] (i =3D 0, ... K-1) has been correctly formed and includes the server generated R1[i]. If any of the c values fail to verify against the values of R1 provided by the server, then the coin is invalid. On Thu, Jul 27, 2023 at 9:08=E2=80=AFAM Jonas Nick w= rote: > No, proof of knowledge of the r values used to generate each R does not > prevent > Wagner's attack. I wrote > > > Using Wagner's algorithm, choose R2[0], ..., R2[K-1] such that > > c[0] + ... + c[K-1] =3D c[K]. > > You can think of this as actually choosing scalars r2[0], ..., r2[K-1] an= d > define R2[i] =3D r2[i]*G. The attacker chooses r2[i]. The attack wouldn't > make > sense if he didn't. > --000000000000c5b71a060177e63a Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

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