From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.191] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1XkHOq-00015X-SZ for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 31 Oct 2014 18:58:16 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.217.177 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.217.177; envelope-from=melvincarvalho@gmail.com; helo=mail-lb0-f177.google.com; Received: from mail-lb0-f177.google.com ([209.85.217.177]) by sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1XkHOo-0003W3-1d for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 31 Oct 2014 18:58:16 +0000 Received: by mail-lb0-f177.google.com with SMTP id 10so6472631lbg.22 for ; Fri, 31 Oct 2014 11:58:07 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.112.219.3 with SMTP id pk3mr28552702lbc.18.1414781887220; Fri, 31 Oct 2014 11:58:07 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.112.1.234 with HTTP; Fri, 31 Oct 2014 11:58:07 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2014 19:58:07 +0100 Message-ID: From: Melvin Carvalho To: Adam Back Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c3d9fad2925a0506bc934d X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (melvincarvalho[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1XkHOo-0003W3-1d Cc: Bitcoin-Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] side-chains & 2-way pegging (Re: is there a way to do bitcoin-staging?) X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2014 18:58:17 -0000 --001a11c3d9fad2925a0506bc934d Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On 22 October 2014 23:54, Adam Back wrote: > For those following this thread, we have now written a paper > describing the side-chains, 2-way pegs and compact SPV proofs. > (With additional authors Andrew Poelstra & Andrew Miller). > > http://blockstream.com/sidechains.pdf > A very well written paper, thank you for putting it together and sharing. Given it's the 6 year birthday of satoshi's white paper, I just read through it again. I find it interesting that bitcoin is never defined in Satoshi's paper, indeed, it never appears after the first word. The term Electronic Coin is defined. The terminology of bitcoin / altcoin / altchain / blockchain in this paper still leaves me slightly uneasy, and I try to use the terms electronic coin and electronic cash, more often. If satoshi were to come back and continue his work, would it be an altcoin, would it be "The" blockchain, would it be bitcoin, or would what we know as bitcoin become an alt. I suspect these questions are nothing more than academic curiosity. But I think I'll get more used to it over time :) In any case, happy birthday "bitcoin" :) > > Adam > > On 16 March 2014 15:58, Adam Back wrote: > > So an update on 1-way pegging (aka bitcoin staging, explained in quoted > text > > at bottom): it turns out secure 2-way pegging is also possible (with some > > bitcoin change to help support it). The interesting thing is this allows > > interoperability in terms of being able to move bitcoin into and out of a > > side chain. The side chains may have some different parameters, or > > experimental things people might want to come up with (subject to some > > minimum compatibility at the level of being able to produce an SPV proof > of > > a given form). > > > > At the time of the 1-way peg discussion I considered 2-way peg as > desirable > > and it seemed plausible with bitcoin changes, but the motivation for > 1-way > > peg was to make it less risky to make changes on bitcoin, so that seemed > > like a catch-22 loop. Also in the 2-way peg thought experiment I had not > > realized how simple it was to still impose a security firewall in the > 2-way > > peg also. > > > > > > So Greg Maxwell proposed in Dec last year a practically compact way to do > > 2-way pegging using SPV proofs. And also provided a simple argument of > how > > this can provide a security firewall. (Security firewall means the > impact > > of security bugs on the side-chain is limited to the people with coins in > > it; bitcoin holders who did not use it are unaffected). [1] > > > > How it works: > > > > 1. to maintain the 21m coins promise, you start a side-chain with no > > in-chain mining subsidy, all bitcoin creation happens on bitcoin chain > (as > > with 1-way peg). Reach a reasonable hash rate. (Other semantics than > 1:1 > > peg should be possible, but this is the base case). > > > > 2. you move coins to the side-chain by spending them to a fancy script, > > which suspends them, and allows them to be reanimated by the production > of > > an SPV proof of burn on the side-chain. > > > > 3. the side-chain has no mining reward, but it allows you to mint coins > at > > no mining cost by providing an SPV proof that the coin has been > suspended as > > in 2 on bitcoin. The SPV proof must be buried significantly before being > > used to reduce risk of reorganization. The side-chain is an SPV client > to > > the bitcoin network, and so maintains a view of the bitcoin hash chain > (but > > not the block data). > > > > 4. the bitcoin chain is firewalled from security bugs on the side chain, > > because bitcoin imposes the rule that no more coins can be reanimated > than > > are currently suspend (with respect to a given chain). > > > > 5. to simplify what they hypothetical bitcoin change would need to > consider > > and understand, after a coin is reanimated there is a maturity period > > imposed (say same as fresh mined coins). During the maturity period the > > reanimation script allows a fraud proof to spend the coins back. A fraud > > bounty fee (equal to the reanimate fee) can be offered by the mover to > > incentivize side-chain full nodes to watch reanimations and search for > fraud > > proofs. > > > > 6. a fraud proof is an SPV proof with a longer chain showing that the > proof > > of burn was orphaned. > > > > There are a few options to compress the SPV proof, via Fiat-Shamir > transform > > to provide a compact proof of amount work contained in a merkle tree of > > proofs of work (as proposed by Fabien Coelho link on > > http://hashcash.org/papers/) with params like 90% of work is proven. > But > > better is something Greg proposed based on skip-lists organized in a > tree, > > where 'lucky' proofs of work are used to skip back further. (Recalling > that > > if you search for a 64-bit leading-0 proof-of-work, half the time you > get a > > 65-bit, quarter 66-bit etc.) With this mechanism you can accurately > > prove the amount of proof of work in a compressed tree (rather than > ~90%). > > > > > > Apart from pegging from bitcoin to a side-chain, if a private chain is > made > > with same rules to the side-chain it becomes possible with some > > modifications to the above algorithm to peg the side-chain to a private > > chain. Private chain meaning a chain with the same format but signature > of > > single server in place of hashing, and timestamping of the block > signatures > > in the mined side chain. And then reactive security on top of that by > full > > nodes/auditors trying to find fraud proofs (rewrites of history relative > to > > side-chain mined time-stamp or approved double-spends). The reaction is > to > > publish a fraud proof and move coins back to the side chain, and then > > regroup on a new server. (Open transactions has this audit + reactive > model > > but as far as I know does it via escrow, eg the voting pools for k of n > > escrow of the assets on the private server.) I also proposed the same > > reactive audit model but for auditable namespaces [4]. > > > > Private chains add some possiblity for higher scaling, while retaining > > bitcoin security properties. (You need to add the ability for a user to > > unilaterally move his coins to the side-chain they came from in event the > > chain server refuses to process transactions involving them. This > appears > > to be possible if you have compatible formats on the private chain and > > side-chain). > > > > > > This pegging discussion involved a number of #bitcoin-wizards, Greg > Maxwell, > > Matt Corallo, Pieter Wuille, Jorge Timon, Mark Freidenbach, Luke Dashjr. > The > > 2-way peg seems to have first been described by Greg. Greg thought of > > 2-way pegging in the context of ZK-SNARKS and the coinwitness thread [2]. > > (As a ZK-SNARK could compactly prove full validation of a side chain > rules). > > > > There was also something seemingly similar sounding but not described in > > detail by Alex Mizrahi in the context of color coins in this post [3]. > > > > Adam > > > > [1] http://download.wpsoftware.net/bitcoin/wizards/2013-12-18.txt > > [2] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=277389.40 > > [3] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=277389.msg4167554#msg4167554 > > [4] http://www.cypherspace.org/p2p/auditable-namespace.html > > > > On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 08:08:07PM +0200, Adam Back wrote: > >> > >> Coming back to the staging idea, maybe this is a realistic model that > >> could > >> work. The objective being to provide a way for bitcoin to move to a > live > >> beta and stable being worked on in parallel like fedora vs RHEL or > >> odd/even > >> linux kernel versions. > >> > >> Development runs in parallel on bitcoin 1.x beta (betacoin) and bitcoin > >> 0.x > >> stable and leap-frogs as beta becomes stable after testing. > >> > >> Its a live beta, meaning real value, real contracts. But we dont want > it > >> to > >> be an alt-coin with a floating value exactly, we want it to be bitcoin, > >> but > >> the bleeding edge bitcoin so we want to respect the 21 million coin > limit, > >> and allow coins to move between bitcoin and betacoin with some necessary > >> security related restrictions. > >> > >> There is no mining reward on the betacoin network (can be merge mined > for > >> security), and the way you opt to move a bitcoin into the betacoin > network > >> is to mark it as transferred in some UTXO recognized way. It cant be > >> reanimated, its dead. (eg spend to a specific recognized invalid > address > >> on > >> the bitcoin network). In this way its not really a destruction, but a > >> move, > >> moving the coin from bitcoin to betacoin network. > >> > >> This respects the 21 million coin cap, and avoids betacoin bugs flowing > >> back > >> and affecting bitcoin security or value-store properties. Users may buy > >> or > >> swap betacoin for bitcoin to facilitate moving money back from betacoin > to > >> bitcoin. However that is market priced so the bitcoin network is > security > >> insulated from beta. A significant security bug in beta would cause a > >> market freeze, until it is rectified. > >> > >> The cost of a betacoin is capped at one BTC because no one will pay more > >> than one bitcoin for a betacoin because they could alternatively move > >> their > >> own coin. The reverse is market priced. > >> > >> Once bitcoin beta stabalizes, eg say year or two type of time-frame, a > >> decision is reached to promote 1.0 beta to 2.0 stable, the remaining > >> bitcoins can be moved, and the old network switched off, with mining > past > >> a > >> flag day moving to the betacoin. > >> > >> During the beta period betacoin is NOT an alpha, people can rely on it > and > >> use it in anger for real value transactions. eg if it enables more > script > >> features, or coin coloring, scalabity tweaks etc people can use it. > >> Probably for large value store they are always going to prefer > >> bitcoin-stable, but applications that need the coloring features, or > >> advanced scripting etc can go ahead and beta. > >> > >> Bitcoin-stable may pull validated changes and merge them, as a way to > pull > >> in any features needed in the shorter term and benefit from the betacoin > >> validation. (Testing isnt as much validation as real-money at stake > >> survivability). > >> > >> The arguments are I think that: > >> > >> - it allows faster development allowing bitcoin to progress features > >> faster, > >> > >> - it avoids mindshare dilution if alternatively an alt-coin with a hit > >> missing feature takes off; > >> > >> - it concentrates such useful-feature alt activities into one OPEN > source > >> and OPEN control foundation mediated area (rather than suspected land > >> grabs on colored fees or such like bitcoin respun as a business model > >> things), > >> > >> - maybe gets the developers that would've been working on their pet > >> alt-coin, or their startup alt-coin to work together putting more > >> developers, testers and resources onto something with open control > (open > >> source does not necessarily mean that much) and bitcoin mindshare > >> branding, its STILL bitcoin, its just the beta network. > >> > >> - it respects the 21 million limit, starting new mining races probably > >> dillutes the artificial scarcity semantic > >> > >> - while insulating bitcoin from betacoin security defects (I dont mean > >> betacoin as a testnet, it should have prudent rigorous testing like > >> bitcoin, just the very act of adding a feature creates risk that > bitcoin > >> stable can be hesitant to take). > >> > >> Probably the main issue as always is more (trustable) very high caliber > >> testers and developers. Maybe if the alt-coin minded startups and > >> developers donate their time to bitcoin-beta (or bitcoin-stable) for the > >> bits they are missing, we'll get more hands to work on something of > >> reusable > >> value to humanity, in parallel with their startup's objectives and as a > >> way > >> for them to get their needed features, while giving back to the bitcoin > >> community, and helping bitcoin progress faster. > >> > >> Maybe bitcoin foundation could ask for BTC donations to hire more > >> developers > >> and testers full time. $1.5b of stored value should be interested to > safe > >> guard their value store, and develop the transaction features. > >> > >> Adam > >> > >> On Mon, May 20, 2013 at 02:34:06AM -0400, Alan Reiner wrote: > >>> > >>> This is exactly what I was planning to do with the > >>> inappropriately-named "Ultimate Blockchain Compression". [...] > >>> > >>> For it to really work, it's gotta be part of the mainnet validation > >>> rules, but no way it can be evaluated realistically without some kind > of > >>> "staging". > >> > >> > >>> On 5/19/2013 11:08 AM, Peter Vessenes wrote: > >>> > >>> I think this is a very interesting idea. As Bitcoiners, we often stuff > >>> things into the 'alt chain' bucket in our heads; I wonder if this idea > >>> works better as a curing period, essentially an extended version of > the > >>> current 100 block wait for mined coins. > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > --001a11c3d9fad2925a0506bc934d Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


On 22 October 2014 23:54, Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org> wrote:
For those following this thr= ead, we have now written a paper
describing the side-chains, 2-way pegs and compact SPV proofs.
(With additional authors Andrew Poelstra & Andrew Miller).

http://= blockstream.com/sidechains.pdf

A ve= ry well written paper, thank you for putting it together and sharing.

Given it's the 6 year birthday of satoshi's= white paper, I just read through it again.

I find it int= eresting that bitcoin is never defined in Satoshi's paper, indeed, it n= ever appears after the first word.

The term Electronic Co= in is defined.

The terminology of bitcoin / altcoin / al= tchain / blockchain in this paper still leaves me slightly uneasy, and I tr= y to use the terms electronic coin and electronic cash, more often.=C2=A0 <= br>
If satoshi were to come back and continue his work, would= it be an altcoin, would it be "The" blockchain, would it be bitc= oin, or would what we know as bitcoin become an alt.=C2=A0 I suspect these = questions are nothing more than academic curiosity.

But I= think I'll get more used to it over time :)

In any c= ase, happy birthday "bitcoin" :)
=C2=A0

Adam

On 16 March 2014 15:58, Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org> wrote:
> So an update on 1-way pegging (aka bitcoin staging, explained in quote= d text
> at bottom): it turns out secure 2-way pegging is also possible (with s= ome
> bitcoin change to help support it).=C2=A0 The interesting thing is thi= s allows
> interoperability in terms of being able to move bitcoin into and out o= f a
> side chain.=C2=A0 The side chains may have some different parameters, = or
> experimental things people might want to come up with (subject to some=
> minimum compatibility at the level of being able to produce an SPV pro= of of
> a given form).
>
> At the time of the 1-way peg discussion I considered 2-way peg as desi= rable
> and it seemed plausible with bitcoin changes, but the motivation for 1= -way
> peg was to make it less risky to make changes on bitcoin, so that seem= ed
> like a catch-22 loop.=C2=A0 Also in the 2-way peg thought experiment I= had not
> realized how simple it was to still impose a security firewall in the = 2-way
> peg also.
>
>
> So Greg Maxwell proposed in Dec last year a practically compact way to= do
> 2-way pegging using SPV proofs.=C2=A0 And also provided a simple argum= ent of how
> this can provide a security firewall.=C2=A0 (Security firewall means t= he impact
> of security bugs on the side-chain is limited to the people with coins= in
> it; bitcoin holders who did not use it are unaffected). [1]
>
> How it works:
>
> 1. to maintain the 21m coins promise, you start a side-chain with no > in-chain mining subsidy, all bitcoin creation happens on bitcoin chain= (as
> with 1-way peg).=C2=A0 Reach a reasonable hash rate.=C2=A0 (Other sema= ntics than 1:1
> peg should be possible, but this is the base case).
>
> 2. you move coins to the side-chain by spending them to a fancy script= ,
> which suspends them, and allows them to be reanimated by the productio= n of
> an SPV proof of burn on the side-chain.
>
> 3. the side-chain has no mining reward, but it allows you to mint coin= s at
> no mining cost by providing an SPV proof that the coin has been suspen= ded as
> in 2 on bitcoin.=C2=A0 The SPV proof must be buried significantly befo= re being
> used to reduce risk of reorganization.=C2=A0 The side-chain is an SPV = client to
> the bitcoin network, and so maintains a view of the bitcoin hash chain= (but
> not the block data).
>
> 4. the bitcoin chain is firewalled from security bugs on the side chai= n,
> because bitcoin imposes the rule that no more coins can be reanimated = than
> are currently suspend (with respect to a given chain).
>
> 5. to simplify what they hypothetical bitcoin change would need to con= sider
> and understand, after a coin is reanimated there is a maturity period<= br> > imposed (say same as fresh mined coins).=C2=A0 During the maturity per= iod the
> reanimation script allows a fraud proof to spend the coins back.=C2=A0= A fraud
> bounty fee (equal to the reanimate fee) can be offered by the mover to=
> incentivize side-chain full nodes to watch reanimations and search for= fraud
> proofs.
>
> 6. a fraud proof is an SPV proof with a longer chain showing that the = proof
> of burn was orphaned.
>
> There are a few options to compress the SPV proof, via Fiat-Shamir tra= nsform
> to provide a compact proof of amount work contained in a merkle tree o= f
> proofs of work (as proposed by Fabien Coelho link on
> http://hashc= ash.org/papers/) with params like 90% of work is proven.=C2=A0 But
> better is something Greg proposed based on skip-lists organized in a t= ree,
> where 'lucky' proofs of work are used to skip back further.=C2= =A0 (Recalling that
> if you search for a 64-bit leading-0 proof-of-work, half the time you = get a
> 65-bit, quarter 66-bit etc.)=C2=A0 With this mechanism you can accurat= ely
> prove the amount of proof of work in a compressed tree (rather than ~9= 0%).
>
>
> Apart from pegging from bitcoin to a side-chain, if a private chain is= made
> with same rules to the side-chain it becomes possible with some
> modifications to the above algorithm to peg the side-chain to a privat= e
> chain.=C2=A0 Private chain meaning a chain with the same format but si= gnature of
> single server in place of hashing, and timestamping of the block signa= tures
> in the mined side chain.=C2=A0 And then reactive security on top of th= at by full
> nodes/auditors trying to find fraud proofs (rewrites of history relati= ve to
> side-chain mined time-stamp or approved double-spends).=C2=A0 The reac= tion is to
> publish a fraud proof and move coins back to the side chain, and then<= br> > regroup on a new server.=C2=A0 (Open transactions has this audit + rea= ctive model
> but as far as I know does it via escrow, eg the voting pools for k of = n
> escrow of the assets on the private server.) I also proposed the same<= br> > reactive audit model but for auditable namespaces [4].
>
> Private chains add some possiblity for higher scaling, while retaining=
> bitcoin security properties.=C2=A0 (You need to add the ability for a = user to
> unilaterally move his coins to the side-chain they came from in event = the
> chain server refuses to process transactions involving them.=C2=A0 Thi= s appears
> to be possible if you have compatible formats on the private chain and=
> side-chain).
>
>
> This pegging discussion involved a number of #bitcoin-wizards, Greg Ma= xwell,
> Matt Corallo, Pieter Wuille, Jorge Timon, Mark Freidenbach, Luke Dashj= r. The
> 2-way peg seems to have first been described by Greg.=C2=A0 Greg thoug= ht of
> 2-way pegging in the context of ZK-SNARKS and the coinwitness thread [= 2].
> (As a ZK-SNARK could compactly prove full validation of a side chain r= ules).
>
> There was also something seemingly similar sounding but not described = in
> detail by Alex Mizrahi in the context of color coins in this post [3].=
>
> Adam
>
> [1] http://download.wpsoftware.net/bitcoin/wizards/20= 13-12-18.txt
> [2] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=3D277389.40
> [3] https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic= =3D277389.msg4167554#msg4167554
> [4] http://www.cypherspace.org/p2p/auditable-namespace.html=
>
> On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 08:08:07PM +0200, Adam Back wrote:
>>
>> Coming back to the staging idea, maybe this is a realistic model t= hat
>> could
>> work.=C2=A0 The objective being to provide a way for bitcoin to mo= ve to a live
>> beta and stable being worked on in parallel like fedora vs RHEL or=
>> odd/even
>> linux kernel versions.
>>
>> Development runs in parallel on bitcoin 1.x beta (betacoin) and bi= tcoin
>> 0.x
>> stable and leap-frogs as beta becomes stable after testing.
>>
>> Its a live beta, meaning real value, real contracts.=C2=A0 But we = dont want it
>> to
>> be an alt-coin with a floating value exactly, we want it to be bit= coin,
>> but
>> the bleeding edge bitcoin so we want to respect the 21 million coi= n limit,
>> and allow coins to move between bitcoin and betacoin with some nec= essary
>> security related restrictions.
>>
>> There is no mining reward on the betacoin network (can be merge mi= ned for
>> security), and the way you opt to move a bitcoin into the betacoin= network
>> is to mark it as transferred in some UTXO recognized way.=C2=A0 It= cant be
>> reanimated, its dead.=C2=A0 (eg spend to a specific recognized inv= alid address
>> on
>> the bitcoin network).=C2=A0 In this way its not really a destructi= on, but a
>> move,
>> moving the coin from bitcoin to betacoin network.
>>
>> This respects the 21 million coin cap, and avoids betacoin bugs fl= owing
>> back
>> and affecting bitcoin security or value-store properties.=C2=A0 Us= ers may buy
>> or
>> swap betacoin for bitcoin to facilitate moving money back from bet= acoin to
>> bitcoin.=C2=A0 However that is market priced so the bitcoin networ= k is security
>> insulated from beta.=C2=A0 A significant security bug in beta woul= d cause a
>> market freeze, until it is rectified.
>>
>> The cost of a betacoin is capped at one BTC because no one will pa= y more
>> than one bitcoin for a betacoin because they could alternatively m= ove
>> their
>> own coin.=C2=A0 The reverse is market priced.
>>
>> Once bitcoin beta stabalizes, eg say year or two type of time-fram= e, a
>> decision is reached to promote 1.0 beta to 2.0 stable, the remaini= ng
>> bitcoins can be moved, and the old network switched off, with mini= ng past
>> a
>> flag day moving to the betacoin.
>>
>> During the beta period betacoin is NOT an alpha, people can rely o= n it and
>> use it in anger for real value transactions.=C2=A0 eg if it enable= s more script
>> features, or coin coloring, scalabity tweaks etc people can use it= .
>> Probably for large value store they are always going to prefer
>> bitcoin-stable, but applications that need the coloring features, = or
>> advanced scripting etc can go ahead and beta.
>>
>> Bitcoin-stable may pull validated changes and merge them, as a way= to pull
>> in any features needed in the shorter term and benefit from the be= tacoin
>> validation.=C2=A0 (Testing isnt as much validation as real-money a= t stake
>> survivability).
>>
>> The arguments are I think that:
>>
>> - it allows faster development allowing bitcoin to progress featur= es
>> faster,
>>
>> - it avoids mindshare dilution if alternatively an alt-coin with a= hit
>>=C2=A0 missing feature takes off;
>>
>> - it concentrates such useful-feature alt activities into one OPEN= source
>>=C2=A0 and OPEN control foundation mediated area (rather than suspe= cted land
>>=C2=A0 grabs on colored fees or such like bitcoin respun as a busin= ess model
>>=C2=A0 things),
>>
>> - maybe gets the developers that would've been working on thei= r pet
>>=C2=A0 alt-coin, or their startup alt-coin to work together putting= more
>>=C2=A0 developers, testers and resources onto something with open c= ontrol (open
>>=C2=A0 source does not necessarily mean that much) and bitcoin mind= share
>>=C2=A0 branding, its STILL bitcoin, its just the beta network.
>>
>> - it respects the 21 million limit, starting new mining races prob= ably
>>=C2=A0 dillutes the artificial scarcity semantic
>>
>> - while insulating bitcoin from betacoin security defects (I dont = mean
>>=C2=A0 betacoin as a testnet, it should have prudent rigorous testi= ng like
>>=C2=A0 bitcoin, just the very act of adding a feature creates risk = that bitcoin
>>=C2=A0 stable can be hesitant to take).
>>
>> Probably the main issue as always is more (trustable) very high ca= liber
>> testers and developers.=C2=A0 Maybe if the alt-coin minded startup= s and
>> developers donate their time to bitcoin-beta (or bitcoin-stable) f= or the
>> bits they are missing, we'll get more hands to work on somethi= ng of
>> reusable
>> value to humanity, in parallel with their startup's objectives= and as a
>> way
>> for them to get their needed features, while giving back to the bi= tcoin
>> community, and helping bitcoin progress faster.
>>
>> Maybe bitcoin foundation could ask for BTC donations to hire more<= br> >> developers
>> and testers full time.=C2=A0 $1.5b of stored value should be inter= ested to safe
>> guard their value store, and develop the transaction features.
>>
>> Adam
>>
>> On Mon, May 20, 2013 at 02:34:06AM -0400, Alan Reiner wrote:
>>>
>>>=C2=A0 This is exactly what I was planning to do with the
>>>=C2=A0 inappropriately-named "Ultimate Blockchain Compress= ion".=C2=A0 [...]
>>>
>>>=C2=A0 For it to really work, it's gotta be part of the mai= nnet validation
>>>=C2=A0 rules, but no way it can be evaluated realistically with= out some kind of
>>>=C2=A0 "staging".
>>
>>
>>>=C2=A0 On 5/19/2013 11:08 AM, Peter Vessenes wrote:
>>>
>>>=C2=A0 I think this is a very interesting idea. As Bitcoiners, = we often stuff
>>>=C2=A0 things into the 'alt chain' bucket in our heads;= I wonder if this idea
>>>=C2=A0 works better as a curing period, essentially an extended= version of the
>>>=C2=A0 current 100 block wait for mined coins.

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