Re: [bitcoin-dev] Timelocks and Lightning on MimbleWimble

[Martin Schwarz <martin.schwarz@gmail.com>]

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Isn't there some way to "rebase" a relative lock-time to some anchor even
further in the past while cancelling out the intermediate transactions?

best regards,
Martin

On Thu, Sep 19, 2019 at 9:52 AM ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Good morning list,
>
> I was reading transcript of recent talk:
> https://diyhpl.us/wiki/transcripts/scalingbitcoin/tel-aviv-2019/edgedevplusplus/blockchain-design-patterns/
>
> And in section "Taproot: main idea":
>
> > Q: Can you do timelocks iwth adaptor signatures?
> >
> > ...
> >
> > A: This is one way it's being proposed by mimblewimble; but this
> requires the ability to aggregate signatures across transactions.
> >
> > Q: No, there's two transactions already existing. Before locktime, you
> can spend wit hthe adaptor signature one like atomic swaps. After locktime,
> the other one becomes valid and you can spend with that. They just double
> spend each other.
> >
> > A: You'd have to diagram that out for me. There's a few ways to do this,
> some that I know, but yours isn't one of them.
>
> I believe what is being referred to here is to simply have an `nLockTime`
> transaction that is signed by all participants first, and serves as the
> "timelock" path.
> Then, another transaction is created, for which adaptor signatures are
> given, before completing the ritual to create a "hashlock" path.
>
> I find it surprising that this is not well-known.
> I describe it here tangentially, for instance:
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-April/016888.html
> The section "Payjoin2swap Swap Protocol" refers to "pre-swap transaction"
> and "pre-swap backout transaction", which are `nLockTime`d transactions.
> Later transactions then use a Scriptless Script-like construction to
> transfer information about a secret scalar x.
>
> My understanding of MimbleWimble is that:
>
> * There must exist a proof-of-knowledge of the sum of blinding factors
> used.
>   This can be trivially had by using a signature of this sum, signing an
> empty message or "kernel".
> * I believe I have seen at least one proposal (I cannot find it again now)
> where the "kernel" is replaced with an `nLockTime`-equivalent.
>   Basically, the `nLockTime` would have to be explicitly published, and it
> would be rejected for a block if the `nLockTime` was less than the block
> height.
>   * There may or may not exist some kind of proof where the message being
> signed is an integer that is known to be no greater than a particular
> value, and multiple signatures that signed a lower value can somehow be
> aggregated to a higher value, which serves this purpose as well, but is
> compressible.
>
> My understanding is thus that the above `nLockTime` technique is what is
> indeed intended for MimbleWimble cross-system atomic swaps.
>
> --------
>
> However, I believe that Lightning and similar offchain protocols are **not
> possible** on MimbleWimble, at least if we want to retain its "magical
> shrinking blockchain" property.
>
> All practical channel constructions with indefinite lifetime require the
> use of *relative* locktime.
> Of note is that `nLockTime` represents an *absolute* lifetime.
>
> The only practical channel constructions I know of that do not require
> *relative* locktime (mostly various variants of Spilman channels) have a
> fixed lifetime, i.e. the channel will have to be closed before the lifetime
> arrives.
> This is impractical for a scaling network.
>
> It seems to me that some kind of "timeout" is always necessary, similar to
> the timeout used in SPV-proof sidechains, in order to allow an existing
> claimed-latest-state to be proven as not-actually-latest.
>
> * In Poon-Dryja, knowledge of the revocation key by the other side proves
> the published claimed-latest-state is not-actually-latest and awards the
> entire amount to the other party.
>   * This key can only be presented during the timeout, a security
> parameter.
> * In Decker-Wattenhofer decrementing-`nSequence` channels, a kickoff
> starts this timeout, and only the smallest-timeout state gets onchain, due
> to it having a time advantage over all other versions.
> * In indefinite-lifetime Spilman channels (also described in the
> Decker-Wattenhofer paper), the absolute-timelock initial backoff
> transaction is replaced with a kickoff + relative-locktime transaction.
> * In Decker-Russell-Osuntokun, each update transaction has an imposed
> `nSequence` that forces a state transaction to be delayed compared to the
> update transaction it is paired with.
>
> It seems that all practical offchain updateable cryptocurrency systems,
> some kind of "timeout" is needed during which participants have an
> opportunity to claim an alternative version of some previous claim of
> correct state.
>
> This timeout could be implemented as either relative or absolute lock
> time, but obviously an absolute locktime would create a limit on the
> lifetime of the channel.
> Thus, if we were to target an indefinite-lifetime channel, we must use
> relative lock times, with the timeout starting only when the unilateral
> close is initiated by one participant.
>
> Now, let us turn back to the MimbleWimble.
> As it happens, we do *not* actually need SCRIPT to implement these
> offchain updateable cryptocurrency systems.
> 2-of-2 is often enough (and with Schnorr and other homomorphic signatures,
> this is possible without explicit script, only pubkeys and signatures,
> which MimbleWimble supports).
>
> * Poon-Dryja revocation can be rewritten as an HTLC-like construct (indeed
> this was the original formulation).
>   * Since we have shown that, by use of two transaction alternatives, one
> timelocked and the other hashlocked, we can implement an HTLC-like
> construct on MimbleWimble, that is enough.
> * Relative locktimes in Decker-Wattenhofer are imposed by simple
> `nSequence`, not by `OP_CSV`.
>   HTLCs hosted inside such constructions can again use the
> two-transactions construct in MimbleWimble.
> * Ditto with indefinite-lifetime Spilman.
> * Ditto with Decker-Russell-Osuntokun.
>   * The paper shows the use of `OP_CSV`, but aj notes it is redundant, and
> I agree:
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2019-March/001933.html
>
> Thus, it is not the "nonexistence of SCRIPT" that prevents Lightning from
> being deployed on MimbleWimble.
>
> Instead, it is the "nonexistence of **relative** locktime" that prevents
> Lightning over MimbleWimble.
>
> Why would **relative** locktimes not possibly exist?
> In order to **validate** a relative locktime, we need to know the
> blockheight that the output we are spending was confirmed in.
>
> But the entire point of the "magical shrinking blockchain" is that
> already-spent outputs can be removed completely and all that needs to be
> validated by a new node is:
>
> * The coin-creation events.
> * The current UTXO set (plus attached rangeproofs).
> * The blinding keys.
> * Signatures of the blinding keys, and the kernels they sign (if we use
> the "kernels encode `nLockTime`" technique in some way, they should not
> exceed the current supposed blockheight).
>
> The problem is that an output that exists in the UTXO set might be
> invalid, if it appears "too near" to an `nSequence` minimum spend of a
> previous output that was spent in its creation.
> That is, the above does not allow validation of **relative** locktimes,
> only **absolute locktimes**.
> (At least as far as I understand: there may be special cryptographic
> constructs that allow signatures to reliably commit to some relative
> locktime).
>
> This means that relative locktimes need to be implemented by showing the
> transactions that spend previous UTXOS and create the current UTXOs, and so
> no backwards to coin-creation events.
> This forces us back to the old "validate all transactions" model of
> starting a new node (and seriously damaging the entire point of using
> MimbleWimble anyway).
>
> I do not believe it is the lack of SCRIPT that prevents
> Lightning-over-MimbleWimble, but rather the lack of relative locktime,
> which seems difficult to validate without knowing the individual
> transactions and when they were confirmed.
>
> Regards,
> ZmnSCPxj
>
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