From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 056662C for ; Fri, 25 Nov 2016 01:39:47 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-qt0-f182.google.com (mail-qt0-f182.google.com [209.85.216.182]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 747D814B for ; Fri, 25 Nov 2016 01:39:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-qt0-f182.google.com with SMTP id w33so53603284qtc.3 for ; Thu, 24 Nov 2016 17:39:46 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=TW16ZzIba7xOJiUTd0FeRZ3q3tUOSytpb+s/Dz2H4sU=; b=oHd68xUQYygVZ2404igsHYnav9aAoFiWB4rk/emUf2RQw5JJFlnlYde+L89xxz8g4M aKVFVWG6WRZDK38B4oaF7UjFXNB8y4wdOts/D2JhaPL94T15Hwoh8eIK+D7D0E6aNCXf VqSI1THkoM/AMRhekun05DlBZDwmYP45e9NZeAi2IMPWLkgAlUVwJ+lOlDkMQmHOqVnd AGc5DZnf72sG1QrWs+UQr2gbahK4KG993Sl1iLrfJFQUjarAaIvGHTleRppl82vZCzOo AnNv5YgVsMrS84FwHI6pnqzYTX4tnSBOM7C6vyABEfuibs4gpWJcEomxtLpPYkM1hlCd qlCw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to; bh=TW16ZzIba7xOJiUTd0FeRZ3q3tUOSytpb+s/Dz2H4sU=; b=VKM3CGXZz+PQtqI6baHrEECMECUw3HGJm4deUo11wanpC1+YrMb1H2neiStyRtZtT5 oInC98a0ZyDfAtaZ1y5FTuGgxWqDJfleW5TIBNkNY541KZlLaEpXUWMe+RcDvYiQxegM sTuE8IKGlEYcJQZua8tDkW/569NGRV9UD1ZHlj5VlOACREMwhn/vHKK4FSNU8Q0j8kmg cUOA2WpANcRClAMWRR7uMjYiS//SN2nfJDxiHHsvtCJkMEBpHuIY/MK9D+s3UvTbF9/p fFoPHqYk/EQQkudu8hueVb34qcCOnbmirADCZWl1ObQAXt16nwUx7T/3YdZ67w06kRtm +uNA== X-Gm-Message-State: AKaTC004einVo3bjwm5pxqHst4vKYNXBNWDyvl/XOlcpUVHgR2NcToKdZzI21ys+Dxas2B6Z2Sx2Bg4LI1FKIw== X-Received: by 10.200.42.170 with SMTP id b39mr4914210qta.55.1480037985625; Thu, 24 Nov 2016 17:39:45 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.237.35.13 with HTTP; Thu, 24 Nov 2016 17:39:05 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: From: Sergio Demian Lerner Date: Thu, 24 Nov 2016 22:39:05 -0300 Message-ID: To: Peter R , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a1137d72e632a910542163294 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.2 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW, RCVD_IN_SORBS_SPAM autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Fri, 25 Nov 2016 11:53:09 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] The Excessive-Block Gate: How a Bitcoin Unlimited Node Deals With Large Blocks X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 25 Nov 2016 01:39:47 -0000 --001a1137d72e632a910542163294 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi Peter, How would a person or exchange decide to accept a payment in BU if it does not know the gate policy of 51% of the miners? Suppose that the exchange receives B1,S2,S3,S4 (a big block at height 1, and 3 small blocks at height 2, 3 and 4), and an alternate chain A1,A2,A3 (three small blocks). The first is the longest, but the second may be the one 51% of the miners will extend. Without knowing the policy of at least 51% of the miners (the maximum acceptance depth) it's unclear if the exchange has to obey the longest chain or the chain with higher probability of being extended. If the maximum acceptance depth of the majority of miners is higher than 6 blocks, accepting a transaction with 6 confirmations is risky. So BU would set a lower bound on the number of confirmations equal to the maximum acceptance depth of the majority of miners.But miners do not publish their acceptance depth, so basically users are clue-less. I think miners should at least advertise their gate block size and acceptance depth in their coinbase field. Is there a game-theoretic analysis of confirmation blocks and their probabilities in BU ? Without a detailed analysis, unlimited block size seems a risky change to Bitcoin, to me. Regards, Sergio. On Tue, Nov 22, 2016 at 1:31 PM, Peter R via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Dear all, > > Bitcoin Unlimited=E2=80=99s market-based solution to the block-size limit= is > slowly winning support from node operators and miners. With this increas= ed > attention, many people are asking for a better explanation of how Bitcoin > Unlimited actually works. The article linked below describes how Bitcoin > Unlimited=E2=80=99s excessive-block logic works from the perspective of a= single > node. (I=E2=80=99m hoping to do a follow-up article that describe how thi= s > =E2=80=9Cnode-scale=E2=80=9D behavior facilitates the emergence of a flui= d and organic > block size limit at the network scale.) > > https://medium.com/@peter_r/the-excessive-block-gate-how- > a-bitcoin-unlimited-node-deals-with-large-blocks-22a4a5c322d4 > > Best regards, > Peter R > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --001a1137d72e632a910542163294 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi Peter,

How would a person or exch= ange decide to accept a payment in BU if it does not know the gate policy o= f 51% of the miners?

Suppose that the exchange receives B1,S2,= S3,S4 (a big block at height 1, and 3 small blocks at height 2, 3 and 4), a= nd an alternate chain A1,A2,A3=C2=A0 (three small blocks). The first is the= longest, but the second may be the one 51% of the miners will extend.
<= br>Without knowing=C2=A0 the policy of at least 51% of the miners (the maxi= mum acceptance depth) it's unclear if the exchange has to obey the long= est chain or the chain with higher probability of being extended.
If th= e maximum acceptance depth of the majority of miners is higher than 6 block= s, accepting a transaction with 6 confirmations is risky.
So BU wo= uld set a lower bound on the number of confirmations equal to the maximum a= cceptance depth of the majority of miners.But miners do not publish their a= cceptance depth, so basically users are clue-less. I think miners should at= least advertise their gate block size and acceptance depth in their coinba= se field.

Is there a game-theoretic analysis o= f confirmation blocks and their probabilities in BU ?
Without= a detailed analysis, unlimited block size seems a risky change to Bitcoin,= to me.

Regards, Sergio.


=

On Tue, Nov 22, 2016 at 1:31 PM, Peter R via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
De= ar all,

Bitcoin Unlimited=E2=80=99s market-based s= olution to the block-size limit is slowly winning support from node operato= rs and miners.=C2=A0 With this increased attention, many people are asking = for a better explanation of how Bitcoin Unlimited actually works.=C2=A0 The= article linked below describes how Bitcoin Unlimited=E2=80=99s excessive-b= lock logic works from the perspective of a single node. (I=E2=80=99m hoping= to do a follow-up article that describe how this =E2=80=9Cnode-scale=E2=80= =9D behavior facilitates the emergence of a fluid and organic block size li= mit at the network scale.)

https://medium.com/@peter_r/<= wbr>the-excessive-block-gate-how-a-bitcoin-unlimited-node-deals-w= ith-large-blocks-22a4a5c322d4

Best regards,
Peter R

________________________________________= _______
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org= /mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


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