From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C941BF08 for ; Wed, 28 Feb 2018 03:57:26 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: delayed 00:09:31 by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mo.garage.hdemail.jp (mo.garage.hdemail.jp [46.51.242.127]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 00F78CF for ; Wed, 28 Feb 2018 03:57:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: from ip-10-217-1-36.ap-northeast-1.compute.internal (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by mo.garage.hdemail.jp (hde-mf-postfix) with SMTP id 9E57114C0B9 for ; Wed, 28 Feb 2018 12:47:52 +0900 (JST) (envelope-from karljohan-alm@garage.co.jp) X-Received: from unknown (HELO mo.garage.hdemail.jp) (127.0.0.1) by 0 with SMTP; 28 Feb 2018 12:47:52 +0900 X-Received: from mo.garage.hdemail.jp (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by mo.garage.hdemail.jp (hde-ma-postfix) with ESMTP id 950114C072 for ; Wed, 28 Feb 2018 12:47:52 +0900 (JST) (envelope-from karljohan-alm@garage.co.jp) Received: from gw21.oz.hdemail.jp (ip-10-172-131-196.ap-northeast-1.compute.internal [10.172.131.196]) by mo.garage.hdemail.jp (hde-mf-postfix) with ESMTP id 88BCC14C0B9 for ; Wed, 28 Feb 2018 12:47:52 +0900 (JST) (envelope-from karljohan-alm@garage.co.jp) X-Received: from mail-qt0-f197.google.com (lb05.oz.hdemail.jp [54.238.57.175]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES128-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by gw21.oz.hdemail.jp (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2BF94148C113 for ; Wed, 28 Feb 2018 12:47:52 +0900 (JST) X-Received: by mail-qt0-f197.google.com with SMTP id 61so967108qta.17 for ; Tue, 27 Feb 2018 19:47:52 -0800 (PST) X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=2h9lHKLj20L2c8VkLi8m7dHqyVXiglVQv44O3fbTeLg=; b=FS0GgJkQ1NZ1Lt5LEX76W7ZO670s6VA8budUGF4Iv6sgAmZ86N2v8jSaOudHET0bfQ jwsz4rl/ePTvtUI6x4bFsiSlA544H3WsO+aYPg3rFwW7E3EgQdAXzW6i7UboOF/ogR5T KibkVIJIpUsRiArCS4pqVz2d2jToyKmASfxn8q1qT4bT81Yw9w6iI+xgpM7Ol1JptOv/ Sw/FWiGlsHOC7AewJ0v+31hoV62DYKYcFsc18hjrJBCCj5PyOQXwy5Dgtmsc60rvNoRu YgkcYVs646lD+Ca8Vn85TLOXeVQmcDHeef4eYdIwVWrsJQOQpFW0lN522JyaovXs8kJE vxww== X-Gm-Message-State: APf1xPCtckqXk39e11rOJEahPcju7VG+xRX6ThWI/pDytPU1kdT25LYq awADqIeaDuBw3Q4xZMNovuHCnsenta5psnqPHjw6YKccz/LrV5zd7Lzr8Ehgxf8xiMCSMyHeGxC g1Fcy7agafpWSxgvjJWpKAwYx5d8yr3rUQCtZ+GlfkwmbMHalL9TOWRsPcOKhx4+ZlrUknAvU0G fxYL3KHphVsI4R3HFWEFMAvWULDAPNjWQ303KPby2GSSehOEf9VsjDLCqNlfCeVKahw8T0FdzGZ WkG+gsUEH49EvJsc1aNjTn0rRN2lPOVC/jrMHk1llksWxLCWvjwI6Jx9dXVM55/K3CJNAEAdBSd 09amQXznMcHDBz4NgSI9/39oJJc= X-Received: by 10.55.21.16 with SMTP id f16mr19084859qkh.252.1519789670584; Tue, 27 Feb 2018 19:47:50 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Smtp-Source: AG47ELto7WXBjnzfwY6BGx5prKvHvHK9wx5ngUncuoMNeBUfyB+zx6F5B3Z2U5TcIRZW5ZH/rFmjAqZ8q20LHrC6aAo= X-Received: by 10.55.21.16 with SMTP id f16mr19084836qkh.252.1519789670301; Tue, 27 Feb 2018 19:47:50 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.12.176.3 with HTTP; Tue, 27 Feb 2018 19:47:29 -0800 (PST) From: =?UTF-8?B?44Ki44Or44Og44CA44Kr44O844Or44Oo44OP44Oz?= Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2018 03:47:29 +0000 Message-ID: To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Wed, 28 Feb 2018 14:20:36 +0000 Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Simple lock/unlock mechanism X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2018 03:57:26 -0000 With the recent trend of physically robbing people for bitcoin (or other cryptocurrencies), I thought it would be beneficial to introduce a standard for locking up a portion of your bitcoin in a simple 'gotta-wait-awhile' system. The idea is to simply create a transaction spending a set of UTXOs to a P2SH address with an OP_CSV attached to it, and then throw away the private keys. To spend the bitcoin, you would have to broadcast the transaction and wait the given amount of time, then use the new txout. There are several ways to shoot yourself in the foot trying to do this manually, but e.g. Bitcoin Core could handle this in a fairly straightforward manner by introducing two new commands, which I call freeze and unfreeze: bitcoin-cli freeze [amount OR array of txid+vout objects] [days, default 1] E.g. bitcoin-cli freeze 10 5 E.g. bitcoin-cli freeze ["abc123:1", "def346:0"] 3 The unfreeze command would by default list all freezes: bitcoin-cli unfreeze txid days status bcd123 5 frozen dca999 3 frozen including the txid would broadcast the unfreeze and status would become 'thawing' until the amount becomes available: bitcoin-cli unfreeze bcd123 bitcoin-cli unfreeze txid days status bcd123 5 thawing dca999 3 frozen The benefit of this is that it becomes physically impossible for you to spend the coins until you thaw them, and if this becomes standard enough, it should disincentivize potential robbers as it would be expected that you keep most of your assets locked up. They could of course hold you hostage until the period is over, which may be worse, but I think that kind of operation would be substantially more difficult than a simply rob-and-run. The drawback is that you have to broadcast a transaction in order to spend the content, and you cannot bump the fee so the transaction could get stuck in a high-fee situation. -Kalle.