[bitcoin-dev] 32-byte public keys in Schnorr and Taproot

[bitcoin-dev] 32-byte public keys in Schnorr and Taproot

[Pieter Wuille]

Hello all,

It has been suggested [1] to drop the Y oddness bit in the witness
program for Taproot outputs. This seems like a worthwhile change, as:
* The bit doesn't actually contribute to security.
* It avoids Taproot outputs from being more expensive to create than v0 P2WSH.
* It doesn't preclude future changes that would still need the
additional byte anyway.

In exploring that option, Jonas Nick found that it seems cleanest [2]
to actually introduce a type of 32-byte public keys (which implicitly
have an even Y coordinate) in bip-schnorr, with associated signing and
verification logic that are distinct from the 33-byte variant.

This makes me wonder if we need 33-byte public keys at all.

So I'd like to hear opinions about modifying bip-schnorr to only
define 32-byte public keys. The implications of that would be:
* bip-schnorr public keys wouldn't be exactly the same as ECDSA public
keys, however all derivation logic would still apply (BIP32,
mnemonics, xpubs, ... would still exist and be compatible - just the
first pubkey byte would be dropped at the end).
* The Q point in bip-taproot (the one going in the scriptPubKey) would
just follow the 32-byte pubkey encoding, rather than needing a 33rd
byte.
* The P point in bip-taproot (the internal key revealed during script
path) would become just a 32-byte public key (and we can drop the one
bit in the control block to transmit the oddness of the Y coordinate
of P).
* In order to permit batch verification of the P to Q tweaking for
script-path spending, another control block bit is now needed, namely
one that indicates whether a negation was needed to make P+H(P||m)*G's
Y coordinate even.
* All public keys inside bip-tapscript would also become 32-bytes. If
desired, the "upgradable public key" construction in bip-tapscript can
be kept, by triggering based on the length of public keys (rather than
based on their first byte).

One question is whether it's worth such a change to bip-schnorr at
this point. We've purposefully never progressed it past draft since
publishing [3], but it has been a while. If necessary, it's possible
to keep verification compatible by still hashing the implied "even"
byte inside the scheme (which commits to the pubkey), but if we're
going to change things, it's perhaps best to do it as cleanly as
possible and also drop that byte.

Opinions?

  [1] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-May/016943.html
  [2] https://github.com/sipa/bips/pull/52
  [3] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-July/016203.html

Cheers,

-- 
Pieter

Re: [bitcoin-dev] 32-byte public keys in Schnorr and Taproot

[Christopher Allen]

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On Fri, Aug 9, 2019 at 11:17 AM Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> if we're going to change things, it's perhaps best to do it as cleanly as
> possible and also drop that byte.
>

I personally lean toward just dropping the byte. I like the simplicity and
I really like 32 bytes. 33 seems so over the edge and so odd ;-)

Yes, there may be some prototype implementations out there that did some
extra work, and will need to be revised, but that is always the risk
developers take when writing code when the spec hasn't fully been
implemented yet.

If you do revise the spec, would you consider proposing a format for
sharing public keys in a non-binary form, maybe using bech32? Given some of
the protocols emerging that may use Schnorr public keys in novel ways,
having a single encoding format for them would be useful.

-- Christopher Allen

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Re: [bitcoin-dev] 32-byte public keys in Schnorr and Taproot

[Karl-Johan Alm]

Hello,

It makes no sense to me to not switch to 32-byte keys. There are
literally no (or very mild) disadvantages to this, from what it
appears like. I don't think refraining from updating a proposal just
because it's been out there for awhile is a valid reason, personally.

On Sat, Aug 10, 2019 at 3:17 AM Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> Hello all,
>
> It has been suggested [1] to drop the Y oddness bit in the witness
> program for Taproot outputs. This seems like a worthwhile change, as:
> * The bit doesn't actually contribute to security.
> * It avoids Taproot outputs from being more expensive to create than v0 P2WSH.
> * It doesn't preclude future changes that would still need the
> additional byte anyway.
>
> In exploring that option, Jonas Nick found that it seems cleanest [2]
> to actually introduce a type of 32-byte public keys (which implicitly
> have an even Y coordinate) in bip-schnorr, with associated signing and
> verification logic that are distinct from the 33-byte variant.
>
> This makes me wonder if we need 33-byte public keys at all.
>
> So I'd like to hear opinions about modifying bip-schnorr to only
> define 32-byte public keys. The implications of that would be:
> * bip-schnorr public keys wouldn't be exactly the same as ECDSA public
> keys, however all derivation logic would still apply (BIP32,
> mnemonics, xpubs, ... would still exist and be compatible - just the
> first pubkey byte would be dropped at the end).
> * The Q point in bip-taproot (the one going in the scriptPubKey) would
> just follow the 32-byte pubkey encoding, rather than needing a 33rd
> byte.
> * The P point in bip-taproot (the internal key revealed during script
> path) would become just a 32-byte public key (and we can drop the one
> bit in the control block to transmit the oddness of the Y coordinate
> of P).
> * In order to permit batch verification of the P to Q tweaking for
> script-path spending, another control block bit is now needed, namely
> one that indicates whether a negation was needed to make P+H(P||m)*G's
> Y coordinate even.
> * All public keys inside bip-tapscript would also become 32-bytes. If
> desired, the "upgradable public key" construction in bip-tapscript can
> be kept, by triggering based on the length of public keys (rather than
> based on their first byte).
>
> One question is whether it's worth such a change to bip-schnorr at
> this point. We've purposefully never progressed it past draft since
> publishing [3], but it has been a while. If necessary, it's possible
> to keep verification compatible by still hashing the implied "even"
> byte inside the scheme (which commits to the pubkey), but if we're
> going to change things, it's perhaps best to do it as cleanly as
> possible and also drop that byte.
>
> Opinions?
>
>   [1] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-May/016943.html
>   [2] https://github.com/sipa/bips/pull/52
>   [3] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-July/016203.html
>
> Cheers,
>
> --
> Pieter
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> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
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