Re: [bitcoin-dev] Simple lock/unlock mechanism

[アルム カールヨハン <karl@dglab.com>]

On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 10:30 PM, Anthony Towns <aj@erisian.com.au> wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 04:34:18AM +0000, アルム カールヨハン via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>> 1. Graftroot probably breaks this (someone could just sign the
>> time-locked output with a script that has no time-lock).
>
> Making the graftroot key be a 2-of-2 muSig with an independent third party
> that commits to only signing CLTV scripts could avoid this. Making it
> 3-of-3 or 5-of-5 could be even better if you can find multiple independent
> services that will do it.

That kind of defeats the purpose. If you go through the trouble of
doing that, you can just do multisig and skip the freezing part
entirely. A robber would have to get you and the cosigner to sign in
both cases, and the CLTV could be overridden with graftroot.

On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 11:36 PM, Adam Back <adam.back@gmail.com> wrote:
> Coincidentally I had thought of something similar to what Kalle posted
> about a kind of software only time-lock vault, and described the idea
> to a few people off-list.  Re. Root incompatibility, if the key is
> deleted (as it must be) then a delegated signature can not be made
> that bypasses the CSV timeout restriction, so Root should not be
> incompatible with this.  I think it would be disadvantageous to mark
> keys as Rootable vs not in a sighash sense, because then that is
> another privacy/fungibility loss eroding  the uniformity advantage of
> Root when the delegate is not used.

1. Create TX1=(tx, sig) from UTXO A to p2sh B which has a CSV
timelock. Discard privkey A.
2. After broadcasting TX1, you need privkey B to spend it.
3. Use graftroot and privkey B with a script without timelock to spend B.

The robber can simply force you to execute step 3, since you have the
privkey to B.

> One drawback is deleting keys may itself be a bit difficult to assure
> with HD wallet seeds setup-time backup model.

That's a good point. Even more of a reason to include as part of
'freezing' a send to a new ephemeral key as 'initialization'. Sucks to
pay triple fees though (freeze ephemeral + unfreeze + actual use).

> As Anthony described I think, a simpler though less robust model would
> be to have a third party refuse to co-sign until a pre-arranged time,
> and this would have the advantage of not requiring two on-chain
> transactions.

I was hoping there was a way for a person to simply lock-up the major
portion of their coins easily.

As a sidenote: a security firm (e.g. one that comes to your house when
the alarm goes off) could have a service where seeing an unfreeze
transaction which you have told them about without you giving a heads
up beforehand is equal to alarm going off.

-Kalle.