From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org (smtp2.osuosl.org [140.211.166.133]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 29872C002B for ; Wed, 8 Feb 2023 00:56:44 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EC90C40B61 for ; Wed, 8 Feb 2023 00:56:43 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp2.osuosl.org EC90C40B61 Authentication-Results: smtp2.osuosl.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20210112 header.b=ImiNbYZE X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -2.098 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.098 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp2.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id wBQPltXsJq9V for ; Wed, 8 Feb 2023 00:56:42 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 smtp2.osuosl.org 79505404B3 Received: from mail-il1-x12b.google.com (mail-il1-x12b.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::12b]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 79505404B3 for ; Wed, 8 Feb 2023 00:56:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-il1-x12b.google.com with SMTP id l7so6832554ilf.0 for ; Tue, 07 Feb 2023 16:56:42 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references:mime-version :from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=Rv356yVXCn9c6w8kH0VDy2Clvbno/em0it6yXfsQa5o=; b=ImiNbYZEI8yjlamu6u7Co15IM9JFgHTFdJYV46dzF0B9N2WbI45rqLeGTPAwxbr68X qMxfMRpYq+n9Xo2Lf3NdmuUGkRypqoihNa+PlbJmlVsm3guDZJasADFIbp7itTyEreNb 2twTsmNMDqFGGjIgKt4bmGmajj3Vh390Eh8eYZVsH+/gW5aLWrR0d7V1RL28RmssdkKV itG/p4WJ5IS7MQA+Krmd1zeMGj9JnyeoJKsLR7rXjsAR484BhXTRxzZTWIq8YuFOp/Lc x0djmjzTpyjDcCKSgoJ4HFiiLBBjs+oPwKvP6Phe0Svas8IB+dRSW6XKZTdMFkVGPsmH UrSQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references:mime-version :x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=Rv356yVXCn9c6w8kH0VDy2Clvbno/em0it6yXfsQa5o=; b=HH9tcRZRQZRSFYTKNllrp0JGKihryw4cFElK0QRK06ABPji1gCJdusYVuQDNf/Zv8E P9oGl5NMtd4BeMYPt5fMc/WQ7NSIEZrtcimtF8SPxgc5tP7MimdKop7HkIbnX5SEhaW6 1ohmHuK2YLL1EFAS5q/jhXqNP9//xxsTKHY5zsRH/C7bmL4dN0rbYNgjR/xnwvpfQLsK i4OheN9trFAJcBwxrW9vLKwAK5a2pCvxaUgrwBB/GzO8Pn8gptRTlyhCjgxOncK9Cj1M gLGGiSMxKegLDLQCA3Quj1in5JHJS8WyjF5/Z3aSeFS99mZYw7n6DwqpVfI7pYVFx9fW v7wQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AO0yUKU0netMpzumvcvYIRlOXjyL8ovXOBXfX1E2wKkL0zU38dZSZ7j+ mWHd5GSghDtyDUBPC5MoFykN1fCS3TIPH4udLi0YlR9gg843Tg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AK7set/j/NesTyCUARNRZNp3A3ex9ujzhe/0NBrlWNja4uuA49RIIo3BBrb9xCdi5/39TBiBd9nKN8w2bZvYvmKY2Vc= X-Received: by 2002:a92:5413:0:b0:30e:f98e:126c with SMTP id i19-20020a925413000000b0030ef98e126cmr3348053ilb.43.1675817801374; Tue, 07 Feb 2023 16:56:41 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: Antoine Riard Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2023 00:56:30 +0000 Message-ID: To: Yuval Kogman , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000c263af05f425bcbd" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Wed, 08 Feb 2023 02:06:56 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Unenforceable fee obligations in multiparty protocols with Taproot inputs X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 08 Feb 2023 00:56:44 -0000 --000000000000c263af05f425bcbd Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi Yuval, > Since the absolute fee amount is already committed to by the provided > (`SIGHASH_ALL`) signatures but the total transaction weight is not, Mallory can > broadcast any valid signatures up to the maximum standard weight and minimum > relay fees, or in collusion with a miner, up to consensus limits. > > This effectively steals a fee from Alice et al, as their signatures do no= t > commit to a feerate directly or indirectly. >From what I understand, there are many inputs for the coinjoin transaction, the latest signer provides an inflated witness downgrading the multi-party transaction feerate. It doesn't sound to me a fee siphoning as occurring with loose malleability [0], rather another case of transaction-relay jamming where the adversary's goal is to slow down the confirmation of the transaction to waste everyone timevalue. I think the issue has already been mentioned to advocate updating Core's mempool acceptance policy, and allows wtxid-replacement [1]. There is also a description available here [2]. To mitigate, among the peer-to-peer style of mitigations, one is of course = a reputation strategy or monetary strategy, where the asymmetries in counterparties reputation are compensated with out-of-band fees/credentials. I don't think increasing adversary costliness is that efficient as there is a scaling effect (e.g the feerate of the previous transaction can be used to feed N outputs for N dissociated attack contexts). Signature ordering supposes also a reputation basis, and it doesn't exclude giving a transaction construction edge to the reputational counterparty (e.g a LSP "promising" a dual-funding UTXO to X distinct participant, picking up the first to yield back a signature). Best, Antoine [0] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-September/00= 2796.html [1] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/19645 [2] https://gist.github.com/ariard/7e509bf2c81ea8049fd0c67978c521af#witness-mal= leability Le mar. 7 f=C3=A9vr. 2023 =C3=A0 02:59, Yuval Kogman via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> a =C3=A9crit : > ## Summary > > Since Taproot (more generally any kind of MAST) spends have variable size > which > depends on the path being used, the last such input to be signed in a > multiparty > transaction can always use a larger than estimated signature to unfairly > extract > a fee contribution from the other parties to the transaction (keeping the > absolute fees the same and reducing the feerate for the transaction). > > ## Attack Scenario > > Alice et al wish to perform a multiparty transaction, such as a CoinJoin = or > lightning dual funding at a relatively high feerate. > > Mallory has a P2TR output with a large script spend path, e.g. an ordinal > inscription commitment transaction output. > > Mallory registers this coin as an input into the multiparty transaction > with a > fee obligation calculated on the basis of a key spend. When all other > participants have provided signatures, the script spend path can be used. > > Since the absolute fee amount is already committed to by the provided > (`SIGHASH_ALL`) signatures but the total transaction weight is not, > Mallory can > broadcast any valid signatures up to the maximum standard weight and > minimum > relay fees, or in collusion with a miner, up to consensus limits. > > This effectively steals a fee from Alice et al, as their signatures do no= t > commit to a feerate directly or indirectly. > > ## Mitigations > > ### RBF > > All parties could negotiate a (series of) transaction(s) ahead of time at= a > lower feerate, giving a lower bound minimum feerate that Mallory can forc= e. > > ### Minimum Weight Before Signing > > Enforcing a minimal weight for all non-witness data in the transaction > before > the transaction is considered fully constructed can limit the > effectiveness of > this attack, since the difference between the predicted weight and the > maximum > weight decreases. > > ### Trusted Coordinator > > In the centralized setting if BIP-322 ownership proofs are required for > participation and assuming the server can be trusted not to collude with > Mallory, the server can reject signatures that do not exercise the same > spend > path as the ownership proof, which makes the ownership proof a commitment > to the > spend weight of the input. > > ### Reputation > > Multiparty protocols with publicly verifiable protocol transcripts can be > provided as weak evidence of a history of honest participation in > multiparty > transactions. > > A ring signature from keys used in the transaction or its transcript > committing > to the new proposed transaction can provide weak evidence for the honesty > of the > peer. > > Such proofs are more compelling to an entity which has participated in > (one of) > the transcripts, or proximal transactions. Incentives are theoretically > aligned > if public coordinators publish these transcripts as a kind of server > reputation. > > ### Increasing Costliness > > A minimum feerate for the previous transaction or a minimum confirmation > age > (coindays destroyed implies time value, analogous to fidelity bonds) can = be > required for inputs to be added, in order to make such attacks less > lucrative > (but there is still a positive payoff for the attacker). > > ### Signature Ordering > > Signatures from potentially exploitative inputs can be required ahead of > legacy > or SegWit v0 ones. The prescribed order can be determined based on > reputation or > costliness as described in the previous paragraphs. > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > --000000000000c263af05f425bcbd Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Hi Yuval,


> Since the absolute fee amount is already commit= ted to by the provided

> (`SIGHASH_ALL`) signatures but the total transa= ction weight is not, Mallory can

> broadcast any valid signatures up to the maximu= m standard weight and minimum

> relay fees, or in collusion with a miner, up to= consensus limits.

>=C2= =A0

> This effectively steals a fee from Alice et al,= as their signatures do not

> commit to a feerate directly or indirectly.


From what I understand, there are many inputs=C2=A0<= /font>for the coinjoin = transaction, the latest signer provides an inflated witness=C2=A0downgrading the multi-party trans= action feerate. It doesn't sound to me a=C2=A0fee siphoning as occurring with loose malleability [0], rather another = case=C2=A0of transactio= n-relay jamming where the adversary's goal is to slow down the=C2=A0confirmation of the transa= ction to waste everyone timevalue.


I think the issue has already been mentioned to advoc= ate updating Core's mempool acceptance=C2=A0policy, and allows w= txid-replacement [1]. There is also a description available here [2].


To mitigate, among the peer-to-peer style of mitigati= ons, one is of course=C2=A0a reputation strategy or monetary strateg= y, where the asymmetries in counterparties reputation are compensated with = out-of-band fees/credentials. I don't think increasing adversary costli= ness is that efficient as there is a scaling effect (e.g the feerate of the= previous transaction can be used to feed N outputs for N dissociated attac= k contexts). Signature ordering supposes also a reputation basis, and it do= esn't exclude giving a transaction construction edge to the reputationa= l counterparty (e.g a LSP "promising" a dual-funding UTXO to X di= stinct participant, picking up the first to yield back a signature).=


Best,

Antoine


[0] https://lists.linuxfoundat= ion.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/2020-September/002796.html

[1] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/19645

[2] https://gist.github.com/ar= iard/7e509bf2c81ea8049fd0c67978c521af#witness-malleability


Le=C2=A0mar. 7 f=C3=A9vr. 2023 =C3=A0=C2=A002:59, Yuval Kogman via bit= coin-dev <bitco= in-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> a =C3=A9crit=C2=A0:
## Summary

Since Taproot (more generally any kind of MAST) spends have variable size w= hich
depends on the path being used, the last such input to be signed in a multi= party
transaction can always use a larger than estimated signature to unfairly ex= tract
a fee contribution from the other parties to the transaction (keeping the absolute fees the same and reducing the feerate for the transaction).

## Attack Scenario

Alice et al wish to perform a multiparty transaction, such as a CoinJoin or=
lightning dual funding at a relatively high feerate.

Mallory has a P2TR output with a large script spend path, e.g. an ordinal inscription commitment transaction output.

Mallory registers this coin as an input into the multiparty transaction wit= h a
fee obligation calculated on the basis of a key spend. When all other
participants have provided signatures, the script spend path can be used.
Since the absolute fee amount is already committed to by the provided
(`SIGHASH_ALL`) signatures but the total transaction weight is not, Mallory= can
broadcast any valid signatures up to the maximum standard weight and minimu= m
relay fees, or in collusion with a miner, up to consensus limits.

This effectively steals a fee from Alice et al, as their signatures do not<= br> commit to a feerate directly or indirectly.

## Mitigations

### RBF

All parties could negotiate a (series of) transaction(s) ahead of time at a=
lower feerate, giving a lower bound minimum feerate that Mallory can force.=

### Minimum Weight Before Signing

Enforcing a minimal weight for all non-witness data in the transaction befo= re
the transaction is considered fully constructed can limit the effectiveness= of
this attack, since the difference between the predicted weight and the maxi= mum
weight decreases.

### Trusted Coordinator

In the centralized setting if BIP-322 ownership proofs are required for
participation and assuming the server can be trusted not to collude with Mallory, the server can reject signatures that do not exercise the same spe= nd
path as the ownership proof, which makes the ownership proof a commitment t= o the
spend weight of the input.

### Reputation

Multiparty protocols with publicly verifiable protocol transcripts can be provided as weak evidence of a history of honest participation in multipart= y
transactions.

A ring signature from keys used in the transaction or its transcript commit= ting
to the new proposed transaction can provide weak evidence for the honesty o= f the
peer.

Such proofs are more compelling to an entity which has participated in (one= of)
the transcripts, or proximal transactions. Incentives are theoretically ali= gned
if public coordinators publish these transcripts as a kind of server reputa= tion.

### Increasing Costliness

A minimum feerate for the previous transaction or a minimum confirmation ag= e
(coindays destroyed implies time value, analogous to fidelity bonds) can be=
required for inputs to be added, in order to make such attacks less lucrati= ve
(but there is still a positive payoff for the attacker).

### Signature Ordering

Signatures from potentially exploitative inputs can be required ahead of le= gacy
or SegWit v0 ones. The prescribed order can be determined based on reputati= on or
costliness as described in the previous paragraphs.
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
--000000000000c263af05f425bcbd--