From: Antoine Riard <antoine.riard@gmail.com>
To: Matt Corallo <lf-lists@mattcorallo.com>,
Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Taproot (and graftroot) complexity
Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2020 17:32:41 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALZpt+HRuxNxKsdwtyMD=+hE-Tq+8Wt9mLVP0vj9Z+yENg_UJg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2d9970d8-209d-7223-6564-ad858dce5981@mattcorallo.com>
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> In particular, you care more about privacy when you are contesting a
> close of a channel or other script path because then the miners could be
more
> likely to extract a rent from you as "ransom" for properly closing your
channel
> (or in other words, in a contested close the value of the closing
transaction is
> larger than usual).
Not sure this point holds, independently of which Taproot/MASTmechanism
deployed,
any time-sensitive transaction will likely leak its "contestness" by the
setting of its
nSequence/nLocktime fields. E.g, for LN, justice tx are not encumbered by a
CSV
delay which distinguish them from a non-revoked spend. And when you're
relaying
htlcs and need to close unilaterally channel to prevent different
settlement on
incoming/outgoing links the HTLC-timeout tx broadcast have a nLocktime set.
Beyond LN, timelocks are a privacy leak and miner-withholding vector for any
offchain protocols but this problem is not tied to Taproot design.
Confidential
enforcement of them would be great but that's another debate..
Antoine
Le dim. 9 févr. 2020 à 15:40, Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> a écrit :
> Responding purely to one point as this may be sufficient to clear up
> lots of discussion:
>
> On 2/9/20 8:19 PM, Bryan Bishop via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > Is Taproot just a probability assumption about the frequency and
> > likelihood of
> > the signature case over the script case? Is this a good assumption? The
> BIP
> > only goes as far as to claim that the advantage is apparent if the
> outputs
> > *could be spent* as an N of N, but doesn't make representations about
> > how likely
> > that N of N case would be in practice compared to the script paths.
> Perhaps
> > among use cases, more than half of the ones we expect people to be doing
> > could be
> > spent as an N of N. But how frequently would that path get used?
> > Further, while
> > the *use cases* might skew toward things with N of N opt-out, we might
> > end up in
> > a power law case where it's the one case that doesn't use an N of N opt
> > out at
> > all (or at a de minimis level) that becomes very popular, thereby making
> > Taproot
> > more costly then beneficial.
> Its not just about the frequency and likelihood, no. If there is a
> clearly-provided optimization for this common case in the protocol, then
> it becomes further more likely that developers put in the additional
> effort required to make this possibility a reality. This has a very
> significant positive impact on user privacy, especially those who wish
> to utilize more advanced functionality in Bitcoin. Further, yes, it is
> anticipated that the N of N case is possible to take in the vast
> majority of deployed use-cases for advanced scripting systems, ensuring
> that it is maximally efficient to do so (and thereby encouraging
> developers to do so) is a key goal in this work.
>
> Matt
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-02-09 22:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-02-09 20:19 [bitcoin-dev] Taproot (and graftroot) complexity Bryan Bishop
2020-02-09 20:22 ` [bitcoin-dev] An alternative deployment path for taproot technology (Re: Taproot (and graftroot) complexity) Bryan Bishop
2020-02-09 20:24 ` [bitcoin-dev] Taproot public NUMS optimization " Bryan Bishop
2020-02-14 21:21 ` Jeremy
2020-02-09 20:40 ` [bitcoin-dev] Taproot (and graftroot) complexity Matt Corallo
2020-02-09 22:32 ` Antoine Riard [this message]
2020-02-09 20:47 ` [bitcoin-dev] Taproot (and graftroot) complexity (reflowed) Bryan Bishop
2020-02-10 0:15 ` David A. Harding
2020-02-10 16:28 ` Jonas Nick
2020-02-14 20:07 ` Jeremy
2020-02-14 22:36 ` David A. Harding
2020-02-18 23:29 ` Pieter Wuille
2020-02-10 0:20 ` [bitcoin-dev] Taproot (and graftroot) complexity Anthony Towns
2020-02-10 6:27 ` ZmnSCPxj
[not found] <<20200210002011.lelhcdmjejmoh6xv@erisian.com.au>
2020-09-19 7:13 ` Jay Berg
2020-09-19 8:46 ` Jay Berg
2020-09-19 12:52 Jay Berg
2020-09-20 3:23 ` Lloyd Fournier
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