Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_CHECKWILDCARDSIGVERIFY or "Wildcard Inputs" or "Coalescing Transactions"

[Trevin Hofmann <trevinhofmann@gmail.com>]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 11222 bytes --]

> Considering the website example, where most websites uses static
content, a bitcoin address could accumulate a dozen of transactions
before the webmaster changes the address to a new one.

Would this use case be a better match for something such as stealth
addresses or hierarchical deterministic addresses?

Trevin Hofmann
On Nov 25, 2015 8:16 AM, "Erik via bitcoin-dev" <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
>
>
> Nice idea. I see it as an important feature because of several reasons:
>
> Considering the website example, where most websites uses static
> content, a bitcoin address could accumulate a dozen of transactions
> before the webmaster changes the address to a new one.
>
> Also consider a QR-code address printed on paper. That address is also
> prone to multiple payments, which could be several small ones.
>
> You ask someone to pay an amount of BTC. That person would be someone
> that want you to actually don't get any money at all, so instead of
> sending one payment, the person sends a lot of small TXes. It costs a
> lot more to achieve this, but that doesn't bother the person sending the
> transactions. What you see is the transactions to the address you've
> agreed sum up to the amount you asked for. When you later try to spend
> it, you can't because of that the size of all UXTOs is too high to even
> overcome the tx fee.
>
> If you use a wildcard transaction to bake them together into one UXTO,
> you will not need to pay more than just one tx fee to solve the problem
> you've got. Also the network will benefit from this because the
> alternative is to not spend those UXTOs at all because it costs more
> than it earns, leaving lots of UXTOs in the databases.
>
> Some problems to consider is:
> * Which addresses should be involved in a wildcard TX.
> * How to not make it repeatable or delayed so that UXTOs not intended to
> be in that TX wouldn't be included.
> * How to make it impossible to sign an wildcard TX with a future date.
> * How to limit outputs so they not are in risk being double-spent.
> * How to guarantee that the output is actually calculated from all the
> inputs involved and not less, making insane TX fees available.
>
> I could see possible solutions to this problems:
> * Using the highest block height number of transactions to include or
> maybe better, the UXTO of one transaction destined to that address
> involved in that block - that implies collecting all UXTOs in that block.
> * Using a signature that includes the date. To let it be present more
> times in the blockchain requires another timestamp that is newer than a
> wildcard TX already existing in the blockchain. Also make the
> transaction invalid to put in a block if the timestamp is behind a
> certain time or in the future.
> * Using the coinbase UXTO or the block hash from the latest block as
> proof that the transaction isn't created earlier than that. Also makes
> the wildcard TX invalid if that block isn't part of the blockchain
> anymore. This also have a secondary effect of certifying the blockchain
> itself making it more difficult to fork it from far behind because it
> will effectively remove all transactions depending on a UXTO including
> this type of certification.
> * Either using a priority like way to determine what are being left to
> wildcard in a block - all transactions spending UXTOs of that address is
> removed before the wildcard TX if they occurs in the same block. Either
> it is possible to set a rule that if a wildcard TX exists in one block,
> it is invalid to include other UXTOs that is to be be included in the
> wildcard from the same address in the same block. (Classic
> double-spending rule)
> * Using a special form of output specifying only one destination
> address/script and the amount of fees to pay. If the amount of fees
> could be payed, then the rest will be sent to the destination address.
> This covers intentional delaying and also discourage forking the
> blockchain by miners to making the signature UXTO appear later than more
> recent transaction in a new fork to collect the later txes as fee.
>
> This transaction type would in fact look like a time-limited offer to
> the network to reduce the UXTO set of an address. I guess some miners
> will then use a logic that prefers this types of TXes even if they are
> low-fee because, if they removes lots of UXTOs, they benefits the network.
>
> Sincerely,
> Erik.
>
> Den 2015-11-25 kl. 02:26, skrev Chris Priest via bitcoin-dev:
> > 1. Technically is it promoting address reuse, but in this case, I
> > think it's OK. The primary purpose of a coalescing transaction is to
> > clear out *all* funds associated with one address and send them to
> > another address (belonging to the same owner). If you coalesce the
> > inputs to the same address over and over again, you an do that, but
> > you'll run the risk of leaking your private key.
> >
> > 2. I see these transactions being broadcast in the background when the
> > user is not planning on sending or receiving any payments. By the time
> > the wallet user wants to spend funds from the address, the coalescing
> > transaction should be sufficiently deep enough in the blockchain to
> > avoid re-org tomfoolery. Exchanges and payment processors who take in
> > payments around the clock will probably never use these transactions,
> > at least not on "live" addresses.
> >
> > 3. I never thought of that, but thats a benefit too!
> >
> > On 11/24/15, Jannes Faber via bitcoin-dev
> > <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >> Few issues I can think of:
> >>
> >> 1. In its basic form this encourages address reuse. Unless the
> wildcard can
> >> be constructed such that it can match a whole branch of an HD  wallet.
> >> Although I guess that would tie all those addresses together making
> HD moot
> >> to begin with.
> >>
> >> 2. Sounds pretty dangerous during reorgs. Maybe such a transaction
> should
> >> include a block height which indicates the maximum block that any
> utxo can
> >> match. With the requirement that the specified block height is at
> least 100
> >> blocks in the past. Maybe add a minimum block height as well to prevent
> >> unnecessary scanning (with the requirement that at least one utxo must
> be
> >> in that minimum block).
> >>
> >> 3. Seems like a nice way to the reduce utxo set. But hard to say how
> >> effective it would really be.
> >> On 25 Nov 2015 12:48 a.m., "Chris Priest via bitcoin-dev" <
> >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >>
> >>>> This idea could be applied by having the wildcard signature apply to
> >>>> all
> >>>> UTXOs that are of a standard form and paid to a particular address,
> and
> >>> be
> >>>> a signature of some kind of message to that effect.
> >>>
> >>> I think this is true. Not *all* transactions will be able to match the
> >>> wildcard. For instance if someone sent some crazy smart contract tx to
> >>> your address, the script associated with that tx will be such that it
> >>> will not apply to the wildcard. Most "vanilla" utxos that I've seen
> >>> have the formula: OP_DUP OP_HASH160 [a hash corresponding to your
> >>> address] OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG". Just UTXOs in that form could
> >>> apply to the wildcard.
> >>>
> >>> On 11/24/15, Dave Scotese via bitcoin-dev
> >>> <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >>>> What is required to spend bitcoin is that input be provided to the
> UTXO
> >>>> script that causes it to return true.  What Chris is proposing breaks
> >>>> the
> >>>> programmatic nature of the requirement, replacing it with a
> requirement
> >>>> that the secret be known.  Granted, the secret is the only requirement
> >>>> in
> >>>> most cases, but there is no built-in assumption that the script always
> >>>> requires only that secret.
> >>>>
> >>>> This idea could be applied by having the wildcard signature apply to
> >>>> all
> >>>> UTXOs that are of a standard form and paid to a particular address,
> and
> >>> be
> >>>> a signature of some kind of message to that effect.  I imagine the
> cost
> >>> of
> >>>> re-scanning the UTXO set to find them all would justify a special
> extra
> >>>> mining fee for any transaction that used this opcode.
> >>>>
> >>>> Please be blunt about any of my own misunderstandings that this email
> >>> makes
> >>>> clear.
> >>>>
> >>>> On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 1:51 PM, Bryan Bishop via bitcoin-dev <
> >>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 11:34 AM, Chris Priest via bitcoin-dev <
> >>>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> **OP_CHECKWILDCARDSIGVERIFY**
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Some (minor) discussion of this idea in -wizards earlier today
> >>>>> starting
> >>>>> near near "09:50" (apologies for having no anchor links):
> >>>>> http://gnusha.org/bitcoin-wizards/2015-11-24.log
> >>>>>
> >>>>> - Bryan
> >>>>> http://heybryan.org/
> >>>>> 1 512 203 0507
> >>>>>
> >>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> >>>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> >>>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> --
> >>>> I like to provide some work at no charge to prove my value. Do you
> need
> >>>> a
> >>>> techie?
> >>>> I own Litmocracy <http://www.litmocracy.com> and Meme Racing
> >>>> <http://www.memeracing.net> (in alpha).
> >>>> I'm the webmaster for The Voluntaryist <http://www.voluntaryist.com>
> >>> which
> >>>> now accepts Bitcoin.
> >>>> I also code for The Dollar Vigilante <http://dollarvigilante.com/>.
> >>>> "He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules" - Satoshi
> >>>> Nakamoto
> >>>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> >>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> >>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
> >>>
> >>
> > _______________________________________________
> > bitcoin-dev mailing list
> > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
> Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)
>
> iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJWVcKuAAoJEJ51csApon2ofiYP/15DXthFvNg9pBPOaaboGOh1
> DhN7R3SXnt4PTLygQGO3AkTRcDinQrZ0Q4GDLIgrOkaKJ4yr6FtnoEYGORQSfFkx
> 946eWtqkR4+IJi7gYIIn1yOfFjWKUp9l4OOWBA8Rxsn0tZUAQPXzf2f+dxAaj0Gd
> fLrftYvK1XJ8BolhwNfonJ193RJGFynQfWqZ+XeQQMS5LW23RpQLyI26f495MPHG
> Wug7M/Aq50JrJDe1OyhjnnjYxNV6Gdbg9o3YIdj2gaOsBKHzsPK+LjcLCdRqD/OI
> TBwmwiI4vrOl3HzvtucHxQqnaP43wubydVhPfmjG97tDaj2cVLjadc17e77PzCVI
> 8N21oVIWDzyW6y14REoo1Zs4A9ALpHjXAGWdls71eP1NIFcfdFAJWhk2/giisw8o
> ZsQTgq2mUHS+n4q3NjFEwGxS011yADE3Uf3ryjuTjp3HVQf3lZxn4E4Z7z/4gkXm
> /h/3Ln7PkjEmOqp9htgHcYW7q5goeJzV0xNDBoY9wvOlJQcAh6nTiS4SJEiFJvXU
> xVZIGZsisrdW/1CfcszOi7KFGaaV1VlAXQnuJHj1I3dJ2r68yi5TQk6voMNFprEz
> 2R4zuZKjIoH79rOjDV8l6XBIU1Kh92GEzCFlTicfvnAoa853fGZt+V/77ralftJW
> E6sERK8uG8S3KdBSVQ7K
> =1xdi
> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>

[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 15048 bytes --]