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[2607:f8b0:4864:20::935]) by gmr-mx.google.com with ESMTPS id 98e67ed59e1d1-3051cc5b291si528021a91.0.2025.03.30.13.16.19 for (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Sun, 30 Mar 2025 13:16:19 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of martin.habovstiak@gmail.com designates 2607:f8b0:4864:20::935 as permitted sender) client-ip=2607:f8b0:4864:20::935; Received: by mail-ua1-x935.google.com with SMTP id a1e0cc1a2514c-86b9d1f729eso1637949241.3 for ; Sun, 30 Mar 2025 13:16:19 -0700 (PDT) X-Forwarded-Encrypted: i=1; AJvYcCVUTFX1HTKKWpE6NtXGBJWrWloi0uJBLlNoHe81gr1dOoSXkzM/BOz4/zQWLQvQzUhhEcx1hFRwWTWd@googlegroups.com X-Gm-Gg: ASbGncvyfDuWDleNma/TZmoh3T+e0VWCGuYHWOy7VZyM/faOIa8xN5ec8eqoV5s0lXr vrAxahzCy4hmS31yDaFMiZE/dkNpMZoHhz5EhU5UOTqNW4rU/erJ1psvY8l7o79nX5BSEiyLuCN TnWkj/BOQQpRVIvA22KZjVjKrQjw== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6102:5246:b0:4af:deaf:f891 with SMTP id ada2fe7eead31-4c6d3824632mr3845009137.4.1743365778293; Sun, 30 Mar 2025 13:16:18 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: =?UTF-8?Q?Martin_Habov=C5=A1tiak?= Date: Sun, 30 Mar 2025 22:16:08 +0200 X-Gm-Features: AQ5f1JovW6Dk_s3KbFXtaEeupP2WCdH6ZSYG_Cginp60cPGOxbQBEzi-6Ub-Kxw Message-ID: Subject: Re: [bitcoindev] Hashed keys are actually fully quantum secure To: Lloyd Fournier Cc: Antoine Poinsot , Bitcoin Development Mailing List Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000edcb0c063194f907" X-Original-Sender: martin.habovstiak@gmail.com X-Original-Authentication-Results: gmr-mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@gmail.com header.s=20230601 header.b=e0IDCuq5; spf=pass (google.com: domain of martin.habovstiak@gmail.com designates 2607:f8b0:4864:20::935 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=martin.habovstiak@gmail.com; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=QUARANTINE dis=NONE) header.from=gmail.com; dara=pass header.i=@googlegroups.com Precedence: list Mailing-list: list bitcoindev@googlegroups.com; contact bitcoindev+owners@googlegroups.com List-ID: X-Google-Group-Id: 786775582512 List-Post: , List-Help: , List-Archive: , List-Unsubscribe: , X-Spam-Score: -0.5 (/) --000000000000edcb0c063194f907 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Indeed, that's what I meant. Even crazy long period like two weeks is still better than losing everything. I have also assumed RBF and related rules to stay similar. Still, a better scheme was proposed already that I was unaware of so far, thus I withdraw my proposal in favor of that one. D=C5=88a po 24. 3. 2025, 1:25 Lloyd Fournier nap=C3= =ADsal(a): > > > On Tue, 18 Mar 2025 at 00:48, 'Antoine Poinsot' via Bitcoin Development > Mailing List wrote: > > I suppose you could in theory have, in addition to making spending old >> outputs invalid on their own, a rule which dictates they may only be spe= nt >> along with a QR output at least X blocks old. This would give the honest >> user a headstart in this race, but meh. >> > > Yes this is how I read the OP "after sufficient number of blocks". I thin= k > this is a really nice idea. The head start can be arbitrarily large so th= at > the attacker simply cannot compete. It's probably not too difficult to > design some honest RBF mechanism either such that you can bump the fee wi= th > a new QR signature if it's taking too long. > > LL > > > >> On Sunday, March 16th, 2025 at 2:25 PM, Martin Habov=C5=A1tiak < >> martin.habovstiak@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Hello list, >> >> this is somewhat related to Jameson's recent post but different enough t= o >> warrant a separate topic. >> >> As you have probably heard many times and even think yourself, "hashed >> keys are not actually secure, because a quantum attacker can just snatch >> them from mempool". However this is not strictly true. >> >> It is possible to implement fully secure recovery if we forbid spending >> of hashed keys unless done through the following scheme: >> 0. we assume we have *some* QR signing deployed, it can be done even >> after QC becomes viable (though not without economic cost) >> 1. the user obtains a small amount of bitcoin sufficient to pay for fees >> via external means, held on a QR script >> 2. the user creates a transaction that, aside from having a usual >> spendable output also commits to a signature of QR public key. This prov= es >> that the user knew the private key even though the public key wasn't >> revealed yet. >> 3. after sufficient number of blocks, the user spends both the old and Q= R >> output in a single transaction. Spending requires revealing the >> previously-committed sigature. Spending the old output alone is invalid. >> >> This way, the attacker would have to revert the chain to steal which is >> assumed impossible. >> >> The only weakness I see is that (x)pubs would effectively become private >> keys. However they already kinda are - one needs to protect xpubs for >> privacy and to avoid the risk of getting marked as "dirty" by some >> agencies, which can theoretically render them unspendable. And non-x-pub= s >> generally do not leak alone (no reason to reveal them without spending). >> >> I think that the mere possibility of this scheme has two important >> implications: >> * the need to have "a QR scheme" ready now in case of a QC coming >> tomorrow is much smaller than previously thought. Yes, doing it too late >> has the effect of temporarily freezing coins which is costly and we don'= t >> want that but it's not nearly as bad as theft >> * freezing of *these* coins would be both immoral and extremely dangerou= s >> for reputation of Bitcoin (no comments on freezing coins with revealed >> pubkeys, I haven't made my mind yet) >> >> If the time comes I'd be happy to run a soft fork that implements this >> sanely. >> >> Cheers >> >> Martin >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Group= s >> "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send a= n >> email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. >> To view this discussion visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/CALkkCJY%3Ddv6cZ_HoUNQybF4-= byGOjME3Jt2DRr20yZqMmdJUnQ%40mail.gmail.com >> . >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Group= s >> "Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send a= n >> email to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. >> To view this discussion visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/XHIL8Z4i4hji8LhbJ0AiKQ4eago= 2evXwjTGUOqqyAye_2nM3QicDpHo6KkcznBAHPUrIWSLj_GuiTQ_97KPjxcOrG8pE0rgcXucK2-= 4txKE%3D%40protonmail.com >> >> . >> > --=20 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "= Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an e= mail to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/= CALkkCJb4aJgpgBxrSqSwmCVb3wdnaDJDo7j%2Bw_D7qC0wFpMOOw%40mail.gmail.com. --000000000000edcb0c063194f907 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Indeed, that's what I meant. Even crazy long period l= ike two weeks is still better than losing everything. I have also assumed R= BF and related rules to stay similar.

Still, a better scheme was proposed already that I was unaware of= so far, thus I withdraw my proposal in favor of that one.

<= div class=3D"gmail_quote gmail_quote_container">
D=C5=88a po 24. 3. 2025, 1:25 Lloyd Fournier <lloyd.fourn@gmail.com> nap=C3=ADsal(a):

On Tue, 18 Mar 2025 at 00:48, 'Antoine Poinsot' via Bitcoin Develo= pment Mailing List <bitcoindev@googlegroups.com> wrote:<= /div>

I suppose you could in theory have, in addition to making spend= ing old outputs invalid on their own, a rule which dictates they may only b= e spent along with a QR output at least X blocks old. This would give the h= onest user a headstart in this race, but meh.
Yes this is how I read the OP "after sufficient number of= blocks". I think this is a really nice idea. The head start can be ar= bitrarily large so that the attacker simply cannot compete. It's probab= ly not too difficult to design some honest RBF mechanism either such that y= ou can bump the fee with a new QR signature if it's taking too long.

LL

=C2=A0
On Sunday, March 16th, 2025 at 2:25 PM, Martin Habov=C5=A1tiak <= martin.habovstiak@gmail.com> wrote:
Hello list,

this is somewhat related to Jameson's recent post but diffe= rent enough to warrant a separate topic.

<= div dir=3D"auto">As you have probably heard many times and even think yours= elf, "hashed keys are not actually secure, because a quantum attacker = can just snatch them from mempool". However this is not strictly true.=

It is possible to imple= ment fully secure recovery if we forbid spending of hashed keys unless done= through the following scheme:
0. we assume we have = *some* QR signing deployed, it can be done even after QC becomes viable (th= ough not without economic cost)
1. the user obtains = a small amount of bitcoin sufficient to pay for fees via external means, he= ld on a QR script
2. the user creates a transaction = that, aside from having a usual spendable output also commits to a signatur= e of QR public key. This proves that the user knew the private key even tho= ugh the public key wasn't revealed yet.
3. after= sufficient number of blocks, the user spends both the old and QR output in= a single transaction. Spending requires revealing the previously-committed= sigature. Spending the old output alone is invalid.

This way, the attacker would have to revert th= e chain to steal which is assumed impossible.

The only weakness I see is that (x)pubs would effecti= vely become private keys. However they already kinda are - one needs to pro= tect xpubs for privacy and to avoid the risk of getting marked as "dir= ty" by some agencies, which can theoretically render them unspendable.= And non-x-pubs generally do not leak alone (no reason to reveal them witho= ut spending).

I think th= at the mere possibility of this scheme has two important implications:
* the need to have "a QR scheme" ready now in = case of a QC coming tomorrow is much smaller than previously thought. Yes, = doing it too late has the effect of temporarily freezing coins which is cos= tly and we don't want that but it's not nearly as bad as theft
* freezing of *these* coins would be both immoral and ex= tremely dangerous for reputation of Bitcoin (no comments on freezing coins = with revealed pubkeys, I haven't made my mind yet)

If the time comes I'd be happy to run a = soft fork that implements this sanely.

Cheers

Ma= rtin

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